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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DIALOGUES BETWEEN FEMINISTS AND JACQUES LACAN ON  
 
FEMALE HYSTERIA AND FEMININITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Katerina (or Catherine) Daniel 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Bruce Fink, Ph.D. 
 
This theoretical dissertation aims to initiate a dialogue between Lacan and 
Irigaray, Butler, and poststructuralist Anglophone feminists on the relationship 
between hysteria and femininity.  The very existence of hysteria has been called into 
question by the majority of Anglophone feminists, who have criticized its diagnostic 
proliferation, claiming that it has negative implications for social change and has 
played a central part in women’s oppression.  The Anglophone feminist tradition 
views Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of sexuation and hysteria with a critical eye, 
arguing that Lacan’s oeuvre is another version of patriarchal discourse, another 
reductionistic paradigm of female suffering, and another essentialist scheme that 
theorizes the subject within the normative realities of sexual difference and 
psychopathology.  I argue that Anglophone feminism theorizes the unconscious 
superficially and fails to conceptualize how women’s unconscious desires sustain 
rather than subvert patriarchy.  Whereas feminists challenge traditional assumptions 
about women’s subjectivity and make a substantial contribution to our knowledge 
about the oppressions brought on by patriarchal discourses, they misread Lacan’s 
 v 
revisionist approach to Freud and undermine Lacan’s theoretical contributions 
regarding the role of unconscious desire and the real in the constitution of 
subjectivity.  Hence, they fail to explain how the female hysteric, as a victim of 
patriarchal discourses, preserves the dominance of patriarchy.  In this dissertation, I 
elucidate the structural differences between female hysteria and femininity.  I 
assume that the subject has a particular structural relationship with the Other, and 
take Lacan’s and Irigaray’s oeuvres as points of departure to articulate an ethics of 
feminine desire and jouissance and the differences between how a woman maintains 
her victimhood by being dominated by the law and how a woman achieves her 
emancipated potentialities by realizing her infinities in relation to the law. 
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Introduction 
  
 For centuries, the concept of hysteria has been intertwined with conceptions 
of sexual difference.  Certain feminists understand hysterical symptoms as protests 
by women against patriarchal norms.  Other feminists see hysteria not as a female 
revolt against patriarchy but rather as a declaration of defeat.  Such views seem to 
assume that hysteria and femininity are the same and that a woman‘s subjectivity is 
limited to patriarchal norms.  A number of Anglophone feminists use Lacanian theory 
selectively to support their views on the role of language and culture in psychosexual 
development and distress, and to articulate the ways in which females are more 
prone to hysteria because of their subjugation to patriarchy.   
Since hysteria was originally defined by the wandering womb, many feminist 
theorists insist that hysteria constituted a fundamentally female disorder (Showalter, 
1985).  For centuries, the female reproductive system seemed to be naturally 
―invalid‖ and puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and menopause 
symbolized the pathology of the female body (see Appendix A).  In addition, 
feminine nature was considered to be determined by the female reproductive 
system, which in turn was linked with sickness and mental instability (Malson, 1998).  
Showalter (1985) maintains that the discourses of hysteria played a central part in 
woman‘s oppression.  They determined her proper social role and served as ―a 
cultural bar to education and suffrage for women‖ (p. 136).  The diagnosis of 
hysteria was used when women resisted their gender roles, wanted to vote, sought 
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education, and filed for divorce.  The conceptual paradigms of hysteria quite literally 
reinforced misogynistic power.   
The conceptual history of hysteria brings today for some researchers and 
scholars an unequivocal need for a solid epistemology at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  The word ―hysteria‖ is currently used informally in our discourse and it 
usually refers to negative characterological traits, often more than other clinical 
entities do.  The female hysteric has been attributed the negative aspects of 
femininity and has been compared with the mythical figure of Medusa.  The male 
hysteric, on the other hand, has been conceptualized as being non-masculine and 
having infantile qualities (Mitchell, 2000).  Although the historian Micale (1995) 
makes the points that nobody really knows why hysteria has disappeared from sight 
today and that the disappearance of hysteria in the psychological and psychiatric 
milieu is a theoretical illusion, other authors argue that the inconsistent clinical 
formulations of hysterical phenomena, which usually do not have good theoretical 
bases, and the unflattering equation of hysteria with femininity have been important 
reasons for its disappearance.   
There are profoundly problematic and conflictual notions about the nature of 
femininity and hysteria.  Mitchell (2000) contends that there is an ideological 
slippage between the feminine—which is conceptualized as involving passivity, 
infantile helplessness, feelings of envy, and emptiness—and the hysterical condition.  
Mitchell says that ―women and hysteria are found synonymously unattractive‖ (p. 
333); hysteria has been feminized, and when a man shows hysterical symptoms, he 
is ideologically defined as feminine.  As the feminine has been repudiated in society, 
hysteria vanished from the clinical picture at the time when we increasingly found 
hysterical men.   
There was a significant problem with the studies of hysteria done before 
Freud‘s time, and there is a similar one with many studies done since Freud‘s time.  
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Theoretical formulations of hysteria have been ―disparate, fragmented, and 
uncoordinated‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 11).  Hysteria has been primarily linked to 
femininity and theorized almost exclusively in relation to female sexuality (Mitchell, 
2000).   Hysteria has been understood differently at different times, which has led a 
number of researchers to the conviction that it did not exist.  The link between 
hysteria and femininity has also sparked feminist reactions to its negative 
implications for social change. 
Some feminists contend that feminism and hysteria are violent reactions 
against male-dominated societies (Showalter, 1985; Cixous in Cixous and Clément, 
1986) and that hysteria is a form of feminism.  Other feminists find that hysteria is 
―a cry for help when defeat becomes real‖ (as cited in Malson, 1998, p. 68; Clément 
in Cixous and Clément, 1986).  In other words, these feminists perceive hysteria as 
a failed form of feminism.  Feminist epistemology is widely controversial within 
psychoanalytic circles and, because of its diverse theoretical orientation, it is even 
controversial within the various feminist groups.   
In general, feminists are renowned for their critiques and interrogations of 
psychoanalytic theories of sexuality and conceptualizations of femininity and 
women‘s distress.  They suspend ontological certainties and challenge the power-
relational cultural constructions of femininity.  They raise critical questions about 
psychoanalytic theories of sexual difference.  Their aim is to challenge and bring 
forward alternative ways of thinking about sexual subjectivity.  Feminist critiques 
open dynamic dialogues between contemporary psychoanalysis and feminism in 
regard to sexuality, sexual oppression, and women‘s distress.  Feminist 
interrogations of psychoanalytic theories of sexual difference and hysteria provoke 
readers to engage in a dialogue between feminism and psychoanalysis.   
Within the Lacanian psychoanalytic circle, Irigaray, Butler, and other major 
Anglophone feminists are controversial.  Lacanians critique feminists for 
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misinterpreting Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory and failing to formulate the 
unconscious of the sexual subject.  They also critique them for prescribing how 
gender is supposed to be and for not describing how subjectivity is structured.   
Although Irigaray is critical of certain theoretical elements in Lacan‘s opus, 
she also gives primacy to his psychoanalytic theory when she elucidates women‘s 
distress, women‘s unconscious in our culture, and the ethics of sexual difference.  
Irigaray formulates the differences between the sexes by both incorporating and 
deviating from Lacan‘s theory.  Butler and other Anglophone feminists, however, 
with their post-structural orientation, critique the psychoanalytic theory of sexual 
difference, arguing that it reverts to conventional patriarchal and essentialist 
ideologies.  Anglophone feminists view Lacan‘s psychoanalytic interpretations of 
hysteria and femininity with a critical eye.  Their questionings and critiques are such 
that, as Rose (1990) puts it, the dialogue between feminism and psychoanalysis 
―constantly slides away from the point of a possible encounter‖ (p. 128).  For 
feminists, Lacanian theory is another version of patriarchal discourse, another 
reductionistic paradigm of female suffering, and another essentialist scheme that 
theorizes the subject within the normative realities of sexual difference and 
psychopathology.  For Lacanians, on the other hand, Lacan‘s theory is not what 
feminists refer to in their critiques.  Instead, they describe Lacan‘s theory as an open 
system—a theoretical system that is more anti-essentialist and anti-patriarchal than 
any other psychoanalytic theory. 
As a reader of feminism and Lacan, the following questions have troubled me:  
―What makes the encounter between these two theoretical paradigms impossible?‖  
―If there is no bridge to connect these theories, why do I find that both theoretical 
paradigms make major contributions to formulating sexuality and psychopathology?‖  
The purpose of this dissertation is therefore to engage the reader in the dialogue 
between feminists and Lacan on hysteria and femininity.  Since feminists critique and 
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question Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory, my purpose is to take feminist 
psychoanalytic skepticism and Lacan‘s psychoanalytic descriptions as my guides, as 
my methods of engaging with a theoretical ethics of the relationship between 
femininity and hysteria—an ethics that excludes neither feminism, with its purpose to 
change the politics of patriarchal oppression, nor Lacan‘s psychoanalysis, with its 
purpose to describe the subject as a structure, as an effect of language.  It is my aim 
to dialogue interrogative feminism with descriptive Lacanian theory.   
It often seems to me that Lacan‘s theory is both a mystery and a nuisance to 
feminists.  Lacan has introduced us to a way of thinking that is extraordinarily 
different from the kind of thinking we are used to in academia and in our daily lives. 
The aspect of Lacanian theory that feminists accept is primarily Lacan‘s argument 
that subjectivity is an effect of language.  For Lacan, subjects‘ utterances come from 
somewhere else, from the locus of the Other as language; subjects emerge in the 
field of the Other.  The subject disappears under the Other‘s desires and 
jouissances the Other being the locus of speech, ―the phantom of Omnipotence …. 
bridled by the Law‖ (Écrits, p. 689/814).  Feminists accept Lacan‘s notion that no 
subject exists without the appearance of the signifier.  Therefore in the theories of 
feminism and Lacan, subjectivity is conceptualized as neither an agency nor a 
substance nor a pre-given content, but an effect of language.   
Nevertheless, Lacan goes beyond not only biological but also socio-cultural 
theories of subjectivity.  In Écrits, Lacan argues that his emphasis on man‘s relation 
to the signifier has nothing to do with socio-cultural theories of language.  Hence, he 
is not of the same mind as feminist theorists when he discusses the effects of 
language on subjects.  Lacan contends that the woven effects of speech resonate in 
humans, but these effects cannot be understood by mainstream psychological or 
socio-cultural theories (Écrits, p. 578/689).   
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According to Barnard (2002a, 2002b), Lacan‘s oeuvre differs from feminism 
substantially.  Whereas feminists refer to gender as an imaginary-symbolic construct 
within socio-cultural idealized norms of embodiment and behaviors, Lacan formulates 
sexuation in terms of the impossibility of symbolization and the failure of meaning.  
The reason why Lacan‘s concept of sexuation cannot be grasped via feminism is 
because feminist theorists do not incorporate the role of the real into their work.  
Indeed, Lacan‘s main thesis on sexuation is that the sexual subject is caused by ―the 
[traumatic] gap between the real and the symbolic.‖  His attempt is ―to trace the 
impact of this trauma … on the functioning of the symbolic itself‖ (Barnard, 2002a, p. 
4).  As we will see throughout this dissertation, a theory about the gap between the 
symbolic and the real produces a different form of knowledge about the relationship 
between the subject and the Other.  Lacan‘s oeuvre provides a kind of knowledge 
that cannot be grasped in the same way as in feminism or other fields, e.g., positive 
science. 
The process of understanding Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory does not simply 
entail assimilation of new meanings.  Following Fink‘s (1995) assertion that ―‘true 
understanding‘‖ is a process ―which goes beyond the automatic functioning of the 
symbolic order and involves an incursion of the symbolic into the real‖ (p. 71), I 
argue that Lacan‘s analytic knowledge requires the reader to work between 
consciousness and unconsciousness, recognize subjective ruptures, and accept that 
imaginary wholeness and consistency are illusions.  This acceptance is obviously a 
challenge, not to mention traumatic in certain situations, for the subject.  A reader of 
Lacan‘s work encounters a theory that runs counter to the utopian and idealistic 
ideas of mainstream psychological, political, and positive sciences.  To understand 
the manifestations of the gap between the real and the symbolic in symbolic 
functioning itself means to be confronted by the deceptions of the reality we live in.   
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For Lacan, structural subjectivity is real (Copjec, 1994).  Lacan understands 
structural subjectivity as the subject‘s internal failure to be wholly realized in 
language, which does not point to a substantial existence.  In other words, the 
subject is in itself a failed whole.  Anglophone feminists formulate gender as being 
constructed by language and they see the function of language in positive terms as 
what constructs beings.  Lacan, however, sees language in terms of both: the 
subject comes to be within language and is subjected by the Other, eclipsed by the 
Other.  The subject is not simply a sedimentation of meanings, it is also realized in 
the forged links between signifiers (Fink, 1995).  The signifier, which is irreducible to 
the signified, has a double (splitting) function: it unifies an image and institutes 
discontinuity.  Lacan‘s descriptions of sexual and clinical structures presuppose 
exclusion, an empty set, and discontinuity of a unified and stable specular image.   
Whereas contemporary Lacanians often pinpoint the shortcomings of 
Anglophone feminist theories of sexuality and subjectivity, they also acknowledge 
feminists‘ contributions to social change.  In Soler‘s (2006) words,  
 
What is certain is that, today, there is no field to which women do not 
have access.  Although this movement has not yet accomplished its 
goals completely, its effects are becoming more and more general, and 
its triumph seems irreversible to me …. There are still, of course, a few 
bastions of male supremacy …. Concerning this evolution, [Lacanian] 
psychoanalysis as such does not have to take a side.  Its 
consequences for both sexes must not, however, be misunderstood.  
(pp. 158-159) 
 
Soler suggests that the feminist movement has succeeded in changing the roles of 
women in relation to men.  In Western societies, women‘s jouissances are no longer 
confined to the home, as they were for centuries.  Nowadays, women are freer and 
more equal to men under civil law.  Aside from their enduring (and perhaps 
endearing?) married and maternal realities, they also enjoy plenty of opportunities to 
obtain knowledge and power.   
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Soler, however, warns us that women‘s equality to men does not necessarily 
mean that women are liberated from oppression.  Several feminists also make the 
same argument.  While feminism stands for the empowerment of women, feminists 
must deal with the question whether or not women are liberated from male 
oppression when women compete in the same ways as men do (Soler, 2006; Walsh, 
2001) and when women become aware of the power structures in ―benign‖ 
discourses.  The subsequent questions that arise are, ―How do women understand 
their differences from men?‖  ―How do they understand their femininity, when they 
adopt the pre-existing norms and assimilate to men‘s belief systems, values, and 
practices for equality purposes?‖1  ―How are suffering women able to accomplish 
change?‖ These questions are not answered in feminist movements today.   
Whereas Anglophone feminists have succeeded in empowering women to 
some extent and challenging patriarchal ideologies, they have failed to conceptualize 
what is different and particular about femininity.  These feminists end up reinforcing 
masculine values in the lives of women.  Lacanian theory, however, is a theory of 
difference.  It recognizes the alterity and otherness of the subject.  It is the theory 
that surpasses the dominant social paradigm of similarities, dichotomies, 
comparisons, and analogies.  Nonetheless, it seems to me that Irigaray‘s, Butler‘s, 
and other Anglophone feminists‘ interrogations of psychoanalytic theory can make 
major contributions to the evolution of Lacanian psychoanalytic articulations of 
sexual difference and suffering.  They can also make major contributions that would 
allow Lacanians to expand their articulation of what constitutes an effective change 
in the relationship between the feminine subject and the Other (patriarchal culture).  
                                                          
1 Walsh (2001) brings up the example of the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who 
claimed that she was an exception.  Thatcher encouraged other women to take her as an example.  
However, Thatcher‘s widespread descriptions of herself were that she was ―the best man in the Cabinet‖ 
and the ―honorary man.‖  Thatcher safeguarded her success by assimilating to the androcentric norms and 
by doing little to promote the careers of other women (pp. 67-103). 
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These are some of the reasons why I chose to write my dissertation on the dialogue 
between feminists and Lacan on female hysteria and femininity. 
In chapter 1, I provide detailed descriptions of Irigaray‘s and Butler‘s critiques 
of the Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of hysteria and femininity.  
Irigaray and Butler challenge ontological certainties and interrogate psychoanalytic 
theories of women‘s subjectivity.  Whereas Butler has misformulated major Lacanian 
psychoanalytic concepts, such as the phallus, foreclosure, and sexuation, the reader 
may find that she provokes psychoanalytic theorists to respond to her critical 
questions and provide clearer formulations of these concepts.  I subsequently lay out 
feminist descriptions of female hysteria.  Unlike Freud‘s and Lacan‘s technical use of 
language, feminists, such as Irigaray, Cixous, and Clément, use rich and poetic 
language to describe how the female hysteric truly suffers from the abuses of 
patriarchy.  Feminists, however, are not clear on the question whether or not the 
hysteric contests or conserves patriarchy.  They thus leave this question open 
without providing a rigorous response to it.  Finally, I show how Anglophone 
feminists misread Lacan‘s notion of the symbolic and fail to conceptualize his theory 
of the subject‘s relationship with the symbolic Other.  Feminists theorize the 
unconscious superficially.  Insofar as Anglophone feminists are committed to an 
epistemology which overvalues conscious negotiations of subjective positions, it 
makes it difficult to see how women‘s unconscious desires sustain rather than 
subvert patriarchy. 
In chapter 2, I elaborate on what it means to approach the question of a 
woman‘s desire, since it is often raised as an unresolved question by feminists.  In 
approaching the issue of feminine desire, I describe Lacan‘s theory of the phallus and 
provide reasons why I think Anglophone feminists have misinterpreted that concept.  
I make a distinction between female hysteria and femininity based on Irigaray‘s and 
Lacan‘s theories and argue that Anglophone feminists may not realize that the 
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Lacanian woman is the plurality and multiplicity of discourses; she is the force that 
transcends men‘s dichotomous logic and monologue.  I also argue that one cannot 
agree with Irigaray‘s concept of speaking as a woman without first exploring Lacan‘s 
distinction between hysteria and femininity and his theories of sexuation and 
psychoanalytic ethics.  In order to explore a woman‘s desire, one must not approach 
hysteria and femininity as sociopolitical discourses but as structures.  Lacan, thus, 
makes a major contribution to the theory of the subject‘s desire in relation to the 
Law.  When one conceptualizes Lacan‘s distinction between having desire vis-à-vis 
the Other and being the cause of desire, one is also able to realize what it takes for 
the subject to be liberated from the oppressions of external reality. 
In chapter 3, I describe Lacan‘s theories of identification and repetition of the 
symptom in order to exemplify further Lacan‘s anti-essentialist approach to 
subjectivity.  I lay out the differences between Lacan‘s structural theory and neo-
Freudian psychodiagnostic formulation.  My aim is to explain to feminist readers that 
the Lacanian subject cannot be inscribed as a stable meaning within language 
because, as Lacan explains, the unconscious subject is always in conflict with the ego 
and with discourses that promise self-coherence, unity, and satisfaction.  I discuss 
how Lacan‘s concept of the real shifts psychoanalytic description to a substantively 
different kind of logic—a logic which is not fully comprehended by neo-Freudian and 
feminist theorists.  I describe how Lacan‘s structural descriptions of hysteria differ 
significantly from the neo-Freudian reductionistic and essentialist psychoanalytic 
formulations of hysteria as a personality trait. 
 In chapter 4, I present a Lacanian case formulation of a female hysteric whom 
I refer to as Sofia.  Although Sofia consciously understood herself as a feminist and 
was adamant in expressing her views on women‘s sufferings owing to patriarchy, I 
show how she unconsciously participated in being the oppressed victim in relation to 
men.  I provide a detailed discussion of Sofia‘s unconscious signifiers which arose 
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from fantasies and dreams.  Sofia consciously challenged the Other‘s patriarchal 
ideals but unconsciously was situated in self-defeating ways.  By being the imaginary 
phallus for men, Sofia upheld the Other‘s patriarchal authority over her destiny.  
Finally, in chapter 5 I argue that, in order to have a further dialogue between 
feminism and Lacan on women‘s experiences, feminists need to read Lacan‘s work 
more closely.  I conclude that the Lacanian theory is an analytic discourse and not a 
sociopolitical one.  I conjecture, however, that if feminists engage with Lacanian 
theory more rigorously, both epistemologies will evolve.  If feminists were to speak 
the Irigararian feminine language—a language that is similar to Lacan‘s concept of 
the analyst‘s discourse—they would succeed in questioning subjects‘ enunciations 
instead of designating truths at the level of the ego.  Anglophone feminists criticize 
psychoanalytic theory in a passive way and they speak instead the hysteric‘s 
discourse.  Speaking the feminine language on issues related to oppression is the 
same technique that Lacanian psychoanalysts use with their analysands to question 
their unconscious desire and the etiologies of their symptoms.  I conjecture that if 
feminists used Lacanian theory, they would succeed in motivating subjects to ask 
more questions about themselves.  It is well known that oppressors and the 
oppressed live and act without asking etiological questions about themselves.  
Furthermore, if feminists engage with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory rigorously, 
neo-Lacanian psychoanalysts will be inspired by feminists to elaborate further 
Lacan‘s own concepts, which at times seem to be treated as pre-given and remain 
theoretically static.  Neo-Lacanians will provide deeper theoretical clarifications to 
questions, including to the question that is often raised by feminists in regards to 
how the subject relates to the Other in various sociopolitical settings.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Feminists on Women and Hysteria 
 
 
1.1 Irigaray‘s Theory of Femininity and Psychoanalytic Critiques 
 
 
Is hysteria a feminine neurosis?  Isn‘t it─today, on a privileged basis─a 
―sufferance‖ of the feminine?  In particular in its inarticulable relation 
to the desire for the mother?  For the woman-mother?  Which does not 
mean that it is found simply in women.  (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 137) 
 
  
Irigaray is best known for both embracing and challenging Lacan‘s 
psychoanalytic theory.  She accepts Lacan‘s concepts of enunciated and enunciation.  
The author‘s analyses of hysterical, obsessive, and psychotic use of language 
coincide with Lacan‘s theoretical formulations (Irigaray, 2000).  When it comes to 
the issue of sexuality, however, Irigaray is critical of Lacan‘s re-reading of Freud.  
Irigaray2 deconstructs Freud‘s and Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theories of female 
sexuality and comes to the conclusion that in these theories femininity is reduced to 
―masculine parameters‖ (1985b, p. 23).  She points out that sexuality is 
appropriated by masculine norms and that psychoanalytic theories perpetuate 
dominant cultural fantasies (Whitford, 1991).  
Irigaray interrogates conceptualizations of sexual difference in terms of 
genitality, the phallus, and Oedipal relations that situate the category ―woman‖ as 
                                                          
2 When Irigaray published her book, Speculum of the Other Woman (1974⁄1985a), Lacan could not accept 
it.  Irigaray was suspended from teaching at the Department of Psychoanalysis, which was chaired by 
Lacan at the University of Paris at Vincennes (Irigaray, 1977⁄1985b, p. 167). 
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both an object of patriarchy and a rebus.  The category ―woman‖ is implicated in the 
patriarchal male-female opposition, which normalizes the male to subjugate the 
female.  Femininity also is conceptualized as exceeding the signifying chain.  Unlike 
Freud, who situates the mystery of femininity in terms of the girl‘s difficulty resolving 
her Oedipal complex, Irigaray asserts that what is inarticulate about femininity is the 
relation of woman to woman, of the maternal-feminine, of daughter to mother.  
There is a physical and cultural separation of daughter from mother ―in order [for 
her] to enter male families or male institutions‖ (Irigaray, 1994, p. 7).   
Irigaray sets out to look ―for the phantasies that haunt‖ (Whitford, 1991, p. 
34) psychoanalytic discourses.  She aims to change these discourses and shift the 
linguistic phenomena of the feminine subject so that the feminine subject does not 
speak as a man; she does not speak about other women; she rather speaks as a 
woman.  To illuminate Irigaray‘s theory of female sexuality, it is worthwhile to 
discuss briefly the ways she understands the phantasmagoria of Freud and Lacan, 
and how, based on these understandings, she formulates her theses on women‘s 
sufferings and speaking as a woman.   
Irigaray (1985b) asserts that psychoanalytic designations of femininity as 
enigmatic perpetuate discourses that define it as ―lack, deficiency, or as imitation 
and negative image of the subject‖ (p. 78).  For Irigaray, what psychoanalytic 
theorists should focus on is how to signify the ―disruptive excess‖ that is possible for 
femininity.  To reconceptualize femininity means to challenge and contest the 
historically embedded patriarchal ideologies in psychoanalysis.  Irigaray suggests 
that we need to read psychoanalytic language—its representations—
psychoanalytically.  In other words, as readers of psychoanalysis we need to 
examine its imaginary configurations and, above all, ―what it does not articulate at 
the level of utterance:  its silences‖ (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 75).  To re-signify femininity 
also means to speak as a woman, that is, to find continuity between hysterical 
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psychosomatic expressions and the speaking of feminine desire.  For Irigaray, to 
speak as an hysteric is to preserve, in suffering, that which one does not articulate 
with words.  Irigaray (1985b) asks, ―[D]oes psychoanalysis offer any cure to 
hysterics beyond a surfeit of suggestions intended to adapt them, if only a little 
better, to masculine society?‖ (p. 137).  Whereas the psychoanalytic talking cure 
helps the hysterical woman to speak in language, it also re-imposes patriarchal 
norms in the guise of a cure.  
 Speaking as a woman is not simple.  It is not a production of discourse of 
which a woman would either be the object or the subject.  Feminine syntax 
transcends the privileged ―oneness‖—the oneness of the male sex.  It goes beyond 
proper masculine meanings, names, and attributes.  To speak as a woman means to 
speak to other women and not about other women.  Feminine speaking obviously 
occurs within the available signifying system, which is patriarchal.  But if a woman 
cannot speak outside the already established signifying system, how can she speak 
to other women?  Following Chisholm's (1994) interpretations of Irigaray, speaking 
as a woman occurs concentrically; it exposes the structural abyss that is concealed in 
male-dominated theories.3  It shows the blind spots of the psychoanalytic paradigm, 
or any other philosophical paradigm, so that other women can get in touch with their 
own unrepresented and unacknowledged sense of difference.  It presses women to 
feel the limitations of dominant discourses and begin to invent collectively different 
metaphors of self-representation. 
 
§ 
Freud‘s theory of femininity in the early 1930‘s (see Appendix B) implies, for 
Irigaray, inadequate representation of what it means to be feminine.  Freud‘s inquiry 
                                                          
3 Chisholm (1994) writes that for Irigaray a woman can either speak concentrically, exposing thus the con 
(in French con means cunt, female orifice) and the phallic lack, or ex-centrically as if she is an outsider 
from phallocentric discourse. 
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into how a woman comes into being with a bisexual disposition—his belief that 
becoming a woman is ―more difficult and more complicated than becoming a man‖—
appropriates notions that are regulated by male values and masculine paradigms 
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 22).  For Irigaray (1985b), femininity remains in psychoanalysis 
the ―Dark Continent‖ (p. 48).  Irigaray (1985a) contends that when Freud theorizes 
that libido is masculine, he implies that sexual difference is a function of sameness.  
He understands women in the same way as men.  He characterizes women as the 
others of the same, as the negatives of males, as defective men.  
Irigaray questions Freud‘s argument that the little girl is a little boy.  She 
finds Freud unreasonable for believing the clitoris alone to be erotogenic and for 
arguing that the little girl‘s sexuality is incomplete and impoverished.  Irigaray 
(1985a) raises the question, ―Why, when discussing the little girl, give the name 
phallic to this moment when her discovery of erotogenic sensitivity is, or is supposed 
to be, so incomplete and impoverished?‖  (p. 29).  For Irigaray, when Freud 
describes the little girl‘s ignorance of the vagina as an erotogenic zone, he 
understands female genitalia as defective male genitals and gives primacy to the 
penis.  A woman is represented by Freud as ―a man minus the possibility of 
(re)presenting oneself as a man‖ (p. 27).  If we leave Freud‘s arguments 
unchallenged, the theory of female sexuality remains fragmentary and reduced to 
the margins of a dominant patriarchal ideology.  Freud‘s arguments fail to 
conceptualize the multiple loci of female pleasures and desires; they fail to formulate 
her sexuality as plural.  For Irigaray, a woman is not forced to choose between 
clitoral activity and vaginal passivity; her whole body is her pleasure.   
 Freud‘s examination of the girl‘s preoedipal phase in the early 1930‘s relies on 
the same patriarchal presumptions he had in the early 1900‘s, regardless of his claim 
that the early attachment of the little girl to her mother is a new addition to his 
theory.  Irigaray (1985b) points out that Freud continues to believe in the early 
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1930‘s that the libido is masculine in males and females.  According to Irigaray 
(1985b), Freud‘s concept of the preoedipal, which describes the little girl‘s love for 
her mother, is another patriarchal version of reality.  The little girl, as a little man, 
loves her phallic mother; her love is thus a masculine love.  The specific relation 
between daughter-mother and girl-woman receives ―very little attention from Freud‖ 
(p. 37).   
As I also illustrate in Appendix B, because Freud goes so far as to identify 
early signs of the Oedipus complex during the preodipal phase, he seems to deny the 
exclusiveness of the mother-daughter relationship in the preoedipal phase 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).  Therefore, in Freudian theory, the Oedipal complex 
predominates over the preoedipal in the etiologies of sexual difference and neuroses.  
The subject‘s sexual maturity depends on the subject‘s perceptions of what it means 
to have or not to have the phallic organ.  For the little girl, full entry into the Oedipal 
complex presupposes the development of penis envy.  It also presupposes that the 
little girl blames/hates her woman-mother for being castrated and desires instead 
her man-father to give her the phallus. 
  Irigaray points out that, in Freudian theory, in order for the little girl to 
become feminine, she has to transform her active masculine libido to passive libido.  
In other words, she has to transform her masculine sadistic pleasures to feminine 
masochistic ones.  Irigaray finds that Freud‘s ideological system encourages a link 
between normal femininity and masochism.  Within that ideological system, Irigaray 
interprets Freud‘s theory of the beating fantasy as the little girl‘s desire to be beaten 
by her father, because she is sexually inferior to her brother.  Her brother has the 
superior penis and she instead has the inferior clitoris, which is the equivalent of an 
under-developed male organ.  Irigaray (1985b) calls into question Freud‘s views and 
asks instead, ―Or does masochism constitute a sexual deviation, a morbid process, 
that is particularly frequent in women?‖ (p. 45).   
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For Irigaray, hysteria—the neurosis of passivity, masochistic obedience, and 
psychosomatic pain—is prevalent in women.  Hysteria is the neurosis in which 
women remain silent and speak only in the mode of bodily symptoms.  Their 
psychosomatic symptoms exhibit desires, revolts, and refusals.  The woman-hysteric 
unconsciously refuses to be the maternal corporeal, a reproductive body for the 
benefit of her patriarchal society.  She unconsciously revolts against the 
appropriation/exploitation of her body, especially when her body is situated in the 
system of economic and sexual production. 
In Freudian theory, Irigaray says, the concept of normal femininity is reduced 
to the economy of sameness in the ideologies of masculine standards, of one sex.  In 
Freud‘s work, normal women remain objects of exchange in men‘s sexual imaginary.  
Indeed, for Irigaray, these women are not normal but hysterical.  Hysterical women 
mime and reproduce masculine language.  When they speak in masculine language, 
they produce caricatured and deceitful words about their own bodies and desires.  
They envelop their subjectivity in the needs, desires, and fantasies of men.   
 
§ 
For Irigaray (1994), masculine language is the language of mastery and 
action.  Masculine speech endorses competition in order to produce ―consumable and 
exchangeable goods (even in most leisure time)‖ (p. 48).  With masculine speech, 
man distances himself from himself, from his concrete and living environment; he 
enters instead into an environment that reinforce exchange skills—possession, 
combat, and waging war.  For the sake of possession, wealth, and competition, the 
masculine subject is allowed to be disrespectful of nature and humanity, abuse 
human rights, disrespect life, and misrecognize intersubjectivity; he is legitimized to 
respect order, calculations, and reductive discourses; he is approved to obey the civil 
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written law and, simultaneously, lose interest in life, in the oral law, in spirituality, 
and in the unpredictable possibilities of human relations.   
Masculine language fails to represent women as subjects who can be 
addressed.  It privileges the male interlocutrix.  The interlocutrix, il (he), is present 
everywhere.  The interlocutrix, elle (she), is erased when it is present with the il 
(he): il + elle = ils (they; masculine).   The married woman becomes ils (they), the 
family being designated by the masculine plural, because it consists of mother, 
father, and children.  The woman loses her status as an existing interlocutor.  When 
the woman uses I as the subject of the sentence, she often addresses another man 
and not another woman.  In her speech, she cannot represent herself and respect 
her mother and other women as other than herself. 
One of the major theses of Irigaray‘s oeuvre is the idea that a hysterical 
woman, who speaks masculine language, mimes patriarchy.  The woman-hysteric 
struggles with the repressions imposed by patriarchal power.  Patriarchy 
subordinates feminine desire and constrains a woman to silence and mimicry.  The 
hysteric-woman suffers, impotent to say what disturbs her.  Hysteria is a necessary 
remainder of a muted, frustrated, and mad response to patriarchy.  Hysteria is ―the 
nonsymbolization of her desire for origin, of her relationship to her mother‖ 
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 71).  The hysteric is this hole, this deficiency in the signifying 
economy.  She borrows signifiers from the patriarchal order, but ―she cannot make 
her mark, or re-mark upon them‖ (p. 71).  Hysteria is the hole in the dominant 
representations of mother-daughter, woman-to-woman relationship.  
 Irigaray reverses the psychoanalytic theory of the preoedipal mother-
daughter relationship.  She takes issue with the Freudian notion of the oedipal 
triangle that sustains the little girl's separation from the mother.  She also takes 
issue with the Lacanian concept of the phallus―a concept that I will discuss in later 
chapters—that situates the feminine in an economy of sexual difference that 
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privileges the masculine subject.  Irigaray asserts that what is inarticulate in 
psychoanalytic theory is the relationship between mother-daughter and female 
speech.  In female speech, women speak about themselves to other women, without 
the interference of men.  In order for a woman to speak to another woman with love, 
psychoanalysts need to go beyond the conventions of the Oedipal triangle and 
explore further the relationship between daughter and mother. 
For Irigaray, in order for women to stop suffering they need to differentiate 
from patriarchal expectations and values.  Women need to learn to love themselves 
and other women.  But this love should not be confined to passionate relationships at 
the individual level.  Rather, love for femininity must take a public form.  The task of 
symbolizing love in the collective arena entails representation of femininity as a 
different sex.  This difference needs to be embodied in language, socio-cultural 
practices, civil laws, symbols, and religion (Whitford, 1991).  The coming-to-be 
feminine transcends merged relationships with the mother and other women.  
Irigaray sees the merged relations of women-to-women as oppressive, as static 
relations that prevent women from having any real effect on the wider society, on 
the society that is hom(m)osexual4—an economy of the same, in which only 
masculinity is recognized. 
§ 
 In her essay, ―And the One Doesn't Stir Without the Other,‖ Irigaray (1981) 
narrates the daughter‘s own experiences with her mother.  She uses the ―I‖ in order 
to address the specific ―you,‖ the mother.  Irigaray describes the infant‘s early 
experiences with its mother by using a rich and poetic language that represents the 
infant‘s sensations of the mother‘s body.  Irigaray elaborates on the merging of the 
daughter-mother.  She represents this merging as both erotic and suffocating.  The 
                                                          
4 Irigaray here seems to mimic Lacan‘s hommosexuelle, which is a play on homme (man) and 
homosexual.  Lacan (1998b) states that the hysteric is hommosexual, because she loves herself by what 
she finds in the Other (p. 84-85/78-79).  She loves the Other for what the Other recognizes in her.  
20 
 
eroticism between the infant-mother is described by Irigaray as when the infant and 
mother ―taste each other, feel each other, listen to each other, see each other‖ (p. 
61).  The mother nourishes her infant.  The mother-infant metamorphosize each 
other into the One with the sharing of fluids: ―To let nothing pass between us but 
blood, milk, [and] honey‖ (p. 62).   
 The infant, however, feels suffocated by the mother‘s attempt to fill up its 
mouth.  This filling up signifies the mother‘s attempt to assimilate her infant in 
accordance with her own mirages, in accordance with her desire to transform her 
infant into an inanimate object and turn to a man‘s validating gaze.  When the 
mother attempts to assimilate her daughter to her ideals, the daughter wants to 
abandon her.  The daughter wants to undo this paralytic relationship—a relationship 
that is suffocating and deadening when it leaves little space for subjective difference.  
The daughter turns away from the mother and turns to the father, to the male figure 
who appears to nourish this difference and thus be more alive. 
 When the mother assimilates her daughter blindly to her mirages, or when 
the daughter and mother are reduced to the disguises of being and doing in 
accordance with the social ideals of femininity, or when the mother remains faceless 
and invisible due to her surroundings, the daughter is imprisoned by her mother‘s 
masculine desires; she feels trapped in her mother‘s single function of patriarchal 
mothering; she is frozen, immobilized, by the mirrored images of her mother.   
Where are you?  Where am I?  Where to find the traces of our 
passage? …. Imprisoned by your desire for a reflection, I became a 
statue, an image of your mobility ….With your milk, Mother, you fed 
me ice.  And if I leave, you lose the reflection of life.  And if I remain, 
am I not the guarantor of your death?  Each of us lacks her own image 
…. My paralysis signifying your abduction in the mirror (pp. 65-66). 
 
I‘ll turn to my father.  I‘ll leave you for someone who seems more 
alive than you …. Farewell, Mother, I shall never become your likeness 
(p. 62). 
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§ 
 Irigaray knows that there is no purely female language, a language that is not 
mediated by masculine interference (Whitford, 1991).  However, Irigaray encourages 
her readers to reflect on the idea that if women speak the language of sameness, the 
language that men have spoken for centuries, they then become absent from 
themselves; they speak mechanistically; and they become enveloped by proper 
names that make women feel that these names are not their own.  Irigaray points 
out that the exclusion of women is not merely an exclusion from opportunities equal 
to those of men, but rather an exclusion of women‘s subjectivity.  Women‘s 
unsymbolized relation with their mothers has the consequence of alienating them 
from language and self. 
 If women are to gain a language of their own, they need to develop/create a 
language that would articulate female love.  Irigaray (1985b) portrays speaking as a 
woman by describing her love of another woman.  For Irigaray, to love another 
woman is not to love equality.  When the two lips cannot articulate more than one 
word, a word outside of sameness, then women become mute and closed off.  In 
sameness, women are trapped in the dichotomous thoughts: virgin/deflowered, 
innocent/experienced, pure/impure, and so on.  They are subordinated, paralyzed, 
by the words of men.  
 The articulation of female love embodies female difference.  Women‘s lips are 
not simply open or closed upon one truth.  They express multiplicities of truths.  
They resist the language that is formed ―of a single thread,‖ a single pattern (p. 
209).  The you/I—the we—are not open or closed.  Between the lips of you/I, there 
are several ways of speaking, there are multiple tones and voices.  Female language 
is not the language of rigid definitions, images, and metaphors that stabilize 
meanings. 
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§ 
According to Irigaray (2002), psychoanalytic theory and practice rest upon 
whole, ahistorical, and absolute foundations.  Freud and the first psychoanalysts 
used their psychoanalytic practice to uncover a new knowledge.  They listened to 
their analysands as though their analysands had the knowledge to contribute to the 
evolution of psychoanalytic theory.  Once the psychoanalytic ―science‖ was 
established and the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious was determined, 
psychoanalysts no longer questioned further the workings of the unconscious, but 
perceived psychoanalytic science as complete.  Nowadays, psychoanalytic theory is 
reduced to ―a pre-established corpus, a pre-existing knowledge, a pre-determined 
law‖ (p. 84).  In this pre-established system—in the system of codes that have 
already been articulated and fixed—the psychoanalyst complies with an a priori 
Other, an a priori psychoanalytic science.  Hence, the Truth of a subject‘s 
unconscious still remains veiled.  Contemporary psychoanalysts analyze patients 
without seeing any real difference between the sexes.   
Psychoanalysts often find that women, after an analytic session, are ―shut in, 
closed up, withdrawn‖ (p. 99).  They often interpret these women as bisexual and 
hysterical.  Asserting that contemporary psychoanalysts fail to evaluate their 
theoretical assumptions, Irigaray (2002) asks the following questions:  ―But is 
bisexuality not both inscribed on the body and a process of identification? …. How 
does [identification] differ in men from in women?‖ (p. 223).  The psychoanalytic 
theory of sexuality formulates identifications as a ―double polarity within the 
economy of one sex and one sex alone‖ (p. 223). 
Within the psychoanalytic frame of mind, women are theorized as identifying 
with the other, masculine or phallic, but, ―When she has become the other—
masculine or phallic—where are her own desires and jouissances to be found?‖  
Women end up speaking men‘s language, a language that separates them from their 
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mothers and other women.  They speak language without speaking it.  Women‘s love 
and desire for other women and between women are still beyond the articulations of 
language.  Being exiled from feminine speech, women experience various 
psychosomatic symptoms and other symptoms related to their non-differentiation 
from other women and their mothers—from the maternal flesh, which is not fully 
recognized but is only reduced to a reproductive body. 
Irigaray (2002) argues that women are reduced to the theory of the Oedipal 
complex that establishes a law of ―the non-return of the daughter to the mother, 
except in the doing like [faire comme] of motherhood‖ (p. 224).  Women are then 
conceptualized not within a process of becoming but in a process of dependency on 
the masculine Other.  The feminine Other is annulled.  Both sexes cannot strive to 
realize their powers; instead, they are reduced to fictions. 
Irigaray (1985a) asserts that the dominant fantasy of the mother is the 
maternal reproductive, ―a mute soil, a mystery beyond metaphor‖ (p. 228).  She 
represents castration and death; she is the inconceivable heterogenous Other. Her 
reproduction of a child is associated with an unrepresentable secret remainder, the 
maternal fluids:  ―Blood, but also milk, sperm, lymph, saliva, spit, tears, humors, 
gas, waves, airs, fire‖ (1985a, p. 237).    
Yet, the woman-Other is undefinable, unformulated, and unformalized.  She is 
beyond the individualization, the dichotomies of activity/passivity, or the closed 
volume (container)—the support of reproduction and discourse.  The woman-Other 
touches a new ground with her body, superseding the repeatable shape that has 
already been established in the social realm (Irigaray, 1985a).  She is ontologically 
an un-closed container.  She is inside the placenta and mucous membranes that hold 
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the child, but she is also outside of those.  She is the place that contains containers 
and gaps, intervals, between these containers.5 
Why are women always dissatisfied?  What do women want?  Irigaray (2002) 
replies that they want more.  They want something that overflows the small, finite, 
and numerical within the closed fields of codes and numbers.  They seek the place 
they have lost, which is the undifferentiating place of the womb.  They want to 
supersede their sexed determination; they want to become the feminine with their 
never-completed potentials.  The daughter-woman is clothed in the mother-Other.  
When the daughter is missing the woman-mother‘s identity, her speech is mimetic.  
It expresses only the desire of that feminine Other.  Since the hysteric‘s language is 
mimetic, her verbal exchanges become impossible.  The woman-hysteric becomes 
the fragments of the woman-Other, ―of discourse, of silences, of blanks that are still 
immaculate‖ (1985a, p. 228).  She struggles to thrust the body within which she has 
been imprisoned so as to fracture the enveloping discourses that represent her as 
finite, whole, and unified. 
 
1.2 Butler‘s Theory of Femininity and Psychoanalytic Critiques 
 
In Bodies That Matter (1993) and Gender Trouble (1999), Butler interrogates 
prominent theories of sexuality and subjectivity with the intention to suspend 
ontological certainties.  She aims to destabilize exclusionary gendered/sexed norms 
that foreclose multiple enactments of sexual desire.  For Butler (1993), it is not 
enough to say that human subjects are constructed—such a theory does not allow us 
to understand what is excluded as constitutive outside.  Discursive and reiterative 
sexual practices open up gaps and fissures that show their ―constitutive instabilities‖ 
                                                          
5 I further describe Irigaray‘s theses on woman as place and woman‘s unlimited boundaries of 
embodiment in chapter 2. 
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(p. 10).  It is also not enough to say that the materiality of the body escapes 
language, because when we refer to materiality we speak of a signifying process.  
Butler inquires into the kinds of erasures, exclusions, foreclosures, and disruptions 
by which any construction of the subject operates.  Any construction of gendered 
subjectivity gains its authority by citing the status quo of regulatory sexual regimes, 
especially of heterosexuality.  The subject is subjected to the norms of sex.  Whereas 
the subject appears as the author of discursive effects, agency is located as ―a 
reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of 
external opposition to power‖ (p. 15).   
Butler formulates the notion of performative gender.  She describes 
performative gender ―not as a singular or deliberate act, but, rather, as the 
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it 
names‖ (p. 2).  Butler argues that performative gender is not the same as gender 
performance.  The subject is not an agency by which he/she can choose gender as 
actors choose parts in plays.  In other words, Butler does not represent gender as a 
theatrical or singular act.  Rather, gender is ―a reiteration of a norm or set of norms‖ 
(p. 12).  When gender performativity becomes an act, this act again conceals the 
status quo and repeats the conventions of heterosexuality.  Within the matrix of the 
regulatory laws of sexuality, the subject is neither an agency nor a passive recipient 
of discourses.  Gender identification is cited and resisted by compulsory normative 
sexual discourses.  Discourses open up spaces of resistance, and so the subject does 
not conform to all the ideals of gender categories.   
Yet, the process of reiteration or citation allows the heterosexual sexual 
categories to be performed again and again.  With the repetition of gender 
performatives, the subject assumes authority over his/her sexuality.  Gender 
performatives iterate interpellating codes in such a way that the gendered subject is 
always subjected to a normative identity.  The paradox, however, is that whereas 
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gender categories maintain an authoritative law because of their repeated 
performativity, they also reinstitute the possibility of their own failure.  Repetition of 
gender performativity offers the possibility of subverting and re-articulating identity.  
It offers the possibility of re-articulating the codes and the laws with a difference.  
Hence, citational performativity is not fixed and goes beyond the dichotomies of 
sexual difference. 
As Butler argues, unlike the psychoanalytic grand narratives of gender as a 
unitary entity, gender is a set of cultural codes, rather than a core aspect of essential 
identity.  Gender is a site of a double movement: identification with and resistance to 
regulatory norms.  Butler‘s reiterated gender is not the same as the predominant 
feminists‘ concept of gender as socially constructed.  The author contends that 
contemporary feminist movements mobilize the subject with certain identity 
categories in order to change the specific laws that concern the equality of the sexes.  
However, these feminist theories undermine the importance of the subject‘s 
persistent disidentifications with regulatory norms.  Butler encourages feminists to 
look at cultural situations that foreclose and exclude multiplicities of gender 
performatives.   
Butler (1993) defines foreclosure, a concept which she allegedly borrows from 
Lacan (2006), as the mechanism that founds the unconscious subject by producing 
―sociality through a repudiation of a primary signifier‖ (p. 243, n. 2).  Foreclosure 
threatens the subject with psychosis.  Butler (2004) argues that Lacan‘s concept of 
foreclosure implies that there is always a lack of self-understanding for any subject.  
Since foreclosure founds the unconscious subject, the subject cannot know his or her 
origins, cannot undo the operations of the unconscious.6  In other words, in Bulter‘s 
interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of foreclosure as the founding moment 
                                                          
6 The psychoanalytic theory of foreclosure is different from Butler‘s formulation of foreclosure (see 
Appendix B).  Butler seems to confuse Lacan‘s foreclosure with repression. 
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of the subject, the sexual subject is fixed.  If the subject seeks to undo foreclosure, 
the subject also loses him/herself.  Butler says that, in Lacan‘s theory, if the subject 
becomes undone, the subject also becomes psychotic.   
Butler believes that foreclosure produces a coherent subjectivity.  The 
foreclosure of homosexuality, for example, inaugurates the heterosexual subject.  
But when ―homosexuality returns as a possibility, it returns precisely as the 
possibility of the unraveling of the subject itself‖ (2004, p. 333).  The possibility of 
homosexuality leads the subject to think that if he or she was homosexual, he or she 
would be undone.  Butler, however, asserts that, in contradiction to Lacanian theory, 
it is ―possible sometimes to undergo an undoing‖ (p. 333).  The Lacanian concept of 
foreclosure is not necessarily ―a founding act,‖ but ―a temporally renewable 
structure.‖  While the subject is socially constituted in certain limited ways—
constituted through exclusions and foreclosures—the subject is not stable or fixed.  
The subject is open to the possibility to alter his/her limitations.  According to Butler, 
subjectivity should be thought of as a dynamic site.  Although the subject never goes 
beyond foreclosure, it is possible to alter the subject‘s thematizations and limitations 
to some degree. 
Hence, the author finds that both psychoanalysis and feminism represent 
sexual difference within the ideologies of heteronormativity.  She formulates the idea 
that gender drags—lesbians, gays, transsexuals, bisexuals, and the inter-sexed—
destabilize sexual categories and norms.  Drag queens, transfags, and queers 
transgress the ideals of femininity and masculinity.  The enactments of gender never 
fully approximate the norm.  Gender is cited by the norm, but this citation always 
produces remainders and violent exclusions in the subject‘s constitutive identity.  In 
other words, the subject lives in ways that are irreducible to the norms by which 
he/she is constituted. 
 
28 
 
§ 
Butler critiques various psychoanalytic texts.  She finds that descriptions of 
sex and sexual difference imply an unexamined framework of phallocentric 
essentialism and heterosexual normativity.  Like other feminists, such as Grosz7 and 
Gallop, who critique Lacan, Butler believes Lacan‘s descriptions of sexual difference 
and his key concept of the phallus to be symptomatic.  Citing Gallop, Butler argues 
that the Lacanian aim to situate the phallus at the center of language shows an 
―inability to control the meaning of the word phallus‖ (Gallop, as cited in Butler, 
1993, p. 57).  In other words, it evinces an inability to restrain the power of 
patriarchy. 
In Gender Trouble, Butler (1999) reflects on Lacan‘s opposition between 
being the phallus and having the phallus.  Butler writes that being and having the 
phallus connote for Lacan ―divergent sexual positions, or nonpositions (impossible 
positions, really), within language‖ (p. 56).  Being and having the phallus are 
ontologically specific for femininity and masculinity respectively, since they describe 
their desires and demands.  In Butler‘s reading of Lacan, by having the phallus, the 
masculine subject appears to be autonomous and self-grounded; he ―appears to 
originate meanings and thereby to signify‖ (p. 57).  With his autonomy, the 
masculine subject shows certainty and conceals the possibility of his own 
ungrounding.  Whereas men appear to have the phallus, originate meanings, and 
                                                          
7 In her book called, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (1990), Grosz provides detailed discussions of 
Lacan‘s theories of subjectivity and the unconscious.  She encourages feminists to appreciate Lacan‘s 
theoretical relevance to socio-political theories, because Lacan‘s theory is based on language.  Grosz, 
however, critiques Lacan‘s concepts of the phallus and jouissance.  She argues that the phallus is not 
simply a neutral term that functions to position both sexes in the symbolic order.  The phallus, as the 
word suggests, privileges masculinity and, specifically, the penis (p. 122).  Thus, for Grosz, the theory of 
the phallus is itself part of patriarchal discourse.  Grosz also argues that when Lacan discusses women‘s 
jouissance as being the jouissance beyond the phallus and discourse, no less than Freud, Lacan conveys 
the message that women are passive (p. 139).  The author points out that although Lacan helps us to 
understand women‘s oppression in relation to the Other, he ―does not acknowledge the structure of 
patriarchal oppression‖ and he does not challenge the patriarchal dominance in the law.  According to 
Grosz, Lacan advocates the idea that the socio-linguistic law of the father is unchangeable (p. 145). 
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signify, they cannot be it; their penis is not equivalent to the Law and therefore men 
cannot symbolize the Law fully.   
By being the phallus, on the other hand, the feminine subject appears to be 
the object of a heterosexualized masculine desire.  Woman does not have the 
phallus.  She is rather what a man is not; she is ―the essential function‖ of the 
masculine subject (p. 45).  Butler finds that in Lacan‘s understanding of femininity as 
being the phallus, power is yielded by the feminine position.  Woman reconfirms the 
autonomy and power of a man.  She is what a man is not in order to reconfirm his 
identity.  Being the phallus is signified by the paternal law.  Yet, it is always 
dissatisfying, because she ―can never fully reflect that law‖ (p. 58).  It often requires 
her to renounce her desire for a man.   
Butler finds Lacan contradictory when he theorizes these ontological sexual 
positions as comedic failures to fully symbolize the paternal law.  In her reflections 
on Lacan‘s contradiction, Butler asserts that both positions enact repeated 
impossibilities to occupy the reality of heterosexuality (p. 59).  Women and men are 
involved in a heterosexual comedy; they are reduced to the play of masquerades 
(appearances) and to the performative productions of patriarchal society.   
For Butler, Lacan‘s ambiguous structural positions of the sexes in terms of the 
phallus and his concept of masquerade raise the question whether masquerade 
conceals a femininity that might be understood as authentic or whether masquerade 
produces femininity.  Butler (1999) asks, ―Does masquerade construct femininity as 
the reflection of the Phallus in order to disguise bisexual possibilities that otherwise 
disrupt the seamless construction of a heterosexualized femininity?‖ (p. 61).  Does 
masquerade conceal feminine desire so as to protect the authority of masculinity?   
For Butler (1993), Freud‘s and Lacan‘s theories of the phallus—Freud‘s 
argument that the erotogenic zones of the body act as substitutes for the genitals 
and Lacan‘s designation of the phallus as the signifier of sexual difference—fix the 
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meaning of the phallic signifier.  Butler finds that Freud‘s analysis of psychosomatic 
symptoms is awry when the body becomes equated with the erotogenic drives and 
male genitals.8  The author writes that Freud produces ―a pathological discourse on 
sexuality that allows figures of organic disease to construct figures for erotogenic 
body parts‖ (p. 64).  According to Butler, the subject‘s unconscious guilt—Freud‘s 
leading cause of hypochondria—has its roots in the subject‘s resistance to the social 
ideals of conventional heterosexual polarities.  In contrast to Freud, Butler contends 
that the subject‘s unconscious guilt is not rooted in the individual‘s narcissism or 
refusal to love others.  Instead, it is the prohibition of homosexuality that generates 
the pangs of guilt. 
Homosexuality is thus the performative of gender that destabilizes and 
reterritorializes heterosexual norms.  Queer and drag do not oppose heterosexuality 
but rather are ―the allegorization[s] of heterosexuality and its constitutive 
melancholia‖ (1993, p. 237).  Drag exposes the failures and dissimulations of the 
heterosexual regime.9  To that extent, the seemingly coherent normative discourses 
fall apart when, for example, no one is listening to those discourses anymore.  In the 
same vein, Butler says, Lacan‘s opposition between having and being the phallus 
cannot be attributed to an ontological difference between the sexes.  The phallus, as 
a primary signifier, is displaceable.  That means that it is possible for men and 
women both to be and have the phallus and both to suffer from castration anxiety 
and penis envy.  The phallus as a privileged signifier gains its privilege from 
                                                          
8 Butler refers to Freud‘s text, ―On Narcissism: An Introduction‖ (1989), where Freud discusses the ―notion 
that certain other parts of the body—the ‗erotogenic‘ zones—may act as substitutes for the genitals and 
behave analogously to them‖ (p. 552).  Freud explains that hypochondria links to ―damming-up of libido in 
the ego‖ which is experienced as unpleasurable.  According to Freud, when the ego is cathected with libido 
excessively, the individual must love in order not to fall ill.  If the individual falls ill, it is because he/she is 
unable to love.  The individual struggles to master internal excitations.  In analysis, the individual works 
over these internal excitations and drains them away towards an outward discharge.  Discharge is often 
experienced as undesirable. 
9 Butler, however, acknowledges that because heterosexual norms are ―taken not as commands to be 
obeyed, but as imperatives to be cited, twisted, queered,‖ drag is not necessarily subversive of sexual 
ideals.   
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reiterations and citations.  This reiteration, however, does not establish a fixed 
sexual subject.  The very force of repetition shows the ongoing possibility of 
variation, plasticity, and deprivileging the master signifier. 
 
1.3 Feminist Descriptions of Female Hysteria and the Question of 
Feminine Desire 
 
 
Cixous:  Dora [seems] to me to be the one who resists the 
system …. Yes, the hysteric with her way of questioning others 
(because if she succeeds in bringing down the men who 
surround her, it is by questioning them, by ceaselessly 
reflecting to them the image that truly castrates them to the 
extent that the power they have wished to impose is an 
illegitimate power of rape and violence), the hysteric is, to my 
eyes, the typical woman in all her force.  
 
Clément:  Yes, it introduces dissension, but it doesn't explode 
anything at all; it doesn't disperse the bourgeois family, which 
also exists only through its dissension, which holds together 
only in the possibility or the reality of its own disturbance, 
always reclosable, always reclosed.   
                           
(Cixous & Clément, 1986, pp. 154 & 156-7, italics added). 
 
 
Cixous and Clément reflect on whether a woman‘s hysteria is a revolutionary 
act against socio-political and familial patriarchal power or a manifestation of 
powerlessness.  Cixous argues that a hysterical woman, a ―typical woman in all her 
force,‖ disturbs or even dismantles oppressive structures, challenges men‘s abuses, 
and destabilizes a system of silences and hypocrisy.   
Clément, on the other hand, sees nothing revolutionary about a hysterical 
woman; she argues, instead, that she is a passive victim, whose pathology is an 
obstacle to bringing about meaningful change when she is pitted against a rigid and 
powerful patriarchal system.  For Clément, Dora provokes and disturbs oppressive 
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dynamics but fails to transform these dynamics because she is predominantly caught 
up in the imaginary realm—the realm that inhibits the circulation of satisfaction and 
knowledge.  Clément argues that whereas Dora contests and introduces some 
dissension into her familial context she does not lead to positive or satisfactory 
changes within her family in the end. 
 Cixous fervently supports Dora for being the one who defies men‘s views, 
including the views of her father, her father's friend, Herr K, and her analyst, Freud 
(see Appendix B).  Cixous disagrees with Freud's interpretations of Dora‘s case.  
Cixous and many other feminist writers who accentuate the sociopolitical 
constructions of male-dominated narratives challenge Freud‘s theoretical 
assumptions about femininity and the repercussions that these assumptions have on 
his conceptualization of hysteria. 
Cixous‘ book, called Portrait de Dora/de Hélène Cixous/des femmes, written in 
1976, is also an expression of the French feminist movement against patriarchy 
(Gallop, 1982).  It is associated with the publishing house ―Psychoanalysis and 
Politics.‖  From the title of Cixous‘ book, we see the substitution of one woman for 
another, so that the reader is able to link the hysteric portrait of Dora with the 
portrait of Cixous and with the portrait of all women in general (Gallop, 1982).  
Cixous argues that women with hysteria protest against the phallocentric system in 
which their bodies become ―despised, rejected … once they have been used‖ (Cixous 
& Clément, 1986, p. 154) and serve as a medium of exchange between men.   
The discussion of hysteria, especially in feminist literature, is key in 
discourses on femininity and politics.  While Cixous and Clément differ about whether 
the female hysteric contests patriarchy heroically (as Cixous argues) or preserves 
the existing system by being a victim within patriarchy (as Clément asserts), both 
writers discuss hysteria in terms of women's oppression under patriarchy.  Like 
Cixous and Clément, many other feminist writers either view hysteria as a male 
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construct that defends patriarchal notions of femininity and female sexuality10 or as a 
female disease in patriarchal culture.11  These arguments raise complex questions 
about the theory of hysteria:  Is hysteria caused by patriarchal power?  Is hysteria 
related to femininity?  Is the hysterical, distressed subject able to challenge social 
structures?    
Some feminists tackle these questions by concentrating on the psychoanalytic 
theory of the unconscious and psychical reality.  Their main purpose is to use some 
of Freud‘s concepts to describe sexual difference and the effects of patriarchal power 
on the subject‘s unconscious.  They provide an analysis of the relationship between 
psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria and socio-political discourse on femininity.  
However, they often end up discussing Freud‘s theories of hysteria and femininity by 
emphasizing Freud‘s inability to understand the essence of femininity and preoedipal 
desire for the mother.  They question Freud‘s overemphasis of the Oedipal complex 
and privileging of the father.  They focus, instead, on the dynamics of the preoedipal 
mother-child relationship.   
Ramas (1990), for example, conceptualizes hysteria as a form of compromise 
between preoedipal sexuality and heterosexuality.  She asserts that Dora protests 
against relationships between men and women that are structured in terms of 
dominance and submission, respectively.  According to Ramas, Dora understands 
heterosexuality as a power relation.  She argues that Dora preserves her preoedipal 
love for the mother and wishes to retain access to the maternal/female body.  Dora‘s 
admiration for the Madonna suggests a preoedipal fantasy—a fantasy in which the 
―mother/child dyad could exist undisturbed by the implications of sexual difference‖ 
                                                          
10 For example, men have frequently misused the diagnosis of hysteria in their attempt to explain 
women's biological make-up, psychological conditions, and resistance to conform to the status quo of 
heterosexuality and to their roles as mothers and wives. 
11 Hysterical symptoms (hypochondria, psychosomatic pains, irritations, and nervousness) have 
predominantly been observed in females in past and present times.  The most common explanation of this 
phenomenon has been that females are looked to to represent gentleness, submissiveness, serenity, and 
domesticity.  Females disavow hostility and sexuality and transform their repressed aggressive and sexual 
desire into physical symptoms. 
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(p. 173).  Ramas contends that Dora‘s identifications with men indicate a protest 
against post-oedipal femininity.  Dora is confronted with the inequality of the sexes—
with masculinity as activity, sadism, and power and femininity as passivity, 
masochism, and powerlessness.  Ramas critiques psychoanalytic formulations that 
present the phallus (the signifier of desire) as the symbol of protection and freedom 
from a devouring, preoedipal mother.  She argues that the girl‘s escape from mother 
to father is not liberating at all.  The girl‘s relationship with her father is imbued with 
patriarchal social meanings and is thus fraught with imprisonment and dependency.  
Ramas sees Dora‘s hysteria as a compromise formation: Dora is in the midst of 
complying and not complying with the patriarchal laws of femininity and 
heterosexuality.  Her compliance with feminine roles is a conscious attempt whereas 
her non-compliance is an unconscious revolt against patriarchy.  Ramas concludes 
that Dora‘s unconscious belief is that ―femininity, bondage, and debasement [are] 
synonymous‖ (p. 176).  Her hysterical symptoms indicate a wish to reconstitute her 
identity within the patriarchal system and reclaim her freedom. 
Rose (1990), who is conversant in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, however, 
contends that while many feminists critique Freud for describing normal femininity 
within the confines of drive theory and the Oedipal complex, they also make their 
own mistake when they base their explanation of Dora‘s sexuality on preoedipal 
attachment to her mother.  Rose contends that these explanations are inadequate 
for understanding Dora‘s hysterical identifications with men and women.  In the case 
of Dora, the question about her feminine sexuality is the question about her desire 
and being a woman within discourses.  Rose (1990) writes, 
I want to conclude with this, not because I think it answers anything 
but because I believe it to be a necessary caution to certain current 
developments within feminist theory.  What seems to me to need 
attention is precisely this movement of psychoanalysis away from 
sexuality as content (preoedipal or otherwise) to a concept of sexuality 
as caught up in the register of demand and desire (p. 146). 
 
35 
 
To this day, the question of feminine desire remains unresolved in feminist texts. 
 
§ 
Whereas for centuries, men have asked the question, ―What does a woman 
want?‖—today this question is posed by women themselves.  It is a question about 
feminine identity and the dialectic between feminine desire and social recognition.  
According to Mills (1991), when a woman is confined to the family, her desire 
remains subject to a man‘s desire.  When she is an active heterosexual lover and 
mother, she is perceived ―as deadly by the male‖ (p. 127).  The man proceeds to 
castrate the woman psychically, because he fears castration from her.  This psychic 
castration is effectuated by social domination.   
Feminists argue that the Western patriarchal Other does not impose its power 
on women directly.  It rather imposes it in subtle ways.  It manifests itself in hidden 
and repressed meanings.  In other words, patriarchy is not a totalizing or monolithic 
system in which all men dominate all women directly and thus all women know that 
they are victims of men (Walsh, 2001).  Rather, the masculine hegemony is diffuse; 
it is embedded in interpersonal discursive practices and institutions that are 
historically associated with men.  These institutional ―discourses maintain their 
dominance because they are organized around practices of exclusion, often involving 
speech rituals‖ (Walsh, 2001, p. 17).  For example, religious, judicial, therapeutic, 
and political discourses ―determine both the particular properties and the stipulated 
roles‖ of the speaking women-subjects (Foucault, as cited in Walsh, 2001, p. 17).  
The positioning of women as excluded others or as ―outsiders within‖ circulates 
within these masculine discursive or institutionalized systems and forms a complex 
matrix of power relations between genders. 
When women do as well as men do, these women identify with masculinity.  
Femininity is thus devalued through the overvaluation of masculine discourses and 
36 
 
practices.  Women are generally required to understand their identity by adopting 
and assimilating the pre-existing male dominated norms and practices.  They are 
asked, in other words, to be somehow more masculine.  According to Soler (2006), 
when women identify with masculinity their jouissance is determined by the phallic 
function.12  Women‘s identification with masculinity positions women as wholly 
hemmed in by the symbolic order of competition and exchange value.  Therefore, 
with the notion of equality we eradicate the differences between the sexes, and when 
we eradicate these differences women passively follow patriarchal values.   
How does inequality between the sexes lead to hysterical symptoms?  Cixous‘ 
and Clément‘s The Newly Born Woman (1986) is, in my estimation, an outstanding 
Francophone feminist text that describes the hysteric‘s sufferings within the 
patriarchal system and the hysteric‘s provocations which destabilize the rigidity of 
that system.  For Cixous and Clément, the woman-hysteric is oppressed by the rigid 
patriarchal system.  The authors present patriarchy as the tarantula—―the invisible 
yet powerful insect of patriarchal lore, lure, and law‖ (p. xi).  When the tarantula 
bites, the hysteric dances madly.  The tarantula bites cause depression, paralysis, 
coughs, pains, dizziness, and migraines.  The hysteric is bitten by the rigid masculine 
hierarchical oppositions of masculinity and femininity.  A woman does not exist in 
man‘s precise calculations.  Her subordination to a man‘s domination preserves the 
functioning of the masculine order.  She holds her marriage together and promotes 
patriarchal values.   
A woman, however, transcends the rules of language; she steps outside her 
function as sign.  Feminine rhythm consists of uncontrollable flow; it is close to 
unruly nature.  Man‘s law is overly possessive.  The woman-hysteric suffers from the 
males (father, brother, brother-in-law, and husband) who act like sexual aggressors.  
                                                          
12  In Lacan‘s work, the phallic function refers to ―the alienating function of language,‖ that which 
institutes lack and desire (Fink, 1995, p. 103).  As I explain in chapter 2, each sex has a different relation 
to the Other as language, to the ways he or she is used by language. 
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She cries and cries and speaks words of agony.  Her words are blown to bits by rage 
and suffering.  She demolishes discourse.  When masculine power pushes her 
offstage, she cries out.  She complies with harassment and repeated attempts at 
castration.  And when the repressed of her culture comes back, it is an explosive 
return, ―absolutely shattering, staggering, overturning, with a force never let loose 
before‖ (p. 95).  Each hysterical attack permits a return to the man‘s promised love.  
She manifests in her body what she cannot represent with words.  Her role is 
ambiguous.  With her symptoms, she provokes, revolts, and shakes up the public 
realm, institutional laws, and order.  She destabilizes familiar bonds and introduces 
disorder into the well regulated system.  With her struggles, she desires.  Inequality 
leads her to desire.  Without desire, she is inert; she feels dead.  When her desire is 
not heard, she breaks loose and releases lions with her symptoms.  Her body 
articulates the words she cannot speak.  Her body is the theater, the spectacle.  
Doctors examine her word-body and attempt to domesticate it again within the 
patriarchal order.  When the hysteric-woman is calm, she returns to her social life of 
marriage and motherhood; she returns to the masculine world.  
 
1.4 The Feminist (Mis)use of Lacanian Theory 
 
Anglophone feminists deconstruct Western cultural values of femininity with 
the intent to subvert imaginary views of sex and social ideals of sexual roles and 
heterosexuality.  They make a useful contribution to our knowledge about the ways 
we are alienated in the Other and the ways we are psychologically and physically 
affected by this alienation.  Using discourse analysis as a method of qualitative 
research, feminists elucidate the ways in which subjects are alienated in the Other‘s 
ideals.  Analyses of subjects‘ discourses challenge our assumed roles as sexual 
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individuals; they help us resist conformity to cultural taboos and change oppressive 
stereotypes.   
Let us consider the case of anorexia nervosa, which is the most frequent 
psychosomatic symptom in women today.  Malson‘s (1998) deconstructive study of 
anorexia nervosa elucidates the ways in which anorexia is not simply an individual 
female pathology.  Rather, Malson‘s work allows readers to understand anorexia 
within a framework that transgresses the individual-society dichotomy and 
acknowledges the complexities of multiple socio-political and patriarchal discourses 
of gender.  Malson analyzes the discourses of female participants who share their 
experiences of being anorectic and female.  The purpose of Malson‘s study is to show 
readers that patriarchal discourse and practices constitute and regulate women‘s 
experiences of gender and embodiment.  Malson‘s readers become aware of the 
ways participants are subjected to social pressures to be thin and the ways they 
conform to and resist men‘s desires.  
Malson uses Foucauldian theory of discourse and Lacan‘s concept of the 
symbolic order to explain how language constitutes and decenters subjectivity.  The 
larger purpose of her study is to change the discursive constructions of anorexia 
nervosa and femininity that oppress women.  The author envisions women‘s freedom 
from patriarchy by subverting patriarchal discourses and privileging instead women‘s 
voices about their subjective experiences.  
However, Malson reaches a theoretical impasse when she implies that 
subjects change when they change their own language/discourse.  The feminist view 
that if we change discourses about femininity then women will be liberated from 
men‘s oppression—and they will thus not suffer from hysteria—ignores the dialectic 
of desire in subjects‘ unconscious.  Burr (1995), a renowned feminist social-
constructionist, also finds that the feminist theory of desire is problematic.  Burr 
points out that the subversion of social taboos does not necessarily mean that 
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subjects are able to live happier and more satisfied lives.  Subjects may conform to 
or rebel against social taboos.  Their conformity or rebellion says nothing about how 
they sustain their unconscious desire.  To say that subjects are negotiators of 
positions and that their subjectivity is formed by discourse does not inform us 
adequately how subjects are willing or able to make positive changes in their lives.  
It fails to explain why subjects who understand that power relations and discourses 
impact their identity and decision-making still do not feel free to make better choices 
for themselves.   
Subjects are conflicted.  They know, for example, that when they make dire 
choices, they have negative consequences.  In the 1970‘s, Chodorow struggled with 
this issue too, and described this kind of feminist theoretical deadlock.  Chodorow 
found in her own research that some women knew that motherhood and sexual 
relations with abusive men would oppress them, but still they wanted children and 
got involved with abusive men (as cited in Burr, 1995).  In other words, we often see 
subjects identifying with discourses even when they consciously know that these 
discourses are harmful to them or that they have the choice to identify with other 
better ones.  Even when feminists understand the implications of discourse and 
power relations for identity, they often fail to explain why subjects do not choose an 
alternative way of life and how subjects‘ unconscious desires are the same as the 
Other‘s desires.   
Conversely, Lacan teaches us that unconscious desire should not be confused 
with conscious desire (Fink, 2004).  What seems to be abnormal/enigmatic on the 
conscious level has significance on the unconscious level.  A subject‘s choice to 
remain dissatisfied and go on desiring serves a purpose; desire emerges as a 
transgression of, rather than a conformity to, the law.   
When Anglophone feminists cite Lacan, they often interpret the symbolic as 
an order that constructs identity and makes the subject conform to the status quo.  
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When they describe the symbolic construction of the subject, they confuse it with 
Lacan‘s concept of the imaginary.  Feminists misconstrue Lacan‘s thesis on split 
subjectivity and misunderstand his conceptualization of the subject‘s real and 
symbolic relationship with the Other. 
Malson‘s study on anorexia nervosa in females is a prime example of how 
Anglophone feminists have a propensity to apply Lacan‘s concepts of the symbolic 
order and real erroneously.  Malson, for example, writes, 
Lacanian theory emphasizes that masculinity and femininity do not 
arise from the real of the body but from the way in which male and 
female bodies are signified within a Symbolic order.  This concept of 
the Symbolic order, central to Lacan's thought, moves psychoanalytic 
theory further in the direction of the social because the Symbolic order 
is primarily a linguistic (and therefore social) order (see Saussure, 
1960).  (Malson, 1998, p. 16)   
 
Malson‘s emphasis on the signified and her reference to Saussure‘s Course in 
General Linguistics shows us that she is unaware of Lacan‘s subversion of the 
Saussurian theory of the sign.  In Lacan‘s work, and in contrast to Saussure, the 
signifier (word) and the signified (meaning) are not complementary.  As Lacan 
(1998b) writes, ―the signifier is posited only insofar as it has no relation to the 
signified‖ (p. 32/29).  In addition, Lacan‘s major thesis on sexuation, as I indicate in 
chapter 2, is that sex is real. 
To Lacan‘s mind, the ego (consciousness) is an imaginary function whereas 
the unconscious is a symbolic function.  The unconscious is structured like a 
language.  It is not, however, structured in the same way as spoken English.  With 
the unconscious, we do not construct meaning and make sense of the world or 
ourselves as we do on a conscious level.  The contents of the unconscious are 
signifiers, which do not obey the same set of grammatical rules as the language we 
speak ordinarily.  No specific signified harmoniously binds or restricts a signifier.  
Lacan understands the function of the signifier inscribed in the unconscious as 
polyvalent and ambiguous, whereas he considers norms to be imaginary.  He says 
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that meaning is imaginary and so the reality that we construct with our words on the 
conscious level is a fantasy; we conceptualize ourselves and this world as whole 
(tout) (Lacan, 1998b, p. 43).  With our ego talk, everyday conscious talk, we echo 
the belief that the reality lying behind language is reliable and unfailing.   
It seems to me then that Malson confuses Lacan‘s theory of the symbolic 
order with his theory of the imaginary.  Malson‘s analyses of her participants‘ 
statements lead her to a variety of often contradictory statements, which she 
nevertheless interprets in imaginary terms—that is, in terms of the ego, in terms of 
how participants recognize or rather misrecognize themselves.  Malson concludes 
that the female anorexic body allows for a multiplicity of meanings.  She writes that 
anorexia is both a manifestation of traditional femininity that seduces men and a 
manifestation of masculinity that resists female roles.  The anorectic imitates super-
thin female models and wants to be the object of men‘s attention.  However, she 
also imitates men by looking boyish.  She resists female sexuality, reproduction, and 
her social role as a woman.  Her refusal of food is a refusal to have breasts, have a 
belly, or menstruate.  Malson sums up her findings by stating that discourses of 
sexual difference produce multiple and conflictual meanings and thus the thin body 
both resists and embodies patriarchal gender identities.   
Malson interprets these discourses in imaginary terms because she theorizes 
the ways in which her participants assimilate the Other and resist the Other.  In 
Lacan‘s theory, however, when subjects are subjugated by the Other and demand 
that the Other supply ideal answers about their identities, they remain dissatisfied 
and stuck on their demands.  Lacan formulates the idea that when subjects evaluate 
their sense of self on the basis of conscious meanings, they engage in an ego/ego-
ideal dialectic and produce empty speech.  In the dialectic of ego/ego-ideal, subjects 
internalize and assimilate the Other‘s ideals (Fink, 2004).  Subjects become further 
alienated in the Other when the Other provides meaning about their existence and 
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needs.  Alienated subjects are often betrayed by the certainties of meanings, empty 
speech, and demands.  They are conflicted and come to realize that the Other is not 
a guarantor of ideal answers about their being.  Subjects‘ desires are set into motion 
when the Other is experienced as failing to provide a reason for their being.  Lacan 
(2006) writes, 
Let us ask ourselves instead where this frustration comes from.  Is it 
from the analyst‘s silence?  Responding to the subject‘s empty 
speech—even and especially in an approving manner—often proves, by 
its effects to be far more frustrating than silence.  Isn‘t it, rather, a 
frustration that is inherent in the subject‘s very discourse?  Doesn‘t the 
subject become involved here in an ever greater dispossession of 
himself as being, concerning which … he ends up recognizing that his 
being has never been anything more than his own construction 
[oeuvre] in the imaginary and that this certainty undercuts all 
certainty in him?  (p. 207/249). 
 
Lacan here argues that unified/fixed discourses consist of empty speech—a kind of 
speech that arouses frustration when we fail to articulate unconscious desire. 
Malson neglects to theorize the speech of the unconscious.  In other words, 
she does not theorize how her participants‘ anorexia, their self-deprivation, is a way 
to sustain their desire.  This omission has much to do with the fact that feminists 
conceptualize feminine identity only as a construct of the Other, of the patriarchal 
social order.   
From a Lacanian perspective, this assumption is incomplete.  When Lacan 
says that man's desire (is the same as) the Other's desire, he indicates that the 
subject also recognizes the fallibility, the incompleteness of the Other.  The Other‘s 
desire is indeterminate and this very indeterminacy causes the subject to desire 
continually.  The subject‘s recognition that the Other is lacking causes him or her to 
seek a representation of his or her being beyond the image that the Other presents.  
We need to keep in mind here that the Other gives answers with signifiers.  But the 
Other‘s answers always fall short, because as I mentioned earlier, signifiers resist 
signifieds, have no unequivocal meaning.   
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Between the lines of the subject‘s statements there is the enunciation of 
desire.  Desire results from the subject‘s splitting by the signifier.  It inclines the 
subject to resist the signifieds that the social order provides as answers about his or 
her being at the imaginary level.  The desiring subject finds the Other to be lacking.  
The split subject, however, especially the hysterical subject, is the one who is 
dependent on the Other‘s dissatisfied desires.  The anorectic hysteric finds his or her 
image, as presented by the Other, to be inadequate, lacking.  By refusing food, the 
anorectic challenges the Other‘s demands of her and motivates the Other to desire.   
 How can we then listen to the enunciation of desire in a subject‘s discourse?  
To answer this question, we can take as an example one of Malson‘s (1998) 
participants who described her experience of being an anorexic: 
MICHELLE:  I remember having lots of chats about her (a supermodel) 
with my dad (.) and my mum and everything (.) and um my dad was 
saying: oh she's she's terribly thin. /H:  right hu / You know:  I hate 
hate women that look so thin an' (.) / H: mm/ you know she should, 
she doesn't really look like a woman an' hu (.) / H: (laughing) right/ 
But I admit I didn't really agree with him and I don't think (.) if there 
were ever any women in the room (.) when (.) he was saying this I 
don‘t think they would either … Yeah she was very um (.) I don't know 
how to put it really (.) um.  She was kind of dignified really … I think 
yeah /H: mm/ I could be like her (pp. 112-113) 
 
At the semantic level, Michelle is obsessed with thin bodies and issues of 
femininity.  Michelle associates a thin body with dignified femininity.  Following 
Malson‘s interpretations, Michelle struggles with the male (her father‘s) opinion of 
femininity and thus struggles with ―the multiple competing meanings of the thin 
female body‖ (p. 113).   
From a Lacanian perspective, to understand her discourse, it is important not 
to get mesmerized by the manifest meanings, the conscious/preconscious meanings 
of her words.  Malson‘s point that Michelle expresses a conflict over competing 
discourses on femininity and sexuality is insightful.  Michelle here embodies the 
Other‘s failures to represent femininity and sexuality adequately.  We can argue, 
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however, that Michele is aware of, or at least preconscious of, the influences that the 
Other has on her.  In other words, it is on the level of her ego that Michelle sees the 
thin body as dignified femininity.13  What she is not aware of is not the ―signifieds‖ of 
sexuality and femininity (p. 118) but rather the signifiers that represent her desire.  
Lacan (2006) prompts us to take desire literally (pp. 518-37/620-42).  For 
Lacan, the symptom of anorexia is the metonymy of desire.  Despite the fact that we 
do not know Michelle‘s personal and family history or the cause(s) of her symptom, 
we can argue that her anorexia is linked to her unconscious desire. 
As opposed to her father, who believes that curvy women are feminine, for 
Michelle, anorexia, lack of food, represents dignified femininity.  For one reason or 
another, Michelle rebels against the parental Other.  Michelle refuses to be fed or get 
stuffed by the Other and identifies with incompleteness.  Michelle wants to be the 
dignified feminine.  We can decipher in Michelle‘s speech that lack of food is replaced 
by the dignified feminine—the feminine of which Michelle tries to find adequate 
meaning from the Other.  Dignified connotes exaltation of femininity and can be read 
as the lack of signifieds.   
Michelle tells us that the supermodel represents the feminine.  The Other, as 
culture, however, does not provide an adequate representation of dignified 
femininity.  Nevertheless, the Other makes dignified femininity desirable.  Michelle‘s 
desire to be a dignified woman enunciates the Other‘s failure to represent femininity 
sufficiently.  Her desire to be feminine remains an unsatisfied desire.  Michelle is not 
interested in being the object of the Other‘s jouissance (satisfaction)—the object of 
the jouissance of her father, for example, who likes women with curvy bodies, but 
                                                          
13 Based on my clinical experience with anorectic patients, anorectics often seem to be aware of their 
experiences of being influenced by the media, which encourages the symptom of anorexia in women.  My 
patients told me that they knew how modern society encouraged them to be thin; they wanted to feel 
happier with how they looked; and they even admired other women who were confident with their body 
and sense of self and were not anorectics.  In fact, one of my patients adored the singer, Amanda Palmer, 
for her singing and admired her for being comfortable with her body, despite her chubbiness.  Yet, despite 
my patients‘ sufferings and insights regarding the culture of thinness, they could not stop not eating. 
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who perhaps reduces women to certain meanings.  In feminist interpretations, her 
refusal to be the object of the Other‘s jouissance would be construed as unconscious 
resistance to male-dominated views of femininity.   
As I explain in subsequent chapters, the hysterical woman is interested in 
being the object of the Other‘s desire.  Her being depends on the Other‘s desire.  
This desire is articulated in the void, abyss, and emptiness.  Michelle desires to be 
feminine in relation to patriarchal desire.  She is captured and frozen by imaginary 
social ideals of thinness and by the signifiers of desire that point to the rejection of 
femininity.  Michelle desires to be the dignified feminine but, at the same time, she 
rejects femininity.  Instead, she is involved in an endless circle of self-hatred and 
self-loathing.  Michelle‘s unconscious rejection is the same as the Other‘s rejection of 
femininity.  Therefore, in contrast to Malson‘s interpretations of Lacan, Michelle 
desires to be thin not because the Other wants her to be feminine, but because the 
Other desires a representation of femininity.  The Other‘s desire is metonymic and 
always demands a new satisfying representation.  Michelle is swayed and spoken by 
the Other‘s dissatisfactions and rejections of her feminine being.  The Other‘s desire 
captures, enslaves her.  The Other‘s gaze disapproves of the possibility of becoming 
feminine and annihilates her existence.  She incarnates the Other‘s desire, which has 
a destructive character.  She is trapped in the desire to desire that points to 
nothingness.  Michelle is not aware of this trap; she is not aware of the ways her 
desire functions as the metonymy (cancellation) of her being.  
 
1.5 Towards a Dialogue between Feminism and Lacan 
 
Feminist interrogations of the psychoanalytic theory of women‘s hysteria, and 
I would go so far as to say, even feminist misinterpretations of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, are vital forces for engaging in a dialogue between feminism 
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and Lacanian theory on the relationship between women and hysteria.  The following 
questions can help us begin a dialogue between these two different theoretical 
paradigms: 
 
A) How can we conceptualize Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory in relation to 
feminist critiques of patriarchy?  How would Lacan respond to Irigaray‘s thesis 
on speaking as a woman, Butler‘s theory of gender as performative, and to all 
the feminists who critique his psychoanalysis as another version of 
essentialist and patriarchal discourse? 
B) Following Rose‘s argument that the unresolved issue in feminism is feminine 
desire, in what ways can feminists use Lacanian theory to advance their 
theorizations of femininity and women‘s distress? 
C) According to Lacan, Irigaray, and Butler, does the hysteric contest or 
conserve patriarchy?  In what ways can the hysterical woman be liberated 
from oppression by the patriarchal Other? 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Ethics of Feminine Desire and Jouissance 
 
2.1 What Do a Woman and a Tortoise Have in Common? 
 
Zeno‘s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise invites us to theorize sexual 
difference and the ethics of feminine desire and jouissance.  Zeno‘s paradox goes as 
follows:  Suppose you have Achilles, the fastest man and the hero of the Trojan war, 
race a tortoise.14  Suppose also that Achilles decides to do the tortoise a favor and 
allow her a head start.  After the tortoise gets a certain distance ahead, Achilles finds 
out to his surprise that he cannot get ahead of the tortoise, which leads her to win 
the race.  Had Achilles not allowed the tortoise a head start, Achilles would have 
obviously been the winner; thus a competition of this kind would have been 
unnecessary, which of course would have led Achilles not to have any relationship 
with the tortoise whatsoever.  In Zeno‘s logic, the reason why Achilles cannot win 
the race after deciding to give her a ten-meter head start is because when Achilles 
runs the ten meters, the tortoise goes one meter further; when Achilles runs one 
meter, the tortoise goes one decimeter further; and when he runs one decimeter, 
she goes one centimeter further, and so on.  Zeno argues that the sum of an infinite 
series of numbers is infinite.   
                                                          
14 Tortoise is a feminine noun in some spoken languages, for example, in Greek (η χελώνα) and French (la 
tortue). 
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Nowadays, we know that this paradox is not valid.  We know that Zeno only 
takes into account space and ignores time.  Since Achilles is faster than the tortoise, 
Achilles will overtake the tortoise in the race despite her head start because time is 
finite and time makes space finite too.  Hence, Zeno‘s paradox is false because if, for 
example, Achilles is able to run ten meters per second the tortoise will run five 
meters per second, and so eventually Achilles will pass her.  Assuming that Achilles 
does not become like Aesop‘s rabbit—the rabbit who lost the race to a tortoise 
because he devalued both the tortoise‘s capabilities in the race and the finitudes of 
time and thus gave up his efforts to go on running—one can conclude that Achilles 
will overtake the tortoise before she reaches the finish line.15   
In Encore, Lacan (1998b) briefly mentions Zeno‘s paradox to argue that the 
tortoise is not wholly inscribed within the symbolic order and that whereas Achilles is 
fast enough to ―pass the tortoise—he cannot catch up with it.  He only catches up 
with it at infinity‖ (p. 8).  In other words, in Lacan‘s logic, the tortoise‘s emancipated 
potentialities are not reducible to a man‘s reason.  Although we know today that 
Zeno‘s paradox is false, strangely enough, its falsification tells us something about 
how ―the feminine is experienced as space,‖ with the connotation of infinity, while 
―the masculine is experienced as time‖ (Irigaray, 1993, p. 7).  As Barnard (2002b) 
also puts it, Achilles‘ relation to the tortoise is such that his phallic jouissance is 
limited by a remainder which ―forever escapes‖ and ―eludes his pursuit‖ (p. 177).  
In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray (1993) elucidates that a woman 
who has discovered her infinity dismantles men‘s certainties and the closure of 
opposing terms—terms such as ignorance versus wisdom, mortality versus 
immortality, poverty versus wealth, ugliness versus beauty, and so on.  Her mystery 
lies in the paradoxical notion that she shows that what seems to be most assured is 
                                                          
15 The details of Zeno‘s paradox were taken from 
http://www.suitcaseofdreams.net/Paradox_Achilles.htm#A, August 2008. 
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indeed inadequate and useless.  And thus she is capable of undoing conclusive 
works, denouncing the already established truths, and allowing space for new 
becomings to occur in life.  Irigaray (2001), however, tells us that both sexes realize 
their differences and potentialities when they accept their own embodied boundaries 
and limitations.  Their becomings are thus not ―abstract, neutral, fabricated, and 
fictitious,‖ but rather ―concrete‖ and ―corporeal‖ (p. 26).  Both sexes appropriate and 
step out of their static identities and assimilations of sameness, when they re-think 
the relations of space and time and ―of the interval between‖ (p. 7).  Irigaray locates 
sexual difference and new becomings in one‘s transformative thinking about desire, 
power, infinity, limitations, and sameness.   
In Seminar XX, Lacan (1998b) suggests in his theory of sexuation that 
whereas the masculine subject is wholly inscribed in the finitudes of the phallic 
function, the feminine subject is both alienated in the phallic function and a 
remainder which exposes the contingency and the failures of the Law.  A woman‘s 
relation to the contingency of the Law, however, does not make her a passive object 
of a man‘s desire or force her to give up her own desire.  Although Butler criticizes 
Lacan for saying that a normal woman is a woman who is the phallus for a man and 
who reconfirms male power and patriarchal significations, Lacan provides instead a 
theory which differentiates the hysterical from the feminine subject.  Whereas the 
female hysteric is the phallic signifier for the masculine Other, the feminine 
actualizes her own desiring cause, overcomes the automatic law-like symbolic 
functioning, and engenders something new in the social realm.  For Lacan, the 
feminine subject inhabits the symbolic but, because she accepts her castration, she 
also has a mysterious presence in it—a presence which unveils the impotence of the 
Law.  As I will discuss further, although the hysteric exposes the Other‘s impotence, 
she is not inhabited by the symbolic function in the same as way as the feminine is.  
The hysteric restricts herself to the limitations of symbolic functioning and becomes 
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the phallic object for the Other.  The feminine subject, on the other hand, has a 
relation to infinity which unveils the Law‘s strangeness and contingency.  She 
triumphs over repetitious dissatisfactions and engenders change.   
One can see from Zeno‘s paradox that time and space are interrelated.  Men 
and women are subjected to the finite logic of phallic competitions, yet within this 
finite logic, there is always something unsettling and infinite.  According to Lacan, 
both sexes are alienated in the symbolic order, but each sex has a different 
relationship with infinity.  Similarly, Irigaray describes sexual difference in terms of 
how a man and a woman come to discover their infinity regardless of their own finite 
identifications with sociocultural ideals.  In this chapter, however, I will argue that 
one cannot clearly grasp Irigaray‘s notions of speaking as a woman and of a 
woman‘s potentiality to discover the infinite place within herself without first 
understanding Lacan‘s theories of sexuation and psychoanalytic ethics.  By following 
Lacan‘s and Irigaray‘s works, one is able to see that Zeno‘s paradox is a call for us to 
theorize how the masculine finite logic of temporality excludes the feminine logic of 
infinite pace/place and how both sexes discover their infinities16 when they realize 
their own structural limitations in relation to the symbolic Other. 
                                                          
16 In psychoanalytic theory, neurotics are restricted to the alienating effects of language when they are 
spoken by a symptom that causes them to suffer.  When neurotics are spoken by a particular symptom, 
they want to get rid of it, but they cannot.  They feel that it is out of their control when they repeat their 
symptom compulsively.  Thus, when I refer to finitude, I refer to the subject‘s state of suffering.  In 
Lacan‘s theory, the symptom retroactively gives meaning to the master signifier.  As Fink (1995) explains, 
the subject‘s symptom is organized around a unique and rigid master signifier, S1, which is pronounceable 
but yet opaque to the analysand and which ―always seems to put an end to associations instead of 
opening things up‖ (p. 77).  The subject, therefore, who is represented and fixed through the effects of 
one signifier (S2) for another (S1) is castrated and finite, because it is presented by the Other and is 
dependent on winning ―attention and recognition from the Other‖ (p. 73).  On the other hand, the 
analyzed subject is the one who has dialectized master signifiers and is no longer inhibited in its pursuit of 
satisfaction.  As Fink (1997) further explains, the fully analyzed subject enjoys and seeks out its 
satisfaction without being inhibited by an unsatisfied desire.  As I discuss in this dissertation, the hysteric 
is limited by her alienation within language in her attempts to be the phallic signifier for a man‘s desire.  
The feminine subject, on the other hand, who is a fully analyzed subject, may have access to limitless 
Other jouissance.  Feminine jouissance is not limited to the jouissance of the organ as a man‘s phallic 
jouissance (Fink, 2004, p. 161).  Her whole body enjoys.  The feminine subject also loves and enjoys by 
her act of speaking.  As opposed to man‘s finite logic of deriving satisfaction only in sexual intercourse, a 
woman makes love by speaking about love and engaging in ―the act of love‖ (p. 162).  The feminine 
subject, thus, is not pinned down by the castrating effects of signifiers.  A woman enjoys when she speaks 
of love.   
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  One could argue that Achilles and the tortoise are capable of attaining their 
potentialities if they both see the paradox that there is infinity within finitudes.  
Achilles does not really need to race a tortoise to prove to himself or others that he 
is fast.  But in order for Achilles to have access to love and realize further his infinity, 
he will have to allow himself to be surprised by the tortoise‘s infinite potentialities at 
her pace.  He will be able to do so if he also accepts the finitudes of time and does 
not become like Aesop‘s rabbit.  And in order for the tortoise to realize her 
emancipated potentialities, overcome dependencies, subvert dominant views, shift 
away from her victim role, and transcend the win vs. lose binary, she will have to 
accept her structural limitations in relation to Achilles and realize her cause.  These 
realizations, however, are not matters of conscious awareness but kinds of analytic 
working through. 
One may wonder, however, if the use of these analogies is anything but 
idealism.  Anglophone feminists have raised serious questions about the dialectical 
relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed between the sexes—questions 
that are claimed to be far from idealistic.  They ask:  What does it mean to be a 
woman in an oppressive and unfair patriarchal society—in a society which does not 
make it easy for a woman to succeed or have equal rights to a man, which violates 
her psyche and misuses her body, and which causes her hysterical fits and 
outbursts?  How are men victimized by the social ideals of being aggressive and 
having to meet high social expectations—expectations to be the primary providers 
for the family, to be warriors for their country, to be invulnerable and detached, and 
to maintain a certain status quo male identity? 
Anglophone feminists thus would not consider looking at the internal logic of 
Zeno‘s paradox to formulate an ethics of sexual difference.  Being primarily 
influenced by Foucault‘s works, Anglophone feminists concentrate instead on 
discourses which affect women‘s oppression in patriarchy and men‘s enslavement to 
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meet social and at times dehumanizing expectations.  They argue that men and 
women are implicated in the complexities of discourses and that institutions function 
to compare, hierarchize, homogenize, exclude, and normalize.  Since, as Foucault 
(1978) contends, discourses qualify, classify, and punish, Anglophone feminists have 
done an outstanding job developing methods to question the ―tactical productivity‖ 
and the ―political strategy‖ of a subject‘s use of a certain discourse (p. 102).  
Feminists, however, misconstrue sexuation and theorize it only as an imaginary 
discursive representation.  They thus ignore the psychoanalytic theory of the ethics 
of human tragedy—a tragedy seen in the subject‘s realization of his or her 
unconscious desire, which goes beyond his or her conscious perceptions of 
personages, and which manages to suspend, destroy, and interrupt the continuity 
and fixed mirages of the ego. 
But if we concentrate on the ethics of femininity, some questions remain 
unresolved from the Foucauldian and Anglophone feminist analyses of political 
strategies of oppression:  In what ways can women realize their own unconscious 
desires so they do not fall victim to patriarchal oppression?  Is it possible that social 
oppression is not only an external force exercised upon subjects, but also that 
subjects, by inhabiting the symbolic, participate in preserving this oppression 
unconsciously?  As I discussed in chapter 1, when we become aware of the social 
and power relations of discourses, we do not necessarily change our structural 
position in relation to the symbolic Other.     
In this chapter, I explore the ethics of feminine desire and jouissance 
primarily from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective and explicate similarities and 
differences between Lacan and feminists.  Lacan does not provide easy answers to 
questions.  In his seminars and writings, Lacan allows readers to interpret his theory 
by requiring them to work through his difficult texts to grasp his internal logic.  If 
readers are motivated enough to read him, they will realize that his theory is about 
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the unthinkable and infinite paradoxes of life and about the unknown and strange17 
potentialities of one‘s ex-sistence.  In order for a woman to discover her infinite 
potentialities, she will need first to realize what it means to be a Woman18 vis-à-vis 
the symbolic Other.  I should specify that a Woman is not free from conflicts or 
struggles—of course, no one is really free from experiencing constraints and 
conflicts.  I will argue, however, that, unlike the female hysteric, she is able to 
achieve her emancipated potentialities and overcome patriarchal discursive 
oppressions.   
 
2.2 Sexuation 
 
In my attempt to formulate an ethics of femininity, I would like first to 
provide a feminist reason why one should concentrate on feminine desire.  By doing 
so in this section, I will also describe Lacan‘s theories of the phallus, castration, and 
sexuation, and show some of the similarities and differences between Lacan and 
feminists.  
A woman often posits herself in relation to a man as powerless, weak, needy, 
irresistible, or as a person who is without limits and pursues aimless pleasure.  
Cixous and Clément (1986) assert that women have been associated with the 
eternal-natural, because she is beautiful, but passive; a desirable, but dependent 
nonentity; unreasonable, but adorable; a threatening force to the social order, but 
                                                          
17 Lacan (1998b) writes, ―Strange is a word that can be broken down in French—étrange, être-ange,‖ 
which means ―angel-being‖ (p. 8) and implies, eternity or infinity.   
18 I do not intend to use woman under erasure like Derrida.  Derrida puts all words under erasure (sous 
rature) to indicate that there is always a lost presence in them.  For Derrida, ―Word and thing or thought 
never in fact become one‖ (Spivak, 1997, p. xx).  As Derrida also contends, every signified functions as a 
signifier.  Every word renders its meaning undecidable and so there is never a univocity of meaning 
attached to a word.  Lacan expresses the same idea with his theory of ―there is no Other of the Other‖ or 
―there is no metalanguage‖ as I explain in chapter 3.  I am referring to Woman (La femme), however, the 
same way Lacan does in Seminar XX.  My software does not allow me to write it as it appears in Lacan‘s 
work.  The feminine subject, for Lacan, is not a signifier, not a word under erasure.  It is rather a 
structure that has a specific relationship with the Other, that relates to a particular failure to be inscribed 
in language.  
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mysterious; dangerous, but easily domesticated; devouring, but longed for; 
excessive, but unreasonable and forbidden.  Irigaray (1993) also elucidates that in 
the masculine economy the female becomes an immobile container, an inseparable 
envelope for the man and the child whom she loves.  A man longs for the maternal 
which has been forever lost, and ends up loving a woman whom he imagines can 
mother him and envelope him (p. 60).  He longs for the maternal home which 
provides boundless possibilities for future creations.  He thus experiences a woman 
as the indefinite ―series of one plus one plus one‖ (p. 61).  However, he cuts himself 
off from feminine spatiality and situates himself as durational time.  He defers his 
infinity with his concrete creations.  He creates a woman with his tools and 
achievements.   
A woman, on the other hand, sets out her infinity into space and loses time.  
She does not measure time in the same way as a man does, and thus, being 
occupied by the man whom she loves, she offers herself up in the here and now to 
an expansive jouissance (p. 64).  Linear time is questionable for a woman.  Temporal 
relations are circular in the feminine realm.   Her circularity of time is bounded by 
the eternal.  A woman delves into the pleasurable abysses of the here and now and 
comes up against the masculine attitudes of timing, which are grounded in the adage 
of ―never more and not yet‖ (p. 64).  By extending herself infinitely into space, a 
woman is thus in the intermediate between being verbal and being voiceless.  She is 
neither passive nor active; she opens up the possibility of taking the course of a 
durational time, but her capacity to present or represent finitude is questionable.  
She is subjunctive and infinitive, because she is formed in an endless circular 
movement.  When a woman is left to do only minor acts and is unable to generate 
full effects for her own cause, Irigaray (1993) calls her infinity ―abyss and night‖ (p. 
7). 
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Irigaray challenges predominant assumptions of space and time.  In her way 
of establishing an ethics of sexual difference, Irigaray interrogates issues related to 
―pure space,‖ ―ecstatic time,‖ presence, absence, and the ―place which gathers and 
protects everything‖ (Chanter, 1995, p. 149).  Irigaray argues that all philosophical 
paradigms neglect to theorize how a woman‘s body serves as a receptacle for a man 
and is used as a kind of envelope in order to help a man sets limits and boundaries.  
A woman thus does not have a place for herself but is rather a place of others.  She 
is the one who gives shape to forms; she is the envelope through which a man draws 
boundaries, articulates limits, and creates coherent wholes (Chanter, 1995).  
According to Irigaray, rethinking space means to rethink the mother‘s mucous, skin, 
blood, and milk—the amorphous fluids associated with the maternal body.  The 
mother‘s protective membrane, blood, and milk, which are essential for the growth 
of the fetus, are suppressed in speech.  A woman is treated as a place to provide for 
others.  She is the provider for men‘s comforts to actualize their cause, cut off from 
the abstract, and transition to the concrete. 
Irigaray adumbrates the thesis that women do not realize that they annihilate 
themselves, constitute their own oppression, and lose their own voice in the depths 
of their assimilation of sameness.  In order for a woman to speak feminine language 
and discover her cause and the infinite place within herself, not simply to quest for 
infinity, she has to differentiate herself from her mother‘s identity and dis-identify 
from the sameness of patriarchal expectations.  As I mentioned in chapter 1, Irigaray 
maintains that when a woman is undifferentiated from the maternal and blindly 
assimilates her mother‘s mirages, she becomes dependent on the masculine Other, 
mimes masculine language, and fails to realize her femininity.   
When a woman is subjugated by patriarchal oppressions, she becomes a 
passive wife and a passive mother and lacks access to her desire.  She becomes the 
object of a man‘s striving for control and a victim of humiliating forms of submission 
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only because she does not realize her own desires.  Because of her lack of limits, she 
becomes men‘s threatening force and remains stuck with men‘s attempts to 
dominate and control her.  Benjamin (1990) resorts to the idea that the problem of a 
woman‘s desire lies in the daughter‘s undifferentiation from the mother, which 
means that the daughter becomes a woman without having desires of her own.  
Likewise, her alienating submission is bound up with her fantasy that if she submits 
to an ideal man, she will escape from her problem of understanding her needs and 
desires as separate from him.  By being desirable and igniting the passion of others, 
she ends up becoming more of an object used by a man than a subject who can 
realize her own cause.  Because of the fact that she is not active in desiring 
something for herself, her power then ―consists not of the freedom to do as she wills, 
not of control over her own destiny, but at best control over others‖ (p. 456).  Using 
Freud‘s psychoanalytic theory of the girl‘s psychosexual development, Benjamin 
(1990) concludes that penis envy should be seen as the organizer of a woman‘s 
assimilation to masculine ideals, of ―female masculinity,‖ and not as the organizer of 
femininity (p. 469).  A grown woman who has not resolved her penis envy resorts to 
love relationships with men with the hope that she will receive something from them 
which she does not have herself.  
 
§ 
As I describe in Appendix B, Freud understands the girl‘s differentiation from 
her omnipotent preoedipal mother by formulating his Oedipal theory:  the little girl 
realizes that her mother is defective in comparison to her father and turns her love 
towards her father in order to get the phallus from him.  One should keep in mind, 
however, that when Irigaray critiques psychoanalytic theory for failing to represent a 
woman‘s difference from masculinity and for conceptualizing the girl‘s differentiation 
from the maternal as a means to hate and devalue her mother, she still misses 
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Lacan‘s psychoanalytic point:  the hysterical woman experiences a masculinity 
complex and attempts to find the ideal signifier that would represent her sexuality.  
Consciously or unconsciously, the hysterical woman depreciates her mother for her 
inability to provide her with the phallus.  Irigaray also fails to realize that Lacan 
provides a structural psychoanalytic theory to explain sexuation.  Although feminists 
interpret Lacan‘s concept of the phallus as the male organ and critique him for 
privileging the male body, Lacan provides instead a complex description of the 
symbolic phallus and lays out its difference from the imaginary phallus.  Therefore, if 
we look more closely at his concepts of the phallus, the symbolic Other, and 
jouissance, we will realize that Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory includes and expands 
further on Irigaray‘s notion of sexual difference and Butler‘s theory of gender. 
 
2.21 The Phallus 
 
Throughout his work, Lacan tells us that the phallus ―is the signifier that has 
no signified, the one that is based, in the case of man, on phallic jouissance‖ (Lacan, 
1998b, 81).  In Écrits, Lacan (2006) contends that the phallus is not a ―concrete 
idea‖ or a ―symbol‖ (p. 579/690).  When feminists understand the phallus as the 
same as the penis, they disregard Lacan‘s thesis that the phallus is a signifier which 
designates the gap between a word and the desired image that the word represents.  
The phallus does not depict positive and visible properties.  It rather represents a 
reason for the subject to desire.  As a signifier, the phallus generates meaning and 
fixes the subject to an imaginary identification.  The image associated with a word, 
however, only partly represents what it is supposed to represent, because there is 
always something lacking in that image.  Lacan prompts us to conceptualize the 
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phallus in terms of its function in subjectivity and not in terms of stable meanings, 
fantasies, or symbols.  
When Lacan explains his deviations from Saussure‘s theory of the sign, he 
shows in the ―Gentlemen and Ladies‖ example that the drawings of a man and a 
woman on the restroom doors are two signifiers that have no particular meaning on 
their own (Lacan, 2006, pp. 416-417/499).  As Žižek (2002) points out, it is as if 
these restroom doors are reproduced twice.  At the level of the imaginary, subjects 
understand their gender identity only by way of cultural images.  Yet, these gender 
binaries are inherently unstable and illusory.  As Butler (2004) also points out, we 
mostly observe this instability in drag queens, transfags, and queers whose gender 
performativity transgresses the sociocultural ideals of sexual difference.  At the level 
of the symbolic, the difference between a man and a woman is mediated by the 
phallus.  The signifier ―man‖ makes sense only in its difference from the signifier 
―woman,‖ and vice versa.   Sexual difference is not translated here into a set of 
symbolic meanings either.  The phallic signifier does not provide stable or satisfying 
meanings to describe the precise nature of that sexual difference.  One cannot, for 
example, describe adequately men‘s and women‘s concrete aims, goals, wants, and 
aspirations, because the desires of each sex are elusive; there is no specific object, 
goal, or aim to define their differences.  We could very well say that desire is unisex.   
However, what Lacan means when he says that the phallic signifier (the signifier of 
lack-of-being) designates sexual difference, he is saying that men and women have 
a different relation to the symbolic Other, a relation that shows that the symbolic 
order cannot be sustained within meanings.  As Barnard (2002b) and Copjec (1994) 
explain, men and women have a different relation to the limits of language.   
It is worth mentioning here that Lacan‘s logic of sexuation cannot be 
compared to the deconstructionist logic of gender.  Whereas Butler understands 
gender within the dimension of language and views sexuality as performative and 
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manipulated in the interplay of various discursive practices, Lacan presents us with 
the paradox that subjectivity cannot be grasped in terms of sociopolitical discourses.  
Subjectivity is rather a site that points to the limits of signification.  Hence, Lacan‘s 
sexuated subjectivity is not a substance, but rather a site of resistance to meanings.  
As feminists too have observed, subjects‘ discourses give rise to competing and 
conflictual meanings.      
The function of the phallic signifier is to give access to the Other‘s desire and 
differentiate the subject from a primordial state of oneness with the maternal.  
Submitting to the phallic law means that one submits to difference.  The phallus 
marks the Other as lacking.  It signifierizes some of the subject‘s renunciation of its 
jouissance from the maternal Thing and transforms the Other into someone who has 
a desire that is not directed solely at the subject‘s being.  The Other as desire is the 
one who cannot provide a stable reason for the subject‘s being.  The ―Other that 
allows for the absence of a reason‖ is the one who takes on a multiplicity of 
meanings and cannot guarantee how the subject will enunciate his/her unconscious 
desire (Fink, 2004, p. 123).  The phallus, thus, designates the lack in the Other, 
S(A)19; it designates the fact that there is not an ―objective‖ or neutral discourse that 
can guarantee what the subject will enunciate in speech.  The subject‘s cause of 
desire is enunciated in the very act of speaking.  The Other cannot explain the 
unpredictability of the subject‘s desire or how the subject is led to over-identify with 
one ideological discourse and dis-identify with another ideological discourse.  In 
other words, there are no objective truths to describe subjects‘ causes.  
Lacan (1960-1961) clarifies that signifiers themselves do not lack anything.  
He writes, ―There is no such thing as a missing signifier.  At what moment can the 
lack of a signifier possibly begin to appear?  In the subjective dimension which is 
                                                          
19 My computer software does not allow me to generate the symbol the way it should appear, as it is seen 
in Lacan‘s (1998b) Seminar XX. 
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called questioning‖ (chapter 17).  In fact, what one cannot express in language, one 
does not experience.  Lacan thus tells us that the signifier itself—an object, for 
example, which the subject identifies with in order to satisfy the Other‘s desire—only 
has an effect on the subject when the subject is involved in the dialectic of desire, a 
kind of dialectic which elevates the object to the status of presence-absence and 
makes the object desired.  Lacan (1961-1962) thus indicates to us that the mother‘s 
breast becomes the phallus, the signifier of desire, when the infant identifies with the 
absence of mama and places its libido in language whose metonymies may relate to 
the mother‘s breast.  The child, for example, may make its mama reappear by 
playing with a transitional object, such as a blanket or a button.  As I will explain 
further on, when the phallus is positivized, it becomes the signifier of castration in 
the sense that it names the lost primordial objects—the breast, the feces, the 
absence of the mother, and the absence or threat of absence of the penis; yet, this 
naming is the name of its own lack (Ragland, 2004).  In other words, the symbolic 
phallus, Φ, gives a positive existence to the threatened lack of jouissance (Fink, 
2004).  The phallic signifier is then that which signifies ―presented absence‖ (Lacan, 
1960-1961, chapter 17).    
The phallus is an important concept in Lacan‘s work, and misunderstandings 
of that concept also lead to misinterpretations of Lacan‘s internal logic.  The 
Anglophone feminist (or poststructural) research method of discourse analysis 
reaches its own impasses, for example, when it concludes that the subject‘s speech 
is contradictory because the subject both resists and embodies a dominant 
discourse—a discourse which appears to be benign but is in reality oppressive.  With 
this conclusion, feminists attempt to provide an external reason for the subject‘s 
enunciations of these contradictions and hope change will occur when the subject 
realizes that.  However, clinical experience shows that subjects do not change in this 
way.  When other discourses are adopted, the subject still remains engulfed and 
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oppressed by the new ―benign‖ discourses.  If feminists understood Lacan‘s logic of 
the phallus as the signifier of desire and the signifier of the lack in the Other, S(A), 
they would realize that in order for the subject to be flexible in its identifications with 
various ideologies and to overcome the Other‘s dominance, the subject first needs to 
develop a transference towards an Other, who no longer gives a new sign (a new 
explanation) for the subject‘s being, but provides instead an enigmatic signifier that 
puts the subject‘s desire into question, into motion.  Feminists would then realize 
that subversion occurs only when the subject‘s fantasy and identification with a 
certain discourse is called into question, and not so much when the discourses 
change.  As Žižek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1999) point out, calling into question an 
ideological discourse and elevating it to the level of the signifier means to interrogate 
the utopian and idealistic fantasies that come with it; it means to expose its dystopia 
and lacking nature, to make subjects think that they cannot really be represented in 
a single discursive image so that they may indeed be what they exclude or eliminate 
from their conception of the good—in other words, so that they also identify with 
what was supposed to be impossible and unrepresentable for them.   
On the one hand, feminists acknowledge that the Other is lacking.  By 
challenging dominant sociopolitical discourses, practices, and ―benign‖ assumptions 
about subjectivity and sexuality, feminists succeed in rearranging the old signifying 
order and reshaping subjects‘ knowledge.  Feminist epistemology succeeds in 
naming and conceptualizing certain discourses and bringing to light how subjects 
position themselves and are positioned within these available discourses.  By shaking 
up the existing signifying order, feminists reform laws and institutional practices.  
Because of feminism, a vulnerable population—a population that has been abused or 
harassed, discriminated against due to its low socioeconomic status, diagnosed with 
an illness and given medication, and made to feel ashamed to communicate 
subjective experiences in various social contexts—is empowered and made more 
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aware of how discourses legitimate and perpetuate oppression and exploitation 
(Willig, 1999).  By naming a certain discourse, feminists articulate an experience 
which had not been previously articulated.  
On the other hand, because of feminist misinterpretations of the phallus, the 
real, and the symbolic, feminists cannot explain how hysteria functions, not as a 
sociopolitical discourse, but as a symptom in relation to the Other.  Hysteria is not an 
organized discourse which can be understood at the level of the enunciated 
(consciousness) but can only be formulated at the level of the enunciation 
(unconscious).  As Žižek (1989) points out, an ideological discourse, which might be 
a rigid designator that stops the metonymic sliding of meaning, is still not an 
absolute guarantee or meaning that one can use to make a fixed point of reference.  
It rather ―represents the agency of the signifier within the field of the signified.  In 
itself it is nothing but a ‗pure difference‘ … in short it is a ‗signifier without the 
signified‘‖ (p. 99).  What lies beyond the enunciation of an external discourse to 
explain subjective experiences is nothing but its ―inability to master the central 
impossibility, the constitutive lack around which human experience is organized‖ 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 129).     
Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory also demonstrates the following paradox:  
When the subject is dissatisfied with the prohibition imposed by the Law, the subject 
does not simply feel pain but, rather, feels pleasure in pain,20 which Lacan calls 
jouissance.  The reason the subject repeats symptoms and cannot transgress his 
superego radically, even after he is given the choice to do so, is that his symptoms 
unveil an unrepresentable desire for a lost object, which is imagined by the subject 
as a source of total satisfaction.  The neurotic, whose desire remains dissatisfied, 
                                                          
20 In Lacan‘s theory, jouissance always implies pleasure in pain.  In his theory of sexuation, the masculine 
subject experiences phallic jouissance which is subservient to the superego, Law, and castration.  The 
feminine subject experiences both phallic jouissance and the Other jouissance.  The feminine subject, who 
loves beyond what one can articulate about it, who wants the abyss, suffers when she relates to other 
desiring subjects with their lack-in-being (see, Soler, 2006, p. 18).   
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desires only when he is subjected to prohibition.  His desire transgresses the moral 
prohibition but not for the sake of radically altering this prohibition.21  As Lacan 
(1997) says, a commandment such as, ―Thou shalt not covet‖—not covet one‘s 
neighbor‘s partner, house, or servant—makes the subject covet all kinds of things 
merely because he is told not to.  In other words, Lacan tells us that the desiring 
subject experiences jouissance due to prohibitions, because he desires to go on 
desiring infinitely.  Prohibition is a recipe for having desire—a kind of desire, 
however, that makes the subject alienated and lack infinitely.   
Lacan (2007) writes, ―[T]he law remains something that is, first and 
foremost, inscribed in the structure‖ (p. 43).  The hysterical subject organizes her 
discourse around her symptom in relation to the Other—the Other as Law or Master.  
Her symptom itself is structured around the Other‘s hole, lacuna, or failure to 
represent her sexuality.  As I will explain shortly, it is an unnameable trauma, which 
has not been articulated in words.  The hysteric positions herself as the imaginary 
phallus—as the object of the Other‘s desire—aiming to repair the Other‘s deficiencies 
in his articulations of a truthful law.  The hysteric is dissatisfied with the Other‘s 
jouissance and articulations of truth and, because she wants to be understood within 
language entirely, she is trapped in her desire to relate to an infallible Other 
(Master).  She thus has the fantasy that there is an omnipotent Other who possesses 
ultimate knowledge about her sexuality.  Her desires and symptoms are structured 
around this fantasy, and thus, regardless of her transgressions of the law, she 
                                                          
21
 Although Foucault also sees power and resistance (the subject‘s refusal to obey it entirely) as linked, he 
differs from Lacan regarding the conceptualization of desire.  Foucault sees the imposition of the law as a 
positive construction, as that which produces the norm (reality) and leads the subject to resist abiding its 
oppressiveness (Copjec, 1994).  Lacan, however, shows that in every affirmation of a statement, there is 
an internal negation to it.  For Lacan, the split subject aims at coherence but his/her unconscious desire 
imposes discontinuities and impasses in every coherent discourse.  Thus, for Lacan, the imposition of the 
law accentuates the subject‘s lack-in-being; it makes the subject desire something which is not articulated 
in any discourse. 
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remains an unrepresentable void in her attempts to be desired by an infallible 
Master. 
I should mention here again that Lacan‘s logic differs significantly from the 
poststructural conceptualization of gender and the Other.  Whereas Butler recognizes 
that the subject is constituted through exclusions, she still tries to theorize this 
absence of meanings with her mistaken understanding of foreclosure.  As I indicated 
in chapter 1, Butler assumes that, because homosexuality is ―foreclosed‖ as a 
subjective possibility, the subject remains a victim of patriarchy.  Thus, she suggests 
that only drags and queens are able to disrupt phallocentric views.  Using this logic, 
Butler views the psychoanalytic theory of the phallus as patriarchal.  Lacan, however, 
leads us to a different kind of logic.  He shows us that the sexuated subject, 
regardless of its sexual orientation, disrupts the reality of dominant discourses by 
exposing the limitations of language.  He also shows that the hysterical subject, who 
is unconsciously bisexual, mimes masculinity, as Irigaray also argues, only because 
she is phallicized, which means that she tries to be entirely within the symbolic 
order—an attempt which, of course, fails and which leads her instead to constitute 
herself as a void, as a voiceless subject whose desires remain dissatisfied.   
Lacan insists that the concept of the phallus is multileveled and polarized.  Its 
polarization involves two dimensions of language—the imaginary and the symbolic.  
It also involves two structural dimensions of subjectivity—the castration complex and 
castration.  By differentiating between Lacan‘s notions of the castration complex and 
of castration, we are led to differentiate between the hysterical and the feminine 
subject.  In other words, we can distinguish between the subject who is alienated 
within language, subjugated by the Other‘s desires and demands, and mortified by 
the phallic fantasy—a fantasy which involves the idea that there is an omnipotent 
Other who can provide ideal answers to subjects‘ questions—and the subject whose 
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desire is purified and whose jouissance exposes the Other‘s powerlessness and lack 
in subversive ways.      
 
§ 
According to Lacan, whereas the imaginary phallus represents the subject‘s 
alienation within language, the symbolic phallus represents the subject‘s separation 
from the Other as demand.  At the outset, the child identifies with its mOther‘s 
desire (the mOther‘s want-to-be) by trying to be the phallus in order to complete 
her—in other words, the child is the imaginary phallus when it strives to be the 
object that would presumably give the mOther jouissance.  In the preoedipal phase, 
however, the mother is not experienced as lacking by the child but as omnipotent.  
The child learns to speak and the child‘s being is represented by signifiers.  The 
mother is the one who comes and goes and breastfeeds, and whose loving gaze, 
voice, and touch seduce the child.  The child becomes a passive object of her 
jouissance and its whole body is taken ―as an erotic doll‖ (Soler, 2006, p. 131).   
Lacan (2006) though also points out that the child refuses to satisfy the 
mOther‘s demand that the child be her erotic love object, because in order for the 
child to desire and become something more than what it is, the mOther needs to 
have a desire for something else too, and not only for the child (p. 524/628).  When 
the mOther desires something more than the child, she also shows that she lacks, 
that she is not whole.   The mOther then leaves a memory trace of completion in the 
child‘s mind.  The grown-up subject desires to refind this lost satisfaction in speech, 
possessions, and accomplishments.  The mother‘s partial corporeal objects—the 
breast, the gaze, the phoneme, the feces, and the urinary flow (or, since Irigaray 
also identifies these objects as fluids and air, mucous, milk, saliva, blood, gas, and 
tears) produce a real rem(a)inder in one‘s articulations of speech: a rem(a)inder 
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which fell away as a fragment of the mother‘s body.  Lacan calls this remainder objet 
petit a—the object which elicits the subject‘s desire.   
Lacan does not focus on good or bad mothering or on the mother as a 
totalized person.  Lacan rather insists that maternal omnipotence is interrupted by 
the intervention of a third term—the phallic signifier.  As Soler (2006) argues, the 
Freudian oedipal structure divides two functions:  ―on the one hand, there is an 
object of primary satisfaction and on the other a limit-function‖ (p. 111).  Freud‘s 
theory, however, has been distorted by other psychoanalytic theorists who have 
conceptualized the subject‘s misfortunes as a result of a bad or defective maternal 
love.  Feminists, of course, express their criticisms of these neo-Freudian 
psychoanalytic theories, arguing that the notion of bad mothering gives legitimacy to 
the power of the father and, thus, to patriarchy.  Soler (2006), however, brings to 
our attention another important point in Lacan‘s theory.  She writes: 
It is not the lack of love but too much of it that is harmful and that 
calls for a necessary effect of separation.  This is why Lacan 
accentuated the mother‘s desire.  This is to be understood as the 
desire of a woman in the mother, a specific desire to limit maternal 
passion, to make her not completely mother: in other words, not 
completely concerned with her child, and even not completely 
concerned with the series of children, the sibling rivals.  (p. 120) 
 
We see here that Lacan‘s theory regarding the daughter‘s differentiation from the 
maternal and the mother‘s desire to be a woman is the same as Irigaray‘s.  Irigaray 
argues that the hysterical woman is someone who has not been differentiated 
adequately from her mother‘s alienating and patriarchal desires.  Irigaray 
understands this differentiation as the daughter‘s recognition of her mother‘s 
Otherness.  A woman, for Irigaray, is more than a mother.  A woman is not reduced 
to the external demands to care for others, but is rather someone who asserts her 
singularity.  She has an expansive jouissance, because she also transcends the 
expectations of patriarchal norms.   
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According to Lacan, from the moment that the mother appears to have a 
desire of her own—a desire which is not directed towards the child but elsewhere—
she is experienced as deficient and incomplete.  Language then functions to name 
the mother‘s desires and this process of naming occurs when the Name-of-the-
Father as a signifier intervenes in the symbiotic dyad of mother-child.  The Name-of-
the-Father ―creates a rift in the mOther-child unity and allows the child a space in 
which to breathe easy, a space of its own‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 58).  Here, the reader 
should realize that Lacan differs from what we occasionally find in Irigaray‘s romantic 
theory of establishing a harmonious mother-child dyadic relationship (Ragland, 
2004).  In the dialectic of desire, Lacan argues, there is no signifier that can 
establish a direct rapport between two subjects.  The child‘s initial identifications with 
images that form its ego are detached from the mother‘s desires.  When the child 
enters into the symbolic, he or she couples with the signifier of the Other‘s desire, 
not with another human being, and his or her desires are subjected to various 
displacements.  In other words, each subject partners with his/her own Other 
(unconscious) and not with the concrete other. 
Lacan theorizes that the little girl undergoes two kinds of experience of lack 
during the Oedipal complex:  privation and castration.  With his concept of privation, 
Lacan attempts to theorize more rigorously the Freudian theory of penis envy.  
According to Lacan, privation is ―the real lack of a symbolic object, the symbolic 
phallus, and it applies exclusively to women‖ (Chiesa, 2007, p. 75).  When the little 
girl perceives the penis as absent, it is because she has the notion that it should be 
there.  What is lacking in her mind, however, is the symbolic object (the symbolic 
phallus).  Her vagina does not lack anything in the real.  The male organ, thus, turns 
into the symbolic phallus only because it involves the opposition of presence and 
absence in the dialectic of desire.  Lacan (1993) argues that a woman does not 
realize her sex ―by identification with the mother, but on the contrary by 
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identification with the paternal object‖ (p. 172).  Because there is no symbolization 
of the female organ—in other words, at the level of desire (at the symbolic level) she 
cannot assume her lack by identifying with her mOther‘s lack—she identifies with the 
man, who is the bearer of the penis.   
The feminist criticisms of the above argument are well-known.  By arguing 
that Lacan is patriarchal, Irigaray (1985b) even goes so far as to contend that even 
though a woman does not have a penis, she has ―two lips‖ (p. 28).  Hence, Irigaray 
argues that her metaphor of the ―two lips‖ implies that a woman‘s sexuality and 
identity are plural; a woman‘s pleasure is not located in a single male organ and is 
not even located in her vagina or clitoris.  Her feminine pleasure comes from her 
whole body.  Where one of her identities ends, another one begins.  A woman‘s 
sexuality is locatable in the multiplicity, ambiguity, and fluidity of discourses.  A 
woman goes beyond dichotomous discourse.  She is the remainder of what the rigid 
patriarchal discourse fails to represent of her.  But, if we were to imagine what Lacan 
would have responded to Irigaray‘s metaphor of the ―two lips,‖ we can be sure, 
based on his Encore seminar, that he would have said—―yes, indeed, that is 
Woman!‖  Lacan‘s Woman does not differ from Irigaray‘s.  Since the feminine subject 
is someone who transcends the finite logic of patriarchal discursive dichotomies, 
Anglophone feminists are also in sync, without realizing it, with Lacan‘s 
psychoanalytic theory of the feminine subject. 
  Like Irigaray, Lacan is clear that hysteria is not the same as femininity.  In 
Seminar XVII, Lacan (2007) argues that the hysteric is someone who suffers from 
her frustrations of being deprived of the phallus.  Lacan (2007) writes, 
Isn‘t it to this experience, however much it could have altered his 
attitude subsequently, that we owe the fact that Freud observed … 
that everything he was ever able to do for hysterics ends in nothing 
other than what he pins down as Penisneid?  Which means, explicitly, 
when it is spelled out, that where this ends is in the girl‘s reproaching 
her mother for not having created her a boy, that is, in carrying 
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forward onto the mother, in the form of frustration, what, in its 
meaningful essence, and in such a way that it gives the hysteric‘s 
discourse its place and its living function with respect to the master‘s 
discourse, is divided into, on the one hand, the castration  of the 
idealized father, who yields the master‘s secret, and, on the other 
hand, privation, the assumption, by the subject, whether feminine or 
not, of the jouissance of being deprived.  (p. 99) 
 
In Seminar III, Lacan (1993) contends that the hysteric, who has not resolved her 
penis envy, ―literally uses the penis as an imaginary instrument for apprehending 
what she hasn‘t succeeded in symbolizing‖ (p. 178).  With her symptoms, the 
hysteric asks the question, ―What is a woman?‖ and attempts ―to symbolize the 
female organ as such‖ (p. 178).  This theory seems to be even more confusing when 
we read from Lacan and post-Lacanian theorists that Lacan does not reduce 
castration to the missing male organ, as Freud did.  It has been argued that Lacan‘s 
castration refers to the subject‘s realization that the Other (man or woman) does not 
have the phallus22 and to renunciation of the subject‘s attempt to be the phallus for 
the mOther.  The subject‘s renunciation to be the phallus for the mOther involves 
giving up a certain jouissance—jouissance that is ―squeezed out of the body [and] is 
refound in speech‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 99).  By sacrificing a certain jouissance to the 
Other as language, the subject lets this jouissance circulate in the Other and 
attempts to gain it in the form of knowledge, possessions, talents, achievements, 
and so on.   Thus, unlike Freud, Lacan conceptualizes the Oedipus complex as 
revolving around the dialectic of being versus having the phallus.  When the child, 
for example, begins to notice that she is not the sole object of her mother‘s desire, 
because the mother enigmatically desires other things, she begins to inquire as to 
who has the phallus—in other words, who has the object of the mother‘s desire.  One 
answer is that the mother‘s partner has the phallus.  The child then concludes that 
the phallus is a number of possessions and qualities which the child does not have 
                                                          
22
 Since the phallus is the signifier of desire, there is no subject who has a specific quality or attribute that 
would ensure his/her omnipotence or infallibility.   
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but the mOther‘s partner does.  Up to this point, it is no wonder that Grosz, Butler, 
and other feminists find that the phallus is not a neutral term, because it also refers 
to the male organ. 
To go on a bit further with the ambiguity of the term, the hysteric thinks she 
is deprived of the phallus.  Hysterical deprivation is not seen as the dispossession of 
materials or talents but, instead, as deprivation of knowledge about her sexuality.  
Parenthetically, I should mention here that, day in and day out, psychoanalysts 
witness the fact that there are many hysterics who are rich in possessions and 
talents, but regardless of these possessions, they are still dissatisfied.  What is 
particular about the hysterical subject is that she understands the Other‘s desire (the 
Other‘s lack-in-being) as what she lacks as an unconscious subject, as a subject of 
the signifier.  As I will explain further in the subsequent chapters, the hysteric feels 
the void, suffers from her lack-in-being, and desperately searches for being.  As 
Soler (1995) also explains, one of her strategies is to get herself loved and desired 
by the Other.  She has a sense of being when she knows that she has a place in the 
Other.  When she encounters her lack-in-being, she questions the Other‘s desire and 
tries to make the Other incomplete so as to be the sole loved object for the Other. 
 Because the hysteric is an effect of the signifier—is represented by the 
signifier—she suffers from reminiscences.  Without knowing why, she doubts and 
desires to know the true cause of her being in relation to the Other.  She sees that 
the Other is incomplete—the Other cannot provide adequate signs for her being—and 
constitutes herself as the object that can make the Other desire.  The hysteric thus 
covers over her castration (-φ), her separation from the Other, by both divining the 
Other‘s power, mastery, and desire for knowledge and by constituting herself as an 
object with the fantasy that she can complete the Other‘s void with her being.  Thus, 
the hysteric cannot really exist without relating to a Master.  She desires as if she 
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was a man.  Her desire is the same as a man‘s desire.  For the hysteric, the Master is 
usually a man, a doctor, or a professional who is imbued with power and knowledge.  
 What exactly does the hysterical subject cover over and what does it mean to 
say that she is deprived of phallic jouissance?  Lacan tells us explicitly that, because 
she wants to be the cause of the Other‘s desire (and in the preoedipal phase, she 
wanted to be the loved object of her mOther‘s desire), she covers over her 
castration, which means that she covers over that which has not been represented in 
language, which is her sexuality.  In Lacan‘s theory, the hysteric is not adequately 
separated/differentiated from the maternal.  Inadequate differentiation from the 
maternal is translated here into inadequate symbolic intervention of the paternal 
function in the mother-child imaginary dyadic unity.  As one sees in Freud‘s case 
studies of hysteria, the hysterics‘ fathers were either villains or ill (Verhaeghe, 
1999).  Lacan (1960-1961), however, also reassures us that his terms castration and 
penis envy are signs, metaphors (substitutions) (chapter 3).  The father is thus not 
approached as a totalized person, but is understood as a linguistic function.  In the 
case of little Hans, for example, we see that Hans‘ father, who was a good guy, did 
not adequately intervene to separate Hans from the engulfing and devouring erotic 
desire of the imaginary Other (Hans‘ mOther).  When one understands lack and 
castration as metaphors and the paternal function (the phallic signifier) as a 
linguistic function, one may also realize that there are case studies in which the 
biological mother instates the Law in the child‘s subjectivity and the biological father 
functions as the engulfing imaginary Other.  
By being insufficiently separated from the imaginary Other, the hysteric is 
caught in onerous bodily and emotional pain.  The hysteric repeats symptoms and 
her symptoms revolve around something that is unnameable, unrepresentable with 
words.  What is unrepresentable is an early experience of sexual trauma by which 
the hysteric reacts with ―disgust or revulsion‖ (Fink, 1997, p. 117).  The traumatic 
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event is evoked by analogous subsequent memories and events.  With her various 
symptoms, the hysteric circles around this unrepresentable black hole.  The hysteric 
desires to give a name to that hole.  Every signification that fails to name it leads the 
hysteric to develop some kind of superficial and dissatisfying speech.  One could say 
that the hysteric‘s speech is cut off from her symptoms.  Her body and emotions 
depend on the Other‘s significations to name this traumatic lacuna.   As I explain in 
chapter 3, the hysteric‘s solution to her impasse is to become the object of the 
Other‘s desire, which means, to become a sign (a meaning at the imaginary level) 
for the Other—a kind of sign that ends in nothing.  The sign fails to symbolize what is 
experienced by the hysteric as extremely painful jouissance.  Being the object of the 
Other‘s desire is the hysteric‘s method to avoid castration. 
Because of the fact that the hysteric has not symbolized this hole, she has not 
been able to grasp it as a loss and, thus, to have a desire different from the Other‘s 
desire.  As Fink (2004) explains, when something is not symbolized, it is not 
experienced as a loss by the subject.  When we name the absence of something, the 
subject becomes aware of her loss.  She gives up some of her symptomatic 
jouissance and, with words, she ―drains away its onerous charge‖ (p. 139).  Giving 
up jouissance and symbolizing one‘s being with words is, for Lacan, castration.  
When the hysteric symbolizes an absence or a lack, she gives a positive existence to 
it.  Lacan symbolizes this positivization as Φ.  Φ is the phallic signifier that gives the 
power of signification, the signifier which ―sublates the loss into something positive‖ 
(Fink, 2004, p. 139).  The subject names the absence and becomes more the master 
in her own house, so to speak.  She is able to talk about the trauma without feeling 
pleasure in pain.  When she puts herself into words, she is able to separate from the 
Other‘s lack—from the Other‘s inability to name her lack-in-being.  She is able to 
have access to language in such a way that language itself does not mortify her, 
does not petrify her with those meaning effects which, in any case, had failed to 
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signifierize her lack-in-being.  In Lacan‘s theory, only then is the hysteric able to 
become a woman with ―two lips.‖  More specifically, to use Lacan‘s terminology, only 
then is she able to move from having a symptom in relation to the Other to 
becoming the symptom of the Other (see Soler, 2006, pp. 62-66), the symptom of a 
man‘s finite and dichotomous logic.  
 Psychoanalytic experience shows that the hysteric suffers from a primal 
experience of sexual disgust.  Disgust is her onerous, painful jouissance, caused by 
an early traumatic event.  As I indicate in chapter 4, for the hysteric, her own body 
image is disgusting, fragile, and vacillating—her feminine organ is desexualized, as if 
it were lacking something at the imaginary level.  Because she desires to find a sign 
that would establish her own femininity, she devotes herself to repairing a deficient 
symbolic Other with her symptoms, at the expense of her own and the Other‘s well-
being.  Her method is to devote herself to receiving the sign of femininity.  She ends 
up becoming masculinized, becoming the imaginary phallus for a man‘s desire.   
What she receives in return is something she does not want.  Lacan‘s notion of the 
hysteric‘s endless desire to receive the phallus from the Other is similar to Freud‘s 
notion of Penisneid and to Irigaray‘s notions hysterical ―abyss and night‖ and of the 
hysterical incapacity to create or to discover her femininity and her infinity.  
  
2.22 Masculinity and Femininity 
 
In Seminar XX, Lacan (1998b) provides a diagram to describe sexuation.  On 
the masculine side of the diagram, Lacan formulates men as being subjected to the 
phallic function.  He provides two contradictory statements to describe masculinity in 
regard to the phallic function:  an affirmative statement and a negation.  Fink (2002) 
describes these statements in the following way:  
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All of man‘s jouissance is phallic jouissance.  Every single one of his 
satisfactions may come up short.  Nevertheless, there is the belief in a 
jouissance that could never come up short, the belief in another 
jouissance. (Fink, 2002, p. 38)   
 
Lacan tells us here that the phallic function is limited and finite and the 
masculine subject comes to be wholly inscribed in that finitude.  In Étourdit, Lacan 
prompts us to understand the inscription of the phallic function as that with which 
subjects try to make sense and positivize with words the absence of a sexual 
relationship.  Man‘s pleasure is determined by the phallic function—in other words, it 
is limited to the interplay of signifiers.  The masculine subject, however, fantasizes 
an exception to his inscription—an exception which points to infinity.  As Barnard 
(2002b) maintains, this exception makes him not identify fully with castration.  
Although he is wholly subjected to the rules of the signifier, he also maintains some 
distance from it by believing that the Symbolic Law cannot inscribe his jouissance 
entirely.  In a man‘s logic of finitude there is always something which escapes—this 
exception exposes the impotence of the functioning of the symbolic Law.  In other 
words, the masculine subject is fixed by the exclusion of the phallic inscription and 
relies on this exception to realize that there is a limit to the law.   
The masculine subject has a relationship with object a, which Lacan places on 
the side of the feminine in the aforementioned diagram.  As I indicated earlier, for 
Lacan, object a is the real remainder, the leftover of what one attempts to represent 
in language.  In one‘s articulations of speech, what is left out is a rem(a)inder.  The 
subject desires to understand what seems to be incomprehensible about femininity 
and the maternal fragments.  As Žižek (1989) points out, the masculine subject 
seeks out ―maternal substitutes.‖  However, his fantasy of the maternal ―is reduced 
to a limited set of (symbolic) features‖ (p. 119).  As soon as he comes close to the 
maternal Thing, he feels anxiously suffocated.  Ragland (2004) further points out 
that a man loves a woman with his fantasy that there is ―a totalized essential 
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Woman—a kind of Ur-mother—who is thought (in Kleinian fashion) to contain the 
object(s) that Lacan says cause desire—the gaze, the breast, the urinary flow, the 
feces, the voice, the (imaginary) phallus, the nothing, and the phoneme‖ (p. 3).  
Thus, a man understands the cause of his desire via the fantasy that there is a 
complete Woman.  This fantasy situates him in a finite and fixed logic.  Yet, as 
Barnard (2002b) elaborates, although a man is wholly alienated in the symbolic 
function, he still takes exception to it in a certain way by also believing that there is 
something ungraspable about a woman.  It seems to me, then, that when a man 
becomes surprised by an encounter with a woman‘s infinity, he is able to realize that 
the automatic and law-like functioning of the symbolic order is an illusion.  When a 
man relates to a hysterical female subject, he feels suffocated by her symptomatic 
dissatisfied desire and makes every effort to control her.  The hysteric also validates 
his fantasy that there is a signifier to describe femininity.  Thus, the hysteric plays an 
important role in his fixed and finite constructions of reality.     
On the feminine side, Lacan understands woman as being ―not wholly‖ (pas 
tout) inscribed in the phallic function.  As Fink (2002) puts it:   
Not all of her jouissance is phallic jouissance …. All the jouissances 
that do exist are phallic, but that does not mean there cannot be some 
jouissances that are not phallic—it is just that they do not exist: they 
ex-sist.  The Other jouissance can only ex-sist, it cannot exist, for to 
exist it would have to be spoken.  (p. 39)   
 
Unlike the masculine fantasy that there is a representable Woman, Lacan‘s Woman 
proves that this fantasy is impossible, or even ridiculous.  When Lacan (1998b) tells 
us, ―Woman cannot be said,‖ ―Woman has a relation with S(A),‖ ―woman does not 
exist, woman is not whole‖ (pp. 7 & 81), he means that the masculine fantasy about 
a woman is erroneous, treacherous.  Lacan (1998b) goes so far as to say that, 
because a woman is the impossibility and the inconsistency of the symbolic order, a 
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rem(a)inder that emerges in language from within, she is indeed the one who 
possesses a man and he is the ―one who obeys orders (à la botte), not her‖ (p. 73).   
In his sexuation diagram, Lacan shows that woman couples with the symbolic 
phallus (with Φ, not with –φ) and triples with the signifier of the lack in the Other, 
S(A).  As Barnard (2002b) elaborates, although woman inhabits language, she 
inhabits it not as ―a simple absence but as a mode of presence.‖  She has, in other 
words, ―a strange form of positivity‖ (p. 178).  Unlike the hysterical subject, who is 
inhabited by the Other‘s lack and void, the feminine subject unveils something that is 
excessive, unlimited, and destabilizing in language.   By having a relation to the 
contingency of the effects of the signifier and the failures of a rigid discourse, woman 
is able to engender something new in the automatic law-like functioning of the 
symbolic order.  Woman ―exhorts from and returns to the Law a certain strange 
corporeality‖ (Barnard, 2002b, p. 179).  In her relation to the Other, she has an 
unpredictable and ―mysterious presence to the Law‖ which exposes its impotence (p. 
178).   
The masculine subject is wholly inscribed in the phallic function.  However, as 
I indicate in chapter 3, language itself is failing.  In every affirmation, there is a 
contradiction, an exception.  No subject can fully say what he intends to say because 
the word itself misses its referent—it cannot describe the lost maternal bliss of unity 
and fullness.  Following Barnard‘s (2002b) descriptions, the masculine subject 
believes in this exception because he desires to know the meaning of the absolute 
Woman, but he cannot possess that meaning.  One could thus say that as much as 
one believes in exception, one is fully caught up in language.  This is because in 
every exception, there is an affirmation and in every affirmation, there is an 
exception.  In other words, every time one tries to give substance to the Other, one 
realizes that meaning is a failed meaning; meaning does not have meaning.  As 
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Barnard (2002b) writes, ―the phallus is at once both the signifier of enjoyment and 
its negation‖ (p. 177).  
 The feminine subject, on the other hand, is alienated within language without 
exception.  With her not whole position, woman is neither inside nor outside the 
phallic function; she goes beyond phallic representation.  One can, of course, see 
here why a man experiences a woman as adorable and as a threatening force to the 
social order at the same time.  Woman both is subjected to and escapes the rules of 
the signifier.  Lacan provides the notation, S(A), the signifier of the lack in the Other, 
to indicate that her relation to language is not all phallic.  Woman lacks a limit.  She 
is the absence of the limit, because she is not entirely susceptible to castration 
(Copjec, 1994). 
To explain this further, woman is the place where meaning slips away.  
Instead of looking for a new signifier to fill up the hole that governs the unconscious, 
woman experiences an unlocatable jouissance, which transforms sense and logic into 
non-sense and non-logic.  Unlike the hysterical subject who searches for the signifier 
to make sense of her unconscious discourse and who experiences onerous bodily and 
emotional pain, the feminine subject is not wholly bounded by the rules of the 
signifier.  She is not pinned down by the signifier, not explained by it; she is not its 
slave.  She becomes the real (enjoying body) in the sense that she extracts from the 
Law something strange.  She shows that the signifier is stupid and cannot sustain its 
imaginary hold.  Paradoxically, she shows its stupidity by identifying with it—in other 
words, by identifying with the signifier‘s impossible representation.  She identifies 
with the impossibility of its representation.  She does not expect to receive that 
signifier from the Other, but instead becomes it (ça). 
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2.3  Ethics  
 
In Seminar VII, Lacan (1997) situates the ethics of psychoanalysis in what he 
calls the ―the tragic sense of life‖ (p. 313).  According to Lacan, tragedy has the 
cathartic aim of purging the passionate emotions of ―fear‖ and ―pity‖ (p. 247).  Lacan 
emphatically opposes the term ―ethics‖ to other terms, such as the ―sovereign good‖ 
and ―morality,‖ in order to emphasize the idea that, in psychoanalysis, we are not 
dealing with moral prohibitions and legal codes, but with the ethos of a living person 
who has habits, affects, and unrealized desires in relation to the Other.  Lacan 
opposes his notion of ethics to the traditional notion of morality.  Lacan does not 
conceptualize the ethics of psychoanalysis in the same way as we understand the law 
in terms of its coerciveness and oppressiveness.  Ethics does not refer to 
prohibitions, taboos, discursive practices, and legal codes.  For Lacan, the ethical 
subject is the subject of the drive, the subject who trespasses the mandates of the 
Law and is no longer captured by the Other‘s desire (by the Other‘s enigmatic desire) 
in assuming its own cause.  The ethical subject is the analyzed subject who is able to 
assume its own cause without being decentred by the Other‘s desire.  It no longer 
looks for anOther‘s desire to guarantee its own existence. The subject who does not 
act ethically is the one who fears the experience of finding him- or herself in an 
entirely different territory—a territory which involves his or her realization of his or 
her pure desire (Zupančič, 2000). 
Lacan tells us that psychoanalytic practice is not just the practice of 
uncovering the unconscious, but is also the practice of transforming the analysand‘s 
desire in relation to the Law.  Lacan (1997) writes, 
What the subject achieves in analysis is not just that access, even if it 
is repeated and always available, but something else that through the 
transference gives everything living its form—the subject, so to speak, 
counts the vote relative to his own law.  This law is in the first place 
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always the acceptance of something that began to be articulated 
before him in previous generations, and which is strictly speaking Atè.  
Although this Atè does not always reach the tragic level of Antigone‘s 
Atè, it is nevertheless closely related to misfortune.  (p. 300) 
 
This Atè, this misfortune, that Lacan talks about is the subject‘s second death—a 
kind of death that results in a loss, not the loss of the individual, but the loss of the 
individual‘s lack-of-being.  The ethical subject gives up her pathos by suspending her 
castration anxiety (-φ) and undergoing positivization of her castration (Φ).  
Positivization of castration implies that the subject recognizes that the Other has 
nothing more to give, that the Other is lacking and has its own desire.  The subject 
thus no longer covers over her own lack and the Other‘s lack, no longer becomes the 
object of the Other‘s desrie.  The subject instead sacrifices her own being, the being 
which is experienced as jouissance in suffering, and ends the repetitions which 
revolve around her past traumas. 
 Following Žižek (2002), a subject acts ethically when she is not spoken by the 
Other.  The Other no longer speaks through the subject.  The subject does not relate 
to the Other‘s hole, lacuna, or failure to represent her traumas, her being.  The 
ethical subject ―is the Thing directly, thus excluding herself from the community 
regulated by the intermediate agency of symbolic regulations‖ (p. 70).  The ethical 
subject, in other words, comes to be the real on her own.  She becomes the subject 
of affect, the subject of jouissance, whose desire no longer works against her own 
satisfaction and creativity. 
 By taking Sophocles‘ Antigone as an example, Lacan (1997) conceptualizes 
the ethics of desire as distinct from the ethics of traditional morality.  Lacan‘s 
admires Antigone‘s act, an act which ―both attracts us and startles us, in the sense 
of intimidates us; this terrible, self-willed victim disturbs us‖ (p. 247).  Her ethical 
act is her uncompromised willingness to deviate from the cause of her own desire—a 
kind of desire which reveals that she values her own existence or life.  Her desire 
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comes into being against the normative order of her community.  Her desire, 
however, is not just to do whatever she wants or simply to act against the rules and 
the norms of her community.  It is also not an act of submission out of fear that she 
will be punished by the superego.  Her desire reveals instead her subjective truth.  
She comes to be what she is.  She acts on and pursues her desire.   
 Following Zupančič (2000), the tragedy of pursuing desire and having access 
to jouissance (satisfaction) is to pay the price.  This price involves giving up the very 
thing that gives the subject happiness and accepting instead the risk of castration.  
This acceptance situates the subject at the point where she feels that she has 
nothing to lose in realizing her desire even at the expense of sacrificing the goods 
and the happiness which captivated her beforehand.  The ethical subject as such is 
not the subject who demands satisfaction from the Other but the subject whose 
desire is no longer compromised by the Other‘s demands. 
 One could thus end this chapter with Irigaray‘s words about speaking as a 
woman: 
[T]he issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which a woman 
would be the subject of the object but of jamming the theoretical 
machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of the 
truth and of a meaning that is excessively univocal …. a disruptive 
excess is possible on the feminine side. (1985b, pp. 77-78) 
 
To speak as a woman, and not to be spoken by the Other, not to mime the Other‘s 
deficiencies and disorders, means to evoke, not to designate; it means to exceed and 
overflow boundaries, restrictions, and oppositions.  It means to discover one‘s 
plurality, to blur the borders between science, philosophy, poetry, and fiction.  It 
means for a woman to be self-determined as regards her pleasures and definitions.  
It means to be able to create new pleasures, new representations, and new 
knowledge, to explore new realities and go beyond the dichotomous structures of 
knowledge. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Lacan‘s Subversions of Neo-Freudian Theories of Hysteria 
 
In the contemporary dominant psychoanalytic milieu in the United States, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis has been left out of clinical practice and theory.  Most 
clinicians today make a diagnosis on the basis of what they consider to be socially 
desirable and adaptive behaviors.  Hysteria has been reduced to negative 
characterological traits.  Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts claim that they reject trait 
theories and the static attributes that one finds in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), because their attempt is to theorize hysteria 
on the basis of the more complex and interpersonal dynamics behind the symptoms.  
However, neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theories provide many unclear explanations 
and constructs that give us the sense that they do not differ much from the 
psychiatric nomenclatures.  In mainstream psychoanalysis, hysteria is theorized 
based on the analysis of defenses.  Unconscious desire is reduced to the analyst‘s 
own demands, ego-identifications, and interpretations of what is real and unreal.   
Reading, for example, the chapter on hysteria in Gabbard‘s (2000) well-
known book, Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Clinical Practice, published by the 
American Psychiatric Press, we see how hysteria has been theorized by the logic of 
current trends in psychoanalysis and psychiatry.  Even when neo-Freudians explain 
hysteria on the basis of the interpersonal dynamics behind what one sees in the 
patient‘s symptoms, their explanations do not differ from the DSM‘s ―atheoretical‖ 
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listing of overt symptoms and behaviors, when they conclude that hysterics are 
orally fixated,23 primitive, demanding, attention-seeking, flirtatious, and 
manipulative by exhibiting acting-out behaviors24 with narcissistic, masochistic, and 
borderline features (Gabbard, 2000).  Consequently, psychotherapists focus solely on 
the elimination of symptoms without taking into much consideration how these 
                                                          
23 Gabbard concentrates on Freud‘s theory of fixation.  In Freud‘s theory, fixation is tied to a particular 
developmental sexual stage, because its instinctual component is more powerful than the corresponding 
instincts of other sexual stages.  In fixation, the individual‘s libido continues to derive satisfaction from 
that particular instinct and this satisfaction evolves into a symptom (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).  Lacan 
(1998a), on the other hand, reinterprets Freud‘s theory of the drive.  For Lacan, the drive is determined in 
part by the function of the signifier and refers ―to a strong, or even overwhelming want or requirement 
that feels like a necessity, but that is in fact not a matter of survival‖ (Jaanus, 1995, p. 120).  Lacan 
states that the function of drive is jouissance (satisfaction).  It seeks jouissance without moderation.  
However, the drive has nothing to do with reproduction, instincts, and biological needs, e.g., hunger and 
thirst, because satisfaction of need does not satisfy the drive.  Whereas satisfaction of need produces 
homeostasis in the organism, the drive, which is a constant force towards jouissance, alters this 
homeostasis.  In Écrits, Lacan refers to the drive with the notation, S‹›D, and states that it is the result of 
the Other‘s demand when the subject vanishes in that demand (692/817).  Any demand that comes from 
the Other makes the subject experience a lack of full satisfaction.  The subject fades in the Other‘s 
signifiers.  It has to consider the Other‘s demands in order to become satisfied.  The aim of the drive is to 
rectify an absolute state of satisfaction, which, of course, always falls short.  Lacan (1998a) argues that 
the drive‘s aim of satisfaction is paradoxical.  When satisfaction is defined by the field of the Other, the 
subject suffers from symptoms and renounces pleasure. 
 Gabbard conceptualizes the histrionic subject, who suffers from symptoms of dependency, 
helplessness, and separation anxiety, as the one who has not managed to attain ―mature whole-object 
relations‖ from both parents (p. 521).  For Gabbard, the histrionic‘s mother failed to provide enough 
nurturance and the patient failed to resolve the Oedipal complex.  In her unconscious mind, the histrionic 
substitutes the maternal breast for the paternal penis, but this substitution is not satisfying, because she 
longs for the maternal breast.  For Lacan, the oral drive, the mouth rim, is an erogenous zone, but there is 
no specific object that satisfies it.  The hysteric, as a desiring split subject, is dependent on the Other‘s 
demands and desires.  The hysteric confuses object a—the residue of symbolization—with the object that 
she assumes the Other desires and demands.  In the case of hysteria, when the drive is connected to the 
symbolic Other and the subject desires a representation of the maternal Thing, the subject‘s drive is not 
erotogenic, but is linked to dissatisfaction and disgust.  When the drive is limited to the symbolic order, in 
other words to an unconscious unsatisfied desire, it loses its erogenicity and correlates with death 
(Brousse, 1995, p. 114).  Lacan differentiates the subject as drive from the subject as demand and as 
desire (Écrits, 722-725/851-854; Miller, 1996; Fink, 1997, pp. 207-217).  Lacan (1998a) explains that, in 
hysteria, the oral drive links to the economy of desire.  The hysteric derives jouissance from desexualized 
digestive zones, as we see, for example, in reactions of disgust and vomiting.  In hysteria, the 
eroticization of the mouth is excluded and other desexualized zones become prominent sources of 
jouissance (pp. 172-173). 
24 According to Gabbard (2000), hysterical patients often act-out in transference.  For Gabbard, acting-out 
is a defense mechanism that describes hysterics‘ inability to verbalize anxiety and unconscious wishes 
towards their therapists.  Hysterics act out by engaging in self-destructive behaviors.  Lacan (1962-1963) 
differs from Gabbard by formulating acting out in relation to the symbolic Other and not to the imaginary 
concrete otherness of the therapist, parent, and any other authority figure.  Lacan describes acting out as 
wild transference but addressed to the Other‘s desire.  He points out that if the analyst interprets the 
acting out, the analyst then has very little effect on the analysand.  The analysand knows what he/she is 
doing and resists the analyst‘s interpretation.  The analysand questions the remainder of the analyst‘s 
interpretation and exposes its impasse.  If the analyst prohibits the analysand‘s acting out, the analysand 
acts out even more.  In reality, the subject does not want to act out, but continues to do so when the 
analyst reinforces strengthening the ego in their therapeutic relationship.  Lacan suggests that the analyst 
needs to occupy the position of the Other and listen to the analysand‘s unconscious desire.  Lacan (1992) 
also argues that when the analyst interprets on the basis of what is real or unreal for the analysand and 
provides a ―premature interpretation,‖ without inquiring further as to the analysand‘s desire, the 
analysand is more likely to act out (pp. 79-80).  Acting out is not exclusive to hysteria.  All patients, 
regardless of their diagnostic structure, may act out (see Fink‘s discussion of Kris‘s case of an obsessive 
man who acted out by craving fresh brains, 2004, pp. 52-62). 
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symptoms correspond to the relation to the symbolic Other—a relation which is 
dissymmetrical—and to the gap between language and jouissance.  Whereas in 
Lacan‘s theory, manifest symptoms are slippery and have a multiplicity of meanings, 
Gabbard‘s descriptions of symptoms, analyses of defenses, and interpersonal 
dynamics propagate a form of psychoanalysis that tends to catalogue censored and 
marginalized personality traits.  It is as if these traits reside inside hysterics or are 
parts of their psychological make-up, which determine what they do, think, and say.  
It is obviously not surprising to find this banal simplicity in the descriptions of all 
personality disorders.  We frequently find the same symptoms, patterns, and even 
etiological explanations across all diagnostic categories. 
Furthermore, psychoanalysts and feminists, who combine British object 
relations with Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory in order to explain hysteria, fail to 
conceptualize the substantial differences between these two theories.  These authors 
provide incoherent and inaccurate structural descriptions of hysteria and reach 
theoretical impasses.  
An example of this impasse can be observed in Bollas‘ (2000) descriptions of 
a hysterical patient who was a transference addict and stayed in a state of 
entrenchment—a state in which she remained in limbo with her symptoms.  Bollas 
finds that she was untreatable for the reason that her symptoms were expressions of 
her erotic life.  Based on his reflections on Lacan‘s theory, the author explains that 
this patient idealized her analyst by positioning herself as incomplete and the analyst 
as powerful, but when the analyst failed to maintain that power, she chose another 
one to sustain her entrenchment and eroticism.  Based on his reflections on object 
relations theory, Bollas interprets the hysteric‘s transference as a repetition of the 
internalized maternal object.  The general principle of object relations theory is that 
the maternal object is construed either as good or bad and is thus experienced as 
satisfying or persecutory.  Bollas describes the maternal object‘s function in hysteria 
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as a split between genital dissatisfaction and performative excitation.  According to 
Bollas, the hysteric‘s embodied self is sexually deprived and her 
performative/narrative self is ecstatic.  In other words, the patient behaved in the 
same ways towards her analysts as her mother did towards her at an early age.  The 
patient eroticized the exchanges of gazes, performances, and narratives with her 
analysts and refused satisfaction by genital intercourse with partners. Similarly, 
Gabbard describes hysterical and borderline25 patients as lacking self-continuity and 
as exhibiting a fragmented and incomplete sense of self which is projected onto 
others.  Gabbard suggests that ―the therapist‘s task is to connect these fragmented 
aspects of the patient‘s self and interpret the underlying anxieties connected with re-
owning and integrating the disparate self-representations into a coherent whole‖ (p. 
445).   
A number of points can be made to show how Lacan subverts the above 
theories considerably.  Although Bollas‘ and Gabbard‘s observations may describe 
some of the overt symptoms of hysteria, we should keep in mind that they diverge 
from Lacan‘s formulation of hysteria in relation to the Other.  For Lacan, the hysteric 
is a split subject.  Lacan‘s description of splitting, however, is not the same as Bollas‘ 
descriptions of the hysteric‘s dissociation between the performative and the sexual 
self or the same as Gabbard‘s descriptions of fragmentations with his goal to 
transform these patients into whole persons.  Instead, the splitting that Lacan refers 
to is essentially the splitting between the signifier and the signified.  One‘s 
pronunciation of a signifier does not make us understand its signified (meaning) in a 
                                                          
25 Bollas (2000) suggests that the borderline person is different from the hysteric.  He argues that the 
borderline has experienced the mother as causing excessive turbulence to the self by arousing feelings of 
anxiety, rage, shock, and loss.  The borderline projects turbulent states of mind onto others (p. 9).  The 
hysteric, on the other hand, experiences intense maternal love, but ―[w]hat is missing … is an unconscious 
sense of maternal desire for the child‘s sexual body—especially the genitals‖ (p. 12).  In Lacanian theory, 
however, there is no differentiation between hysteria and borderline personality disorder.  As Fink (2007) 
points out, in Lacan‘s theory, ―neurosis is defined by repression whereas psychosis is defined by 
foreclosure … there can be no genuine borderland between neurosis and psychosis‖ (p. 260).  Thus, from 
a Lacanian perspective, one is diagnosed as either psychotic or neurotic.  In Lacan‘s oeuvre, diagnoses are 
not limited to descriptions of manifest symptoms but are rather structural and far more rigorous in theory 
than the diagnoses we find in contemporary psychiatry and psychoanalysis. 
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clear manner.  Patients who display various behaviors which are not clear to us at 
first become clearer only after they have the opportunity to decipher signifiers which 
have been kept out of their consciousness.  The symptom is thus articulated by the 
signifiers and fixes the subject to a certain mode of jouissance.  These signifiers shift 
meanings when the patient interacts with a symbolic Other (the analyst) and when 
the patient has the opportunity to dialectize them.  As Lacan shows in his Écrits (pp. 
428-429/515), when the signifier is dialectized, it shows that it is not fixed to a 
single representation but rather condenses one configuration of meanings within 
another by its metaphoric function and instates ―lack of being [le manque de l’être] 
in the object relation‖ by its metonymic function (p. 428/515).  There is thus a 
structural disjunction between the conscious meaning of one‘s discourse and the 
unconscious desire that is formulated in signifiers (Fink, 2004).  One‘s designation of 
a referent—that is, of a specific object—that could satisfy one‘s desire is never clear 
or constant in one‘s speech.  Desire is thus structurally unsatisfiable, because the 
subject is always left to desire something more and something else as soon as one 
satisfies one‘s needs. 
Following Fink (2004), whereas patients are defensive and transference 
addicts, the manifestations of these overt symptoms should not be the pivotal 
focuses in analysis.  Defenses are designed to keep the unconscious under the 
surface.  In speech, the subject fails to show that he or she is coherent, and 
eventually produces various forms of slips, ambiguous idiomatic expressions, and 
double entendres.  The surface signifiers in one‘s discourse have nothing to do with 
one‘s overall personality, and thus when the analyst and the analysand decipher 
signifiers, they are not engaged in interpretations of personality characteristics or of 
the self.  The analyst is instead interested in the analysand‘s discourse, which 
employs ―well-known rhetorical figures to keep from saying certain things and to 
keep certain ideas from surfacing‖ (p. 72).   The subject dialectizes unconscious 
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signifiers when the analyst adopts a symbolic position and listens from that position.  
The analyst thus listens neither from the position of his or her own ego nor from the 
position of the analysand‘s ego, but from the vantage point of the subject‘s symbolic 
Other.  In other words, the analyst does not take it personally how he or she is being 
treated by the analysand, for example, ―as a good object or a bad object, as a 
punitive parental figure or as a loving one, and so on‖ (Fink, 2004, p. 10).  The 
meanings that the subjects produce are not clear, but they become clearer in the 
process of deciphering unconscious signifiers, desires, and jouissances (Fink, 1999, 
2004, 2007). 
Reflecting further on Bollas‘ formulations of the subject‘s internalization of the 
maternal—I should note here that Bollas‘ notion of maternal internalization implies 
identification and does not have the same meaning as Irigaray‘s notion of maternal 
internalization, as described in chapters 1 and 2—one should mention that whereas 
the parent may be experienced as good or bad and the subject may identify with 
good or bad traits of that parent, identification is partial.  It does not imply 
unification, but is rather discreet.26  By identifying with a specific trait of someone, 
the subject does not become identical with the other (Lacan, 1961-1962, chapter 4).  
The trait that is identified with is a signifier of desire and has different meanings for 
each individual.  In addition, the meaning of the trait identified with is more likely to 
change for the subject over time.  Whereas Bollas describes the internalized object 
as temporal, constant, and fixed, Lacan formulates it in terms of the subject‘s 
relationship to the signifier of desire, which points not to a full meaning but to a cut 
and a hole.  The trait that is identified with exposes the discontinuity and 
                                                          
26 Similarly, Freud (1921) writes, the ―identification is a partial and extremely limited one and only 
borrows a single trait from the person who is its object‖ (p. 107).  Freud provides an example of a little 
girl who identified with her mother‘s cough.  Her identification signified her love for her father, but 
because she felt guilty for having the desire to take her mother‘s place, she imitated her mother‘s 
symptom.  In Dora‘s case, however, Dora‘s identification with her father‘s cough signified her admiration 
of her father and sympathy with his physical ailment.  In later years, her loss of voice and coughing 
related to her admiration of her father‘s mistress, Frau K.  In Lacan‘s reinterpretation of Freud, 
identification is conflictual and partial.  The ego copies either the beloved or the unloved object.  Symbolic 
identification is the unconscious desire of putting oneself  in the same situation as the Other‘s desire.   
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differentiation between subjects.27  By identifying with someone‘s trait, the split 
subject also identifies with the Other‘s lack and desires to be the Other‘s precious 
object so as to fill the Other‘s lack.   
Hence, identification involves not only an imaginary but also a symbolic 
dimension.  The object in itself—breast, parent, or transitional object—cannot fully 
satisfy the subject.  Unconscious desire reveals the gap between the subject‘s aim 
for satisfaction and the subject‘s attachment to a particular object.  In other words, 
Lacan rejects the dominant formulation that the hysteric fails to attain ―mature 
whole-object relations‖ (Gabbard, 2000, p. 521), because no object can give total 
satisfaction to any subject.  Paradoxically, subjects may experience objects as good 
and bad at the same time.  For example, the ―good enough parent‖ may be 
experienced as devouring by the child when that parent is always on the child‘s back 
and does not leave space for its own desire.  The bad parent may petrify the child 
with the master signifier of being a bad child and this master signifier may have 
certain effects on the child‘s sexuality and identity.  However, Lacan (1962-1963) 
argues that even when the subject is inscribed in the field of the Other by this 
master signifier, she is still something more than what that signifier describes her as.  
The unconscious subject ―cuts the Other into slices‖ (chapter 2) and situates the 
Other not as absolute but as lacking.  As Soler (1995) says, the unconscious subject 
                                                          
27 In Seminar IX, Lacan argues that identification is not unification and that there is no such thing as the 
equivalence of two signifiers, e.g., A=A.  The signifier A has fecundity and cannot be identical to itself.  
For example, we cannot say my mother is my mother, because the signifier, ―mother,‖ cannot have a 
tautological value.  Tautology makes a false signified, because it signifies nothing.  A signifier has a value 
only insofar as it is what other signifiers are not.  The function of the signifier is difference.  In Écrits (pp. 
424-435/509-523), Lacan elucidates that the functioning of signifiers in the subject‘s unconscious takes 
place by means of metaphorical and metonymical processes.  Signifiers are irreducible to the elements of 
language we use consciously.  The functions of metaphor and metonymy show that there is not any real 
resemblance between signifiers, but that two or more signifiers link together through a third term.  The 
third term is the signifier of desire and links words together by constituting them as similar.  For example, 
if we say, ―Melina is a workaholic like her mother,‖ we situate the signifier, ―workaholic,‖ as the mediator 
between Melina and her mother in order to understand Melina as similar to her mother.  Nevertheless, the 
signifier, ―workaholic,‖ which combines two other signifiers, ―work‖ and ―alcoholic,‖ is understood in the 
chain of many other signifiers and does not have the same meaning in Melina‘s unconscious as in her 
mother‘s unconscious.  When Melina identifies with her mother‘s trait, she situates her mother as the 
Other of authority.  Her mOther is not simply understood in terms of her personality qualities but rather as 
the bearer of a message.  Melina is constituted by that message and the content of this signifier forms her 
personality in various possible ways.  
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who asks about the cause of her symptoms vacillates ―between petrification and 
indeterminacy, petrification by the signifier and indeterminacy within the slippage of 
meaning.  That‘s what we might call the impasse of the subject of the signifier‖ (p. 
48). 
The hysteric‘s vacillation between petrification and indeterminacy vis-à-vis the 
Other is clearly shown in Irigaray‘s (2002) research study on hysterical grammar of 
enunciation.  Irigaray concludes her analysis of hysterical discourse with the 
following findings: 
a) The hysteric often utters I and you as if both were equal.  She pronounces 
you more frequently.  She relies on you in order for her to make a choice 
or take action.  The subject in her discourse is always you. 
b) She pronounces action verbs, the active voice, and the present and future 
tenses more frequently than the passive voice and the past tense.  Her 
enunciation is ongoing and not complete. 
c) She continually questions the addressee‘s message regarding its 
incompleteness and ambiguity. 
It is obvious that Irigaray‘s findings support Lacan‘s theory of hysterical discourse 
(Lacan, 2007).  From Irigaray‘s findings, we see that the hysteric is alienated in the 
Other‘s enunciations but also brings forth the real of these enunciations.  She 
identifies with the rem(a)inder of the Other‘s signifiers and constructs the Other not 
as a closed system but rather as an open and incomplete one.   
Whereas the subject seeks to understand its identity fully and identifies with 
socially acceptable ideologies, the subject stumbles upon alienation and lack.  
Lacan‘s main thesis is that the subject is what one signifier represents to another 
signifier.  As Lacan (1961-1962) writes, ―The signifier, as opposed to the sign, is not 
what represents something to someone; it is what represents the subject [to] 
another signifier‖ (chapter 4).  Although we consciously associate subjectivity with 
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fixed and stable meanings, Lacan tells us that the psychoanalyst‘s main task is to go 
beyond this conscious lure and redirect him- or herself to the logic of the signifier—to 
the logic that the subject is caused and divided by the signifier.  For Lacan, subjects 
derive meanings and coherence from the network of signifiers.  The signifier has 
primacy over the signified and the subject is captured by the signifier‘s play of 
successive substitutions.   In the ―Seminar on the Purloined Letter‖ (Écrits, pp. 6-
48), Lacan describes the signifier as preeminent over the subject and says that its 
displacements and substitutions determine the subject‘s acts and destiny.  In his 
analysis of Poe‘s (1912) famous story of the ―Purloined Letter,‖ all of the 
characters—some of whom did not know how to find the letter, others of whom did 
not know the letter‘s content, and still others of whom did not know how to act upon 
the consequences if the letter was revealed—were mobilized and kept in suspense by 
the signifier, which took the form of a letter.28   
Lacan‘s analysis of Poe‘s story teaches us that the unconscious is manifested 
by the displacement and substitution of the signifier, which nevertheless the speaker 
and the listener may find unimportant.  In order for the analyst and analysand to 
decipher the encoded message of a symptom, they will have to see how the signifier 
                                                          
28
 In Poe‘s story, the Minister, who stole a letter from the Queen and replaced it with a fake one and had 
the power to jeopardize the Queen‘s status, ended up not using it in any significant way.  The letter 
constituted him as a personage.  As Lacan states, the Minister was constituted as an ―absolute master‖ by 
the Queen, because the Queen knew that the Minister was the robber of that letter and knew that he was 
capable of abusing his power by having it in his possession (Écrits, p. 24/33).  The Minister did not have 
control over that letter, but, instead, the letter inhabited, superimposed, and inscribed the topography of 
his unconscious.  Lacan also reminds us that ―the letter which the Minister addresse[d] to himself, 
ultimately [was] a letter from a woman‖ (Écrits, p. 25/35).  The Queen, who was powerless to act, was 
forced to accept the Minister‘s authority over her own destiny.  Lacan writes, ―ladies, as we know, detest it 
when principles are called into question, for their charms owe much to the mystery of the signifier‖ (Écrits, 
p. 29/40).  The Queen, as a woman, was caught in the desire of the Minister and entrapped in his phallic 
personage of omnipotence, only to prove later on, that by being totally inscribed within the symbolic 
function, she was in some sense outside it.   By yielding the signifier of desire to the Minister, her 
subjectivity was mediated by the male Other, but she also situated her existence as indeterminate within 
the symbolic order.  In fantasy, the Minister existed in the finitudes and pretentions of his powerful 
personage, only to find out to his surprise that the signifier represented his limits and inconsistencies. The 
Minister became the addressee of that letter, because it concealed a truth:  it concealed the flaws of the 
meaning which it intended to deliver.  The Minister was consciously blinded by the way that letter 
maintained his desire and jouissance.  He unconsciously turned the letter over to the Queen, in the same 
way as the Queen turned the letter over to him, in order to continue having access to the image that was 
lacking in him and the jouissance which supplemented that lack. 
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constitutes the analysand‘s personage and how its encoded message reveals the 
analysand‘s unsatisfied unconscious desire.  In Poe‘s story, for example, we read 
that the police used ingenious and mechanical tactics to search for the letter in the 
Minister‘s apartment without realizing how the Minister maintained an unconscious 
desire in relation to the Queen.  When the Minister was gone from his apartment, the 
police used objective methods to investigate where the Minister hid the letter, but 
the police did not succeed in finding the letter by using these ingenious investigative 
methods.  The police failed to understand the Minister‘s logic:  they failed to realize 
how the Minister maintained his unconscious desire in relation to the Queen and how 
he did not use the letter as it was commonly expected.  The letter rather inscribed a 
unique message to the Minister‘s unconscious and incarnated a particular form of 
jouissance, and so certainly the letter could not be deciphered when one used 
―objective‖ or imaginary techniques without looking at his own symbolic relationship 
with the Other. 
Lacan also uses mathematics and set theory to show readers that even in the 
logic of rigorous and conscious calculations one encounters conclusive impossibilities 
and manifestations of the real.  As Fink (1995a, 1995b) explains with clarity, in the 
Postface to the ―Seminar on ‗The Purloined Letter,‘‖ by using the example of coin 
tosses and grouping them by threes, Lacan demonstrates the linguistic structure of 
the unconscious and shows how ―the real manifests itself within the symbolic, and 
thus point[s] to the limits of ‗literalization‘‖ (Fink, 1995a, p. 153).  Using the coin 
toss combinations as an analogy, Lacan shows that the syntax of the signifying chain 
allows certain combinations to occur but excludes others (see Fink, 1995a, pp. 153-
164).   
What we learn from this analogy is that, when a subject repeats a symptom, 
the subject itself is not only a construction of the Other‘s signs, but also a failure to 
represent the object of a ―lost satisfaction‖ (Fink, 1995b, p. 228) and, thus, to 
91 
 
represent what remains as an unsatisfying desire.  The subject repeats an automatic 
and law-like chain of signifiers, but also circles around the cause of its symptoms.  
The signifier that describes that cause is excluded from consciousness.  The subject 
aims to get at an early trauma, but it cannot find the words to say it.  In Fink‘s 
(1995b) words, ―Repetition thus involves the ‗impossible to think‘ and the ‗impossible 
to say‘‖ (p. 225).  Lacan (1998a) shows the difference between tuche (τύχη) (the 
real cause of repetition) and automaton (αυτόματο) (the automatic return of signs) 
by arguing that behind the endless automatic repetitions of a symptom, which 
situate the subject in ―alienation of its meaning‖ (p. 61), there is the real, which 
presents itself in the form of an ―unassimilable … trauma‖ (p. 55).  This 
―unassimilable … trauma‖ is gotten at in analysis by the analysand‘s free associations 
to dreams and fantasies.  Dreams and the fundamental fantasy unveil an 
unrepresentable desire for the primal object, which is imagined by the subject as the 
source of total satisfaction.  In dreams and fantasies, the subject situates the Other 
as the one who has inhibited its pursuit of satisfaction.  The subject repeats a 
symptom compulsively, because it aims to maintain the desire to articulate this 
unassimilable thought. 
Lacan has his own logic.  By using mathemes to demonstrate his 
psychoanalytic logic, he shows that the real, as it manifests itself in the metonymies 
of desire and as jouissance, precedes language and that it stands apart, ex-sists with 
respect to our common understanding of reality.  The real is the disharmony, the 
anomaly that leads to the impossibility of complete symbolization.  It is that which is 
not yet represented by signifiers but what remains to be represented when the 
subject dialectizes the metaphors and metonymies of the unconscious.  It is for that 
reason that Lacan writes, 
Mathematization alone reaches a real—and it is in that respect that it 
is compatible with our discourse, analytic discourse—a  real that has 
nothing to do with what traditional knowledge has served as a basis 
92 
 
for, which is not what the latter believes it to be—namely reality—but 
rather fantasy.  The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking 
body, the mystery of the unconscious.  (Lacan, 1998, p. 131) 
 
Signs and symbols have limits.  There is something above and beyond the realm of 
meaning, something outside and in excess of language.  The real imposes 
discontinuities and impasses in the signifying chain and accounts for the impossibility 
of having pre-existing sets of laws and grammatical rules.   
In his discussions of Frege‘s logic and Russell‘s paradox, for example, Lacan 
(1961-1962) discusses how logicians arrive at an impasse when they reduce 
signifiers to unambiguous representations and homogeneity.  Lacan‘s logic radically 
differs from the logic we find in analytic philosophy.29  In Seminar IX, Lacan (1961-
1962) tells us that Russell‘s question about the set of all the sets which do not 
include themselves, more particularly, his question whether or not that set includes 
itself, misses the point because a set functions as a signifier (chapter 9).  Just as no 
signifier can signify itself, a set cannot signify itself.  In fact, Lacan tells us, in order 
for a signifier to signify something, it has to ―be pos[it]ed as different [from] itself‖ 
(chapter 17).  He shows that the impasse that arises from the logic of self-reference 
is the result of the signifier‘s metonymic function.  As Lacan (1998b) writes, ―the 
references or things the signifier serves to approach remain approximate—
                                                          
29 Bertrand Russell, who was an analytical mathematician in the early 1900‘s, disproved Gottlob Frege‘s 
ambitious efforts to establish a law of non-contradiction.  Frege attempted to establish a mathematical 
propositional law that would ensure that the knowledge one could derive from it was an indisputable 
certainty.  His infamous Basic Law V expressed the following:  If all Fs are Gs then the class of F is 
identical to the class of G.  Frege‘s Basic Law V was translated mathematically in the following way:  
(∀a (Fa = Ga)) ↔ ({x/Fx} = {y/Gy}).  In other words, the set of Fs is the same as the set of Gs if every F 
is a G and every G is an F.  If we take, for example, the proposition, ―Something is a tree and is in this 
garden,‖ the ―something‖ is an indeterminate x.  We can substitute the x with an object that is associated 
with the concept, ―tree in this garden.‖  Russell disproved Frege on the notion of set theory by identifying 
a paradoxical problem.  He showed that not all objects behave in accordance with this equation.  Although 
we can identify a collection of ―trees in this garden,‖ it would be problematic to identify objectively a set of 
―good books in this library.‖  Russell also showed a paradox that was similar to Epimenides‘ liar‘s paradox.  
Epimenides‘ statement, ―All Cretans are liars,‖ was paradoxical.  Being Cretan himself, the question that 
arose from that statement was, ―Is what he says true or false?‖  Russell‘s paradox recognized the problem 
of self-reference and showed that arguments and functions are not as clear and non-contradictory as 
Frege intended to prove.  The statement, for example, A = ―the set of all sets that don‘t contain 
themselves as elements,‖ raises the question, ―Is set A an element of itself?‖ This question is similar to 
the Liar‘s paradox.  If set A is an element of itself, then it isn‘t an element of itself by definition.  However, 
if set A is not an element of itself, then it is an element of itself by definition (Roberts, 1992, pp. 78-79). 
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macroscopic …. [T]he signified misses the referent‖ (p. 20).  The signifier cannot 
represent fully what it intends to represent and, consequently, the subject cannot 
say fully what he intends to say.   
 
§ 
Reflecting further on Lacan‘s anti-essentialist approach to his theories of 
symptoms and identifications, and his substantial deviations from the neo-Freudian 
understandings of ―wholeness‖ and the ―self,‖ one should be clear that the Lacanian 
subject comes to be as a failure to be inscribed as a stable meaning within language.  
The subject‘s discursive positions and identifications overlap with the metaphorical 
and metonymical functions of words and meanings.   When Lacan (1998b) says that 
the ―signifier … is characterized by the fact that it represents a subject to another 
signifier‖ and that ―a sign is not the sign of some thing, but of an effect that is what 
is presumed as such by a functioning of the signifier‖ (p. 49), he is saying that the 
subject is not reducible to representations and meanings.  Meaning is unstable 
because it is not found in any one single signifier, but in the play between signifiers.  
The notion that the subject acquires an identity from the Other is not different from 
contemporary psychological theories.  But Lacan subverts these theories by locating 
the Other as the locus of signifiers and not of signs.  For Lacan, the subject is caused 
by the splitting between the signifier and the signified.   
The desiring subject and the Other are involved in a dialectical relationship.  
They both ask each other the question: ―Chè vuoi?‖  ―What do you want?‖ (Écrits, p. 
690/815).  The Other, therefore, calls the subject‘s existence into question.  The 
subject encounters the trauma of being questioned whether it is legitimate enough 
for the Other and, hence, whether or not its identifications with external images and 
social ideals are justifiable.  The unconscious subject thwarts the possibility of 
coherence and the subject never gets an ultimate confirmation from the Other about 
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the unity of its identity.  The unconscious subject wants to be the signifier of the 
Other‘s desire.  The Other, as the locus of speech, cannot point to a single signifier of 
his desire and so the unconscious subject is in conflict with its ego and with the 
external discourses and images that promise self-coherence, unity, and satisfaction.  
In the same vein, the subject questions the validity and power of the Law.  When the 
desiring subject situates itself in the interrogative dialectics of Chè vuoi?, it prevents 
the Other‘s signifying system from being complete.  After all, as is often the case, 
one can have all kinds of phallic gratifications, from social recognition to wealth, and 
still experience a profound discontentment and dissatisfaction with life.  
In Seminar IX, Lacan (1961-1962) further elucidates that when the subject 
identifies with the Other‘s trait, that trait constructs the subject‘s singular identity.  
The trait that the subject identifies with is initially marked as an image, but is then 
―effaced‖ from its status as an image and becomes transformed into a signifier.   
Lacan goes so far as to say that the paradox of the unary trait is that ―the more it 
resembles‖ the Other whom the subject identifies with, the more this resemblance is 
effaced and supports ―difference as such‖ (chapter 10).  When the subject identifies 
with the Other‘s trait, the subject is not fused, merged, or amalgamated with the 
Other; needless to say, the subject is not even in harmony or allied with the Other.  
On the contrary, the subject who identifies with the Other‘s unique trait, whose value 
is arbitrary but yet significant for the subject, fades in his or her unconscious 
displacements of signifiers. 
The unary trait is a unique value for the subject and thus functions as a One.  
By identifying with a trait of a loved object, the subject initially covers up his or her 
own emptiness and acquires a sense of being.  The unary trait also inscribes 
particular conditions of jouissance which involve the loved object.  What remains as 
a leftover from the symbolization of the trait is experienced by the subject as a 
particular corporal tension.  The unary trait marks the body as ―an enjoying 
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substance‖—in other words, it corporizes, it transforms ―the body in a signifying 
way‖ (Lacan, 1998b, p. 23).   
Regardless of the subject‘s identification with the Other‘s single trait, the 
subject attempts to enunciate its own wholeness and unity and demands absolute 
love from the Other.   In its attempts to construct a whole, the subject finds itself at 
odds with what remains failing, unrepresentable, incomplete, and unsymbolizable.  
Language fails the subject.  The Other as language is fundamentally flawed and thus 
the subject finds out that there is no ultimate guarantor for its own completeness 
and consistency.   
The split subject, Lacan (1961-1962) tells us, desires to know.  It desires to 
know the trace which has appeared and has disappeared and has thus not been 
structured as whole and fulfilling.  Through the automatism of repetition (repetition 
compulsion), the subject insists on something which is nothing other in its essence 
than a signifier, as it is rooted in an original unary trait (chapter 13).  The subject 
fades in the function of the signifier and makes the same cycle of repetitions.  The 
subject circles around a torus-like ring in a repetitive attempt to master the hole at 
its center (the real, jouissance), repeating the same symptoms over and over again.  
As Lacan says, ―something happened at the origin which is the whole system of the 
trauma … something which took on from that time the form‖ of the unary trait.  The 
subject repeats the same symptom by attempting to re-emerge from that trait and 
the lost object of satisfaction.30  The subject becomes a pure sufferer and is sucked 
                                                          
30 Freud‘s case of Emma, a case study of a female hysteric, is a good example with which to demonstrate 
how the unary trait gets transformed into a signifier.  Emma was an anxious girl who was afraid of going 
into stores alone because she thought that people were making fun of her clothes.  Her anxieties were 
related to two early memories.  At age twelve, Emma went into a store alone and thought that the store 
assistants laughed at her clothes.  Emma became attracted to one of them.  At a younger age, a 
shopkeeper pinched her under her dress and thus Emma had a memory trace of someone who 
experienced sexual attraction towards her for the first time.  Emma‘s anxiety about going into stores alone 
was retroactively related to the mark that the Other stamped onto her body for the first time, inscribing 
her sexuality through the intervention of the signifier, which was the signifier of his desire for her (see 
Lacan, 1997, pp. 73-74).  Emma thus identified with the shopkeeper‘s sexual attraction towards her, 
which elicited sexual jouissance, and was transformed into a signifier of desire (into a symptom) that gave 
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in by that which ―it speaks‖ (ça parle).  Its living being is caught up in the 
mechanisms of the signifier (chapter 6). 
The nature of the unary trait is to be lacking.  As Lacan states, only in the 
absence of the mother‘s breast is the subject able to identify the breast as a partial 
love object and substitute for its absence with words.  The subject‘s memory trace of 
the mother‘s breast is elevated to an unattainable object a—object cause of desire—
when it changes its status from that which supplies milk and satisfies the need of 
hunger to that which brings forth an unsatisfied desire for absolute love and 
wholeness.  Oral demand thus situates the memory trace of the mother‘s breast as 
an exclusive possibility of unity and wholeness.  At the level of demand, the subject 
poses the implicit question, ―What do I want?‖ when it speaks to the Other, but at 
the level of desire, the subject wants ―nothing maybe‖ (chapter 14).  The enunciated 
―nothing‖ poses the initial question of the impossibility of determining how the 
subject can really be satisfied by the object‘s partial nature.  Lacan, however, 
specifies that this is the difference between enunciation and the enunciated.  At the 
level of enunciation, the subject reproduces the sign, the meaning of something the 
subject wants, but at the level of the enunciated (i.e., what is stated), the sign shifts 
to the level of the signifier where the subject is articulated in an indefinite sliding of 
meanings. 
Is the subject a sign?  Since the Other is impotent to provide ultimate 
answers to the subject, the subject is ―the sign of nothing‖ (chapter 14).  The 
subject is thus dependent on the Other for its desire.  It desires the Other for its 
impossibility to say it all and for its possibility that the Other is hiding a precious 
object that could supposedly be given to the subject to achieve a sublime 
satisfaction.   As Lacan writes, ―The object of desire exists as this very nothing which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
an account of that original mark from the Other (S1).  One could argue that her anxiety to go into a store 
reenacted her anxiety of losing the object that was the source of a supplementary jouissance. 
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the Other cannot know to be all it consists in‖ (chapter 14).  The Other‘s incapacity 
to provide this precious object leads the desiring subject to exclude the Other for not 
knowing.  The neurotic, Lacan tells us, excludes the Other‘s ignorance by designating 
him- or herself as a victim and by telling the Other, ―It is absolutely necessary that 
you should know‖ (chapter 14).  The desiring subject posits itself as a real, as 
impossible, in the face of the Other.  More particularly, the hysteric posits herself as 
the sign that could possibly complete the Other—a sign that marks the Other but is 
of course constituted as impossible. 
In Encore, Lacan (1998b) asks the question, ―To be hysterical or not—that is 
truly the question.  Is there One or not?‖ (p. 102).  The hysteric desires the One 
from the Other—the One which is ―the function of desire‖ (Lacan, 1961-1962, 
chapter 10).  By identifying with the Other‘s single traits, the hysteric aims at the 
Other‘s castration and not at the Other‘s jouissance, though she contemplates what 
this Other jouissance is, what makes the Other not-wholly inscribed within the phallic 
function, and how the Other jouissance escapes the symbolic.  In Seminar XVII, 
Lacan (2007) maintains that the hysteric identifies with the Other because she wants 
the Other to be a master.  She wants the Other to be the master of knowledge, ―but 
at the same time she doesn‘t want him to know so much that he does not believe 
she is the supreme price of all his knowledge‖ (p. 129).  The One that the hysteric 
identifies with is what counts to her as a phallic being, as an object of desire, as the 
one who is valued as precious but yet an impossible individual.  By wanting to be the 
phallus, she demands love; she demands to be the one who can plug up the lack in 
the Other.  Yet she refuses to give her body as a sexual body and withholds pleasure 
from the Other.  In the case of Dora, for example, Dora‘s identification with Frau K‘s 
adorable white body, her embodied trait, and her subsequent recourse to meditating 
before the Madonna, constructed particular conditions of jouissance in regard to her 
sexual being.  Dora played the part of a man by adoring Frau K‘s body at the 
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symbolic level and the part of a woman by identifying with a man‘s interests in her.  
In both sexual identifications, Dora examined her father‘s cause of desire in order to 
acquire knowledge of the true essence of femininity. 
The hysteric plays the parts of a man and a woman in a masquerade in her 
attempts to incite the Other‘s desire for her.  Her sexual masquerade camouflages 
her desire to be the phallus for the Other and conceals her feminine jouissance.  In 
Écrits, Lacan (2006) maintains that ―in order to be the phallus—that is, the signifier 
of the Other‘s desire—… a woman rejects an essential part of femininity, namely, all 
its attributes, in the masquerade‖ (p. 583/694).  The phallic function of her 
masquerade entails a loss of being.  In her relationship with a man, the hysteric 
becomes the object cause of his desire and, by the means of triangular and at times 
quadrilateral identifications, maintains her desire dissatisfied.  As I will discuss in the 
next chapter, the hysteric conforms to what she imagines the masculine Other 
desires her to be for him. 
In this chapter, I glossed over some fundamental differences between Lacan 
and neo-Freudians on theories of hysteria.  I argued that Lacan‘s theory of hysteria 
is neither a description of characterological traits and fixations nor a list of 
symptoms.  Hysteria is a structure in relation to the Other.  When the hysteric 
complains about a symptom in analysis, the hysteric is then asked to decipher this 
symptom at two levels:  At the level of its etiological meaning—a meaning that is 
construed from the analysand‘s historical context, s(A)—and at the level of 
unconscious desire in relation to the Other, S(A), as it is deciphered from the place 
where the hysteric situates the Other in her fundamental fantasy.  In the following 
chapter, I discuss a case study of one of my own patients, who was a female 
hysteric, and provide a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation in order to show how 
the hysteric structures her desire in relation to an overbearing/oppressive male 
Other.  
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Chapter 4 
 
A Lacanian Case Formulation of a Female Hysteric  
 
The case of hysteria that I am going to describe is that of a woman in her late 
20‘s whom I saw for therapy for 30 sessions.  I refer to this patient with the 
pseudonym of Sofia.  Prior to working with me, Sofia had been in therapy with two 
other therapists for approximately two years.  By reflecting on this case, I elaborate 
on Sofia‘s relationship to the symbolic Other and issues of femininity.  Regardless of 
the patient‘s overt cooperation with her therapists, Sofia‘s case has much to teach us 
about the complexities of providing an effective treatment of hysterical symptoms.31  
This case also provokes us to raise and reflect on the following questions:   
What kind of sexual jouissance did Sofia fantasize about as a substitute for 
her unpleasurable sexual experiences with boyfriends?  What was love for Sofia and 
what did she want from men?  How can we understand Sofia‘s resistance to male 
perceptions of the female body?  How did Sofia resist the hegemonic discourses of 
gender and how did she identify with femininity and masculinity?  How did Sofia‘s 
suffering become a site of resistance to patriarchal discourses of femininity?  How did 
Sofia‘s symptoms signify a longing for the lost relationship with the maternal?   
                                                          
31 The patient whom I describe here was far from being cured of her symptoms during my therapeutic 
work with her.  Sofia saw three doctoral clinicians in training for therapy for approximately three years.  
Due to the therapists‘ end of practicum training, Sofia had to transfer to a new therapist each year.  None 
of her therapists practiced Lacanian analysis.  Sofia‘s first therapist intervened based on the eclectic 
theoretical approach; the second therapist was influenced by the object-relational approach; and I was 
influenced by the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan, but did not practice Lacanian psychoanalytic 
techniques, as they are described by Fink (2007, 1997), for example, scansion and punctuation.  I 
encouraged the patient to free associate to childhood memories, dreams, fantasies, and fleeting thoughts.  
Whereas I interpreted some of the latent contents of her dreams and fantasies, more work needed to be 
done for Sofia to realize her unconscious desires and transverse her fundamental fantasy.   
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I first provide a description of the case and then respond to the above 
questions by formulating the case from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective.  My 
purpose is to show readers that Lacan provides different answers to the above 
questions than feminists do.  In order to build a bridge between feminism and Lacan, 
it is necessary to analyze a case of female hysteria in Lacanian terms so as to reflect 
on the feminist interrogations of his theory. 
 
4.1 Description of the Case 
 
4.11 Presenting Problems 
 
 Sofia was a Caucasian female of American descent.  During the time of 
therapy with me, Sofia was 28 years of age and a single mother of an 8 year-old 
daughter.  She was a graduate student in business and worked part-time as an 
assistant at a research center.   
 She sought therapy to discuss problems maintaining good relationships with 
friends and boyfriends.  She avoided those friends who were more intelligent than 
her because of her feelings of inadequacy during conversations.  She maintained 
relationships with few friends, ―less intelligent‖ than her, but she often felt ―annoyed 
by them‖ for not understanding her views on art, politics, and gender issues.  Sofia 
fervently wished to discuss issues related to the inequalities between the sexes.  She 
believed that women should feel more comfortable with their bodies and should not 
wear Victoria‘s Secret products, e.g., ―sexy‖ underwear and sleepwear.  Sofia was 
against Victoria‘s Secret advertisements, because, as she said, they portrayed 
women as ―very thin‖ and ―sex slaves of men.‖  When she was an adolescent, Sofia 
received Victoria‘s Secret catalogues and other women‘s magazines but, after her 
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pregnancy, she stopped buying them because she realized that she should not 
support their advertisements. 
Sofia dated a man who was six years older than her, whom I refer to as 
Gerald.  Sofia had already been involved with Gerald for approximately three years 
when she began therapy with me.  Sofia described herself as being deeply in love 
with him.  Gerald, however, did not identify himself as her boyfriend and did not 
commit himself exclusively to her.  Sofia and Gerald often met and had sexual 
relations, but soon after their intimate encounters, they argued over ―small issues‖ 
and separated for short periods of time.  Sofia described him as a ―controlling man‖ 
who showed little affection or consideration for her and was insensitive to her 
feelings.  Gerald used to take care of Sofia‘s daughter or wash her dishes when he 
wanted to have sex with her, but he also used to tell her that he dated other women.  
Sofia was attracted to his ―knowledge, skills, and aloofness.‖  She longed for his 
affection, but Gerald never told her that he loved her.  Although she had numerous 
verbal conflicts with him, she also made many efforts to maintain their relationship.  
Sofia was both submissive to him and defiant regarding the limited nature of their 
relationship.   
Gerald asked Sofia once to shave her pubic hair before he would give her oral 
sex.  Gerald found that she had ―too much hair‖ around her genitalia.  Gerald also 
complained to Sofia that she did not dress up in as feminine a manner as he liked.  
When I asked her what she thought of Gerald‘s requests, Sofia said she was against 
Sports’ Illustrated issues, which portrayed women as shaved and thin, and which 
influenced men to desire these sorts of women.  Sofia became infuriated with Gerald, 
explaining that she found his demands offensive.  Sofia complained that, as a single 
and working mother, she did not have the time to do extra shaving or dress up in a 
more feminine way.  Sofia added that she perceived herself as dressing in a feminine 
manner, but did not have time to make herself look ―sexy.‖  Sofia sometimes 
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complied with his demands after an argument, because she was fearful that if she 
failed to satisfy his demands, Gerald would leave her for another woman.  When 
Gerald was more available, Sofia refused to be submissive and had arguments with 
him. 
 Sofia expressed ambivalence about maintaining long-lived and steady 
relationships with men due to her concern with losing her ―independence‖ and with 
being ―easily bored.‖  Sofia found Gerald‘s aloofness seductive.  When he was 
inaccessible to her, she wished she was married and had a ―normal romantic life.‖  
After an argument with Gerald, Sofia was tearful and wished to have a married life 
with him.  When both were intimate, Sofia found herself resisting the constraints of 
their relationship.  Sofia believed that men oppress women by placing high 
expectations on their appearances and roles in the family.   
 Sofia had had many boyfriends over the years.  Since the age of 13, she had 
had casual sex even with those who did not identify themselves as her boyfriends.  
During her high school years, Sofia used to smoke marijuana, drink alcohol, skip 
school, and associate with friends and boyfriends who behaved in similar ways.   
After she gave birth to her daughter in her early 20‘s, she drank alcohol and 
smoked cigarettes at night by herself in order to overcome feelings of intense 
sadness, boredom, and psychological emptiness.  While she was drunk on her own, 
Sofia cried, listened to ―depressive‖ music, wrote poems and stories, and played 
solitaire for hours.  Although she often regretted spending long hours engaged in 
those activities, she found herself as if she was able to take away her ―social mask‖ 
and be herself while drunk.  Sofia associated her playing solitaire with her tendency 
to be alone for hours and lament her loneliness and social limitations. 
 When Sofia was around other people, she felt as if she was ―wearing a mask‖ 
for them.  Sofia‘s use of the word ―mask‖ was a metaphor to describe the 
dissatisfactions and disappointments in her life, especially in being a single mother, 
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working in a monotonous job environment, feeling misunderstood by others, and 
being involved with an inconsiderate boyfriend.  When she was with others, Sofia felt 
she had to pretend that she was happy.  In reality, Sofia was depressed and angry at 
others.  Sofia masked her own desires and portrayed an image of a woman who was 
in control and met the expectations of others.  In therapy, she was often tearful 
when she discussed her relationships with Gerald, friends, and parents, as well as 
her failure to be a good mother to her daughter. 
 
4.12 Family History 
 
 Sofia grew up with both of her biological parents and three siblings.  Sofia 
was the first-born.  She had a sister who was one year younger, a brother who was 
two years younger, and another brother who was ten years younger than her.  
Before her marriage, Sofia‘s mother had been a nun.  After marriage, the mother 
stayed at home as a housewife and the father worked at an auto-body shop and 
fixed cars.  Her father owned his own business, but when Sofia was 11 years old, he 
lost his business.  Since then, her father had to work for someone else.  He was not 
happy with his work and complained that he was not successful.  At the loss of the 
father‘s private business, the family had to move into a smaller house and Sofia had 
to change from private to public school.  Sofia explained that this was one of the 
reasons why she had friends who were bad influences on her and started to drink 
alcohol and smoke marijuana.  
 Sofia grew up in a house in which there were several conventional rules.  She 
was brought up in a strictly religious Catholic home and both parents were critical of 
her and her siblings.  All family members had to go to church every Sunday, 
regardless of whether they wanted to or not.  Sofia reported that her mother‘s 
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dedication to religion impacted the family in such a way that her father and the 
children passively obeyed her and went to church to make her happy.  Sofia recalled 
that, at the age of eight, her father called her to get ready to go to church with him, 
which she did but felt ―empty and hollow.‖  She found church ―depressing.‖  Sofia 
sensed that her father‘s choice to go to church was artificial; he was simply 
complying with her mother‘s expectations, because he was, as she knew, not a very 
religious man.  Since then, Sofia regarded religious beliefs as ―meaningless,‖ 
―useless,‖ and oppressive for enjoying one‘s life. 
 Sofia described both parents as the ―kind of people who would push and pull.‖  
Sometimes they would be warm and understanding and other times angry and 
demanding.  Many times, her mother would try to pull Sofia close to her, but when 
Sofia was affectionate to her, her mother criticized Sofia about her way of dressing, 
lifestyle, and mothering skills.  Although Sofia found her father to be easier going 
and more fun than her mother, she was disappointed with him many times.  Her 
father often failed to grant Sofia‘s demands.  For example, when Sofia asked him a 
question about how to fix her car, he responded in a detached way, ―I don‘t know.‖  
Sofia understood his response as ―ironic‖—since he repaired cars for a living—and 
her father as ―indifferent.‖  When Sofia did not ask for help, her father offered it.  
Sofia felt confused about whether or not her father loved her.  
Sofia viewed her mother as ―cold‖ and as the kind of woman who had a 
strong impact on her father.  In her associations to her mother‘s coldness and 
influence on her father, Sofia recalled that when she was 4 years old, she had the 
mental image of standing in front of the refrigerator, seeing the door of the freezer 
open, and finding her parents in there.  This mental image was transient and it was 
associated with finding her mother ―cold,‖ ―fake,‖ ―critical,‖ not genuinely 
affectionate, overpowering, and controlling with her father. 
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Sofia gave many examples of her mother being fake, critical, and cold:  One 
example was that her mother cooked meals for the family, but never served them on 
the table.  Each family member was expected to make his/her own plate from food 
that was prepared on the stove.  Her father often raised it as an issue and demanded 
that she serve him; his daughters ended up doing the serving for him.  Another 
example was that her mother always gave her ambiguous and contradictory 
criticism.  Her mother made her feel even more worthless when she was compared 
with her sister, who was the most compliant and obedient child in the family.  As a 
young child, Sofia was organized, like her mother, but she felt confused and 
disappointed when her mother compared her with her sister and told her, 
―disorganized people are more intelligent.‖  When Sofia misbehaved, her mother told 
her, ―I expected this from you.‖  When she received compliments and hugs from her 
mother, she felt that her mother was being insincere.  Her mother‘s hugs were 
unusual for Sofia and when she squeezed her, Sofia felt discomfort, ―weird,‖ and 
anxious at finding her unpredictably affectionate.  Sofia was used to seeing her 
mother having outbursts for small issues.  The mother occasionally used to threaten 
her children that she would throw them out of the house when they misbehaved. 
After the birth of Sofia‘s daughter, the mother told Sofia that Sofia was ―80% 
of a good mother‖ towards her daughter, especially because Sofia did not take her to 
church more.  On one occasion, the mother gave her an article to read about how to 
become a good parent and, on another occasion, she blamed her children for her 
inability to connect with them.  She often told Sofia that if Sofia did not have sex 
with so many men, she would not have personal problems and would have better 
relations with her mother.  Sofia expressed feelings of anger and hurt about her 
mother in the sessions, especially because Sofia never discussed with her their 
issues but just ―gossiped about superficial things.‖  She also expressed feelings of 
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guilt for being too harsh in her descriptions of her mother and for not succeeding to 
connect well with her. 
At age 16, Sofia did something wrong and her parents told her that from then 
on she would have to do her own laundry.  At that time, Sofia felt alienated and hurt 
as she thought that she did not belong to them anymore. 
Sofia reported that her parents did not argue with each other, but that they 
were not very intimate either.  Sofia described her mother as being sexually 
reserved.  When her father wanted to kiss her, she expressed distaste.  At age 10, 
Sofia overheard her parents arguing about sex.  She recalled that her father wanted 
sex and her mother was critical of him.  When Sofia was an adolescent, her mother 
used to complain to Sofia about her father wanting sex and Sofia used to interrupt 
her, telling her that she did not want to hear that.  
 Sofia described her father as being ―a more normal person‖ than her mother 
was before he got married.  Unlike her mother, her father ―lived his life by smoking, 
drinking alcohol, and having sex with other women.‖  Sofia found her father happier 
and more loving.  However, she also said that her father criticized her just as her 
mother did.  Sofia felt that she was not good enough or intelligent enough for either 
parent and complained that she never had an intelligent conversation with them.  
They shared nothing but ―small talk.‖ 
 When Sofia was an adolescent, she heard from her sister that their father had 
sexually abused Sofia‘s sister at a young age.  Sofia reported that her sister never 
told her the details of the abuse and that she never asked her for them.  Sofia 
expressed disbelief and uncertainty as to whether or not this actually happened or 
whether her sister misinterpreted their father‘s intentions.  Sofia, however, recalled 
that when she was young, she used to take baths with him naked.  When Sofia was 
eight years old, her father got angry with her for misbehaving and he pulled her 
pants down.  He did not spank her but, when Sofia had her pants down, left.  Sofia 
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talked about being confused as to why her father had pulled her pants down.  Sofia 
conjectured that he wanted to either abuse her or spank her, but left because he 
changed his mind.  
 Sofia reported that her father never ―really punished‖ her.  When Sofia was in 
high school, she skipped classes and slept in.  Her father was ―fed up‖ with her and, 
one morning, he grabbed her by her ankles and dragged her out of bed, leading to 
her hitting her head on the floor.  Sofia was very upset with the way her father 
treated her.  She complained that he criticized her without inquiring as to what might 
be going on.   
 Sofia said that both parents gave more attention to her brothers.  Her 
youngest brother suffered from asthma and was treated better than anyone else.  
When Sofia was 12, the other brother got hospitalized for a suicide threat and was 
diagnosed with severe depression.  When he had a tantrum towards his parents, her 
brother grabbed a razor and threatened to kill himself.  The family was forced to go 
for family therapy.  Sofia was resentful and angry towards her whole family.  She 
skipped ―these meaningless meetings‖ and chose to go see a boyfriend instead.   
  
4.13 Personal History 
 
 Sofia had been depressed since she was a child.  She was pessimistic about 
her life and felt empty.  When she went to high school, Sofia lied a lot to her parents, 
missed school, drank alcohol, used street drugs, and had relationships with boys.  
Sofia associated with girlfriends who referred to themselves as ―tomboy hippie 
chicks.‖  Several times, the principal of the school called her mother to inform her of 
his concerns about Sofia.    
 Sofia lost control of her drinking and drug use at age 14.  At that time, she 
also had her first sexual experience.  She became promiscuous and found herself 
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―losing control.‖  Like with her parents, Sofia got involved with boyfriends who would 
―pull‖ her toward them and then ―push‖ her away inconsistently.  Sofia was confused 
about what her boyfriends expected from her.  She often gave in to their demands, 
but she also felt frustrated and hostile and argued with them.  Most of her boyfriends 
got her into ―trouble,‖ especially with drugs and alcohol.  They were verbally 
abusive, which led her to be dependent on them and resentful.   
 At age 20, Sofia became pregnant from an ―irresponsible boyfriend‖ who 
asked her to have an abortion.  Although she did not want the baby, she kept it, 
because she decided to follow her family‘s religious beliefs for that decision.  Sofia 
then separated from her boyfriend, became depressed and lonely, and had constant 
difficulties in rearing her daughter.   
 In sessions, Sofia discussed how she looked at sex as a control issue in 
relationships.  She felt obligated to have sex with her boyfriends, since she was 
involved with them, but also experienced difficulty reaching orgasm.  Sofia felt 
abused by most of her boyfriends because they were drug addicts.  She often slept 
with boys without having intimate feelings for them.   
When Sofia got involved with Gerald, she thought that she would finally have 
a more mature and intimate relationship with a man.  Gerald, however, did not want 
to commit to her and often seemed to be domineering and irresponsible.  Sofia also 
described him as attractive and found that behind his domineering character he had 
low self-esteem.  At times, when Gerald was vulnerable to low self-esteem, he was 
more considerate toward Sofia.  Sofia wanted Gerald to love her.  On one occasion, 
she was surprised to hear from Gerald that he thought she only wanted him for sex.  
Sofia reported that she was the one who simply gave in to his sexual requests.  Sofia 
was tearful when Gerald did not want to make an exclusive commitment to her.  
Unlike her previous boyfriends, who were alcoholics, drug addicts, and 
dropouts from school, Sofia found Gerald different.  Sofia never really loved her 
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previous boyfriends, including the one with whom she had her child, but was in love 
with Gerald.  Sofia found Gerald to be more affectionate and intelligent than her 
parents were.  Her love for him and struggle to maintain a meaningful relationship 
with him were the main reasons Sofia came to therapy.   
 
4.14 A Fantasy, a Dream, and a Tale 
 
 An important turning point in Sofia‘s therapy came when she was willing to 
talk with me about a fantasy that she had had since she was 15 years old.  The 
fantasy was about having a relationship with the singer Vince Neil.  Vince Neil was a 
popular singer of heavy metal music.  Sofia adored the singer‘s appearance, music, 
and lyrics.  In the early 1980‘s, although he identified as heterosexual, Vince Neil 
looked like a woman with his long blond hair, slim body, form-fitting clothing, 
necklaces, and make-up.  Vince Neil sang about the enjoyment of life, the struggle to 
enjoy one‘s life, and man‘s love for a woman.  In one of his CD‘s, there was a 
painting of a split face, one half of which was happy and the other half sad.  This 
duality was related to Sofia‘s psychological state and to her statements, ―I seem to 
adore my powerlessness and helplessness….I am more creative when I am 
depressed.‖  
Sofia fantasized that the singer had a brother and that his brother abducted 
her.  His brother beat her up, was verbally abusive, and then raped her.  When Sofia 
had sex with his brother, Vince showed up and saved her from him.  Other times, 
her masturbation fantasy involved having consensual sex with Vince‘s brother and 
Vince caught them in the act.  Vince watched them having sex and was disappointed 
with Sofia.  Sofia then begged Vince in tears to take her back.  Sofia said, ―When I 
am harmed by his brother I know that I should fantasize about my pain more, but it 
is blurry how I feel.‖   
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 Similar versions of that fantasy also involved Gerald.  Sofia fantasized that 
she was having sex with a man while Gerald watched them.  Sofia then told Gerald 
that she loved him but Gerald did not want to listen.  Sofia followed him and begged 
him to come back.  Sometimes Gerald came back and had sex with her and other 
times Gerald refused to come back to her.  Sofia viewed Gerald as masculine, like 
her dad, and unlike Vince Neil, but she also associated Gerald with her mom because 
of his contradictory and inconsistent personality characteristics. 
In one of her dreams, Sofia was possessed by the devil.  Sofia was down in a 
basement with a laundry machine and blacked out.  She passed out in the arms of 
the actress Glenn Close.  Sofia asked Glenn, ―What is going on with me?‖  Glenn did 
not respond.  Sofia asked again, ―Tell me, what is going on with me, am I 
possessed?  I know I am.‖  Glenn responded, ―I recorded a CD for you!‖  Sofia 
panicked and woke up. 
Sofia described her dream as a nightmare and portrayed Glenn Close as a 
―devilish woman.‖  Sofia was not sure if Glenn was also possessed in that dream as 
she was.  She associated Glenn with obscure depictions of the feminine and the 
masculine in her movies.  She described her as playing the ―seductive and clever 
woman‖ as well as the very ―active, aggressive, and practical‖ one.  Sofia associated 
the basement and the laundry area with her memory of being asked by her parents 
to do her own laundry at the age of 16.  She also associated it with a couple with 
whom she was friendly and whose daughter used to play with Sofia‘s daughter down 
in their basement.  Sofia‘s daughter sometimes had tantrums in that basement and 
Sofia had difficulties calming her daughter down.  The couple criticized Sofia‘s 
parenting skills, telling her that she needed to have stricter rules and set boundaries 
with her daughter. 
Finally, Sofia‘s loneliness and emotional pain were also associated with one of 
the stories she wrote.  In the story, the main character, called Ann, was anguished 
111 
 
and hopeless because she had cancer.  She was dying.  She had kids and was not 
able to take care of them.  Ann had an independent personality and refused to 
accept her husband‘s help, even though he was a loving and affectionate man.  Sofia 
admired Ann‘s strength but also envied her for being able to cope with her despair 
without the help of her husband.  Sofia identified with Ann‘s pain, hopelessness, and 
despair, but also looked up to Ann for her strength and independence from her 
husband.  Sofia felt she was not strong enough to be independent from others.  
 
4.2 A Lacanian Case Formulation 
 
4.21 The Paradoxes of Speech 
 
 
                  The desired and unexploited  
       The abused sister                                 Woman  
        (ego’)                (e.g., religious mother, 
                         What is it to be a Woman?    possessed Glenn, 
                                                                                     suffering Ann) 
                                                                                       
                        
                                                                                     What makes a man enjoy? 
 
                                        What makes a man desire a woman? 
Sofia         Man (e.g., father)  
         (Other) 
 
Figure 4.1 Quadrangular Schema 
 
Sofia presented vague statements of who she was.  She found inconsiderate 
and uncommitted boyfriends to be both hurtful and attractive.  She hated the idea of 
men‘s control over women, but was involved with men.  She complied with men‘s 
requests for sex, but did not find sex enjoyable.  When her boyfriend, Gerald, was 
―aloof‖ and ―inconsiderate,‖ she loved him more.  She fantasized about being raped 
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by a stranger and gazed at by her boyfriend.  By making these contradictory 
enunciations in therapy, Sofia wondered about her identity.  Whereas she 
consciously believed she knew who she was, by exploring the unconscious, she 
realized that the sign that described her was an ambiguous question mark.  In other 
words, the sign was raised to the function of the signifier, which disconnected her 
from her conscious representations of her identity.   
 The signifiers in Sofia‘s unconscious made her enunciations incomprehensible.  
They made holes in the meaning that was determinant of her discourse (Écrits, 
678/801).  Her unconscious signifiers insisted and interfered in the cuts of her actual 
discourse.  In dreams and fantasies, Sofia was possessed by the devil; Glenn Close, 
the actress, was transformed into a devilish bisexual figure; Vince Neil, the singer, 
was transformed into a gaze; Sofia‘s fictional character of Ann, who suffered from 
cancer, was transformed into a sublime woman; and Sofia loved Gerald when she 
positioned herself at the specific distance from him that allowed her to maintain her 
desire for him. 
 These were some of the unconscious signifiers in Sofia‘s mind.  These 
signifiers could only become comprehensible and subvert Sofia‘s conscious 
understandings of her identity by being engaged in the process of deciphering her 
unconscious and of tying these signifiers together to create a new button tie.  The 
button tie that arose during therapy sealed a new kind of symbolic meaning by its 
retroactive effect from the Other to Sofia.  Each signifier represented Sofia‘s 
subjectivity for another signifier.  For example, as I will discuss shortly, the signifier 
S4, ―devil,‖ represented Sofia for the signifier S3, ―lived,‖ and the signifier S3 
retroactively gave meaning to the signifier S2, ―feeling alive in the same way as her 
father lived before his marriage to his cold wife,‖ and so on.  Sofia was involved in 
the process of dialectizing isolated and opaque signifiers—signifiers such as the devil 
which froze, subjugated, and annihilated her as a subject—in order to separate 
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herself from their alienating effects and create new metaphors and assume ―a new 
position in relation to the cause‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 79).   
Sofia‘s certainty about her identity provided a meaning in the imaginary 
realm.  The imaginary meaning stemmed from times when domineering others and 
the patriarchal Other supplied answers or reasons about her existence.  Being 
engulfed by the Other‘s capricious desires and dependent on the Other‘s provision of 
signs, Sofia was alienated in the Other (Écrits, 690/815; Fink, 2004, p. 123).  
 Listening to Sofia‘s description of her story of Ann—a story she shared with 
me after she discussed her associations to dreams and fantasies—one can discern 
that Sofia imagined the possibility of being independent from the Other‘s demands 
and desires.  Whereas in Sofia‘s experience the Other was patriarchal, overpowering, 
cold, inconsiderate, and unloving, through the story of Ann, Sofia told us that she 
wished to be an independent woman, even when the Other was loving and 
considerate.  However, Sofia also informed us that she did not have the strength to 
be such a woman.  She created instead the fictional character of Ann and wondered 
about what it was like for a woman to suffer an unbearable disease, cope with pain 
on her own, and be free from social expectations without relying on her husband‘s 
help and approval or disapproval of her decisions.  Ann‘s husband was loving and 
desirous of his sublime and strong wife.  Sofia wondered, what was it to be a sublime 
and independent woman?  What made a man desire a woman?   
As I show in Figure 4.1, Sofia was implicated in a quadrangular ―circuit of 
desire‖ (Fink, 1997, p. 127).  Sofia desired to know what aroused her father‘s desire 
for her mother and what made her father satisfied.  She identified with her father‘s 
desire for her mother by identifying with his lack of knowledge about feminine 
jouissance that was beyond the jouissance of the organ.  Whereas the mother was 
the object of her father‘s desire, her rival sister was the object of her father‘s sexual 
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satisfaction.  In other words, her father sustained desire vis-à-vis her mother and 
derived jouissance from her sister.   
At the level of the symbolic, Sofia identified with her father‘s desire for his 
wife and, subsequently, with masculine desire for a woman.  At the level of the 
imaginary, Sofia identified with her sister, who was used and abused by their father.  
Sofia thought her sister was more loved by their father than she was, and wished to 
take her sister‘s place.  In her rape fantasy, Sofia retroactively returned to the 
thought that she was raped by her father and that her father loved her more than 
her sister.  At the level of the real, Sofia enjoyed being the used and abused objet a 
for a man.  In other words, she was the real and unspeakable cause of desire for a 
man whose jouissance was obscene. 
§ 
Sofia presented the following signifiers and memories in therapy: 
 Alcohol:  Sofia consumed alcohol to fight off depression.  She recalled that 
her father used to drink alcohol and be happy before he married her mother.  Sofia 
engaged in masturbatory fantasies and felt warmth and jouissance when drunk.  
Through alcohol, she escaped from memories of cold and unloving relationships with 
significant others.     
 Devil:  In one of her dreams, Sofia was possessed by the devil and was 
offered a CD by the actress, Glenn Close.  If one reads the signifier devil backwards, 
it reads lived.  Sofia lived when drunk, alone, and free from the tyranny of the 
superego.  She felt alive in the same way her father was alive before marriage and 
as opposed to her mother‘s restrictions and conservative religious lifestyle.   
 Glenn Close:  To Sofia‘s mind, the actress embodied masculinity and 
femininity in obscure ways.  She enjoyed like a man but was seductive and desired 
like a woman.  Sofia dreamt of an Other who seemed to have the final word about 
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enjoyment and femininity.  Sofia‘s dream was a nightmare because she came close 
to an Other whose jouissance was still alien to her.32    
Be beaten and be raped:  Sofia fantasized of being both beaten and raped by 
a man.  She recalled that her father sexually abused her sister.  Sofia wondered if 
her father loved her less than he loved her sister.  In her associations to her father 
being an indifferent man and a passive follower of her mother, Sofia recalled that he 
never disciplined her when she was a child and only beat her once when she was an 
adolescent.  Sofia constructed fantasies of being both beaten and raped, indicating 
her wish to receive attention and love from an active male figure.  Rape signified 
having sex with an aggressive and active man without her consent or sexual 
satisfaction.  In real life, Sofia had sex with men without satisfaction.  Sofia allowed 
herself to have fun with boyfriends, revolted against the norms of family and school, 
got in trouble for deviating from rules, and situated herself as an insignificant 
individual in relation to boyfriends. 
In Sofia‘s unconscious, her symptom of being dissatisfied with having sexual 
intercourse with boyfriends was a substitute for the symbolic prohibition of incest 
between Sofia and her father.  We may recall here that when Sofia was a young child 
she took baths with him naked.  We might conjecture that she imagined seducing 
and being seduced by him.  Sofia wished her father was an active and fun-loving 
man, different from her mother, who was cold and religious. 
The signifiers, being beaten and being raped, implied Sofia‘s initial wish for 
seduction with her father—a wish which related to her thought of taking her sister‘s 
place and a wish which ran counter to her mother‘s religious dogmatism.  Yet we 
also know from Sofia‘s history that, regardless of her mother‘s religiosity, her mother 
desired her father even though he did not hold the same religious views as her.  Her 
                                                          
32 Lacan (1962-1963) writes, ―the anxiety of the nightmare is experienced properly speaking as that of the 
jouissance of the Other … it is this being who weighs with his whole opaque weight of alien jouissance on 
your chest, who crushes you under his jouissance‖ (chapter 5, italics mine). 
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mother‘s desire was thus a phallic signifier.  Even though Sofia consciously hated her 
mother, she was unconsciously pulled back to the enigma of her mother‘s desire.  
The question—―What does my mother want?‖—elicited phallic responses.  In Sofia‘s 
words, her mother was the one who ―pull[ed]‖ Sofia close to her and showed 
affection, but when Sofia was close to her, her mother ―push[ed]‖ her away with 
criticism.  Sofia received the message from her mother that she was not a good 
enough child; she was not a good enough woman.  By experiencing her mother as 
cold and unloving, Sofia constructed this fantasy as a way to compensate herself for 
the loss of her preoedipal jouissance.  
Sofia fantasized that her male seducers beat, raped, and gave pleasure 
without her will.  Her mother‘s religiosity and unloving personality as well as her 
father‘s obscene jouissance and passivity embodied Sofia‘s void and lack of being in 
the signifying system.  In order for Sofia to have access to this veiled phallic 
signifier, Sofia became the object of men‘s desires and sexual demands.  Sofia 
allowed herself to have sexual intercourse with inconsiderate and abusive boyfriends, 
but also asked—who am I in relation to them?  Is it right to allow myself to be 
satisfied by them?   
Lacan writes, ―The demand for love can only suffer from a desire whose 
signifier is foreign to it‖ (Écrits, p. 582/693).  Lacan (1960-1961) makes clear to us 
that we should not confuse the phallic object with the sign.33  The phallic object is 
the desiring Other, ―what the Other is missing in order to be the noetic A [Autre, 
Other], the full-fledged A, the Other insofar as one can have faith in his response to 
demand‖ (chapter 15).  Whereas Sofia refused to comply with the Other‘s explicit 
demands on her—for example, she did exactly the opposite of what her parents and 
other authority figures told her to be or do—she maintained an ambivalent 
                                                          
33 The difference between the sign, s(A), and the phallic signifier, S(A), is also discussed in Écrits (pp. 
806-807/682-683) and Fink (2004, pp. 122-124). 
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relationship with the Other as a phallic object.  The Other‘s desire petrified her.  
Sofia defied the Other in order to get her to desire her.  Hence, Sofia‘s own desire 
was determined by the Other‘s desire. 
 Be gazed at:  Sofia fantasized about Vince Neil, the singer who looked like a 
woman, and Gerald, the boyfriend who had similar personality traits to her mother, 
imagining them gazing at her while she had sex with another man.  For Sofia, the 
mOther was masked by those men whom she declared she was in love with—Vince 
Neil and Gerald.  That of course did not mean that her boyfriend, Gerald, and the 
singer, Vince Neil, were pure semblances of her mother in character.  Rather, they 
shared particular traits with Sofia‘s mother.   
They rescued her from the abuser.  They got disappointed and rejected her 
when Sofia consented to get off with that man.  In Sofia‘s unconscious mind, as in 
any hysteric‘s unconscious mind, the Other was split between desire and jouissance 
(Soler, 2006).  In her fantasy, Sofia consented to get off with the Other of 
jouissance; she was gazed at by the Other of desire; and she preferred to be with 
the Other of desire.   
Sofia situated Gerald as the Other of desire and positioned herself as the one 
who wanted both to fill the Other‘s lack and preserve it.  As it was with her mOther, 
in her relationship with Gerald, Sofia went back and forth between having him 
present in and absent from her life.  Sofia was interested in being a precious object 
for the Other so as to fill the Other‘s lack and compensate for the Other‘s limitations.  
Sofia discussed the limitations of both of her parents.  Her mOther‘s lack was 
skewed, however, when Sofia told us that her father desired her mother.  Her father 
complied with her mother‘s rules and wanted her mother even more when she 
refused to have sex with him.  Sofia emphasized her mOther‘s lack when she saw 
her father as a passive follower of her mother without him having a good reason for 
it.  In Sofia‘s unconscious mind, her mOther was the one who was both powerful and 
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inadequate; her father was the one whose sexual jouissance was dangerous who had 
to restrain that jouissance.   
Sofia‘s repetitive masturbation fantasy of having sex with an active, 
aggressive male while being gazed at by a male who had female traits, was a re-
enactment of her childhood primal scene and Oedipal fantasy.  Sofia‘s childhood 
memory of hearing her parents argue about sex—more particularly, her father 
wanting sex and her mother being critical of him—played a significant role in Sofia‘s 
construction of her fantasy.  We can decipher Sofia‘s fantasy in the following ways:  
a) Sofia thought her father should have forced her mother to have sex; b) Sofia 
identified with her mother who was forced by her father to have sex; c) Sofia 
thought her father should have abused her (made love to her forcefully) instead of 
her sister; d) Sofia thought her mother should have caught them in the act, which 
would have been a punishment to her mother; e) Sofia thought her mother should 
have rescued Sofia from her Oedipal wishes. 
There were two versions of Sofia‘s fantasy.  In one version, the Other who 
gazed at Sofia rescued Sofia from the man who raped her and, after the rescuing, 
the Other left her because he was disappointed in her.  In another version, the Other 
rescued Sofia and had sex with her.  If we think of the Other primarily as the 
mOther, we may deduce here that Sofia had an ambivalent relationship with her 
mOther.  She saw the mOther as split between the desiring Other and the maternal 
and Sofia fluctuated between separation from and symbiosis with her.   
Thinking of the Other as split between desire and jouissance, Sofia fantasized 
about the desiring Other stopping her from having sexual satisfaction with the male 
Other whose jouissance was obscene.  In other words, by fantasizing about the 
desiring Other stopping her from getting off with the rapist, Sofia sustained an 
unsatisfied desire in the man whom she loved but enjoyed being the used and 
abused objet a for another man.  As I explained earlier, we can deduce here that 
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Sofia identified with her mOther‘s phallic desire for her father—a desire which ran 
counter to her religious beliefs—and her father‘s splitting of desire and jouissance 
which did not converge on a single woman.  Her mOther‘s desire for her father 
played a significant role in how her father also sustained his desire and lack of sexual 
satisfaction.  Sofia questioned her mother‘s religious beliefs and her awry desire for 
her father.34  Sofia became interested in her father‘s awry desire for his critical and 
serious wife and in her father‘s sexual jouissance with her sister and other women. 
Sofia fantasized that she was gazed at by a desiring male.  Under the domain 
of his gaze, Sofia vanished in the phallic ghost of his desire and was reduced to an 
object.  Her boyfriend‘s gaze—the boyfriend here is her mOther‘s substitute—
provoked Sofia‘s lack of being and transformed Sofia into a desired object. It killed 
off Sofia‘s living sexual jouissance.  Concurrently, Sofia fantasized about being a 
perverse masochistic objet a for another man—a man who was her father‘s 
substitute.  In other words, in fantasy, Sofia made her mOther lay down the law 
effectively—the law that required her to give up her Oedipal jouissance.  By 
positioning herself as masochistic and as being gazed at by the desiring mOther in 
fantasy, Sofia transformed her indifferent and detached mother and boyfriend into 
active enunciators of the law and constituted herself as the object cause of their 
desires.  Sofia imagined that her mother desired to have a more active and dynamic 
husband and that her father desired to have a wife who was sexually submissive.  
Like Dora—I am referring specifically to Lacan‘s interpretation of Dora as being the 
copula between Frau K and her father—Sofia was the copula between her parents.  
She constituted herself as the precious object who could sustain the Other‘s desire 
and fill up the Other‘s lack. 
                                                          
34 Lacan (1962-1963) writes that the mother‘s desire ―is identical to the function of the law.  It is insofar 
as the law prohibits her that it imposes desiring her:  for after all the mother is not in herself the most 
desirable object.‖ (chapter 8) 
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Female Genitalia:  Sofia got frustrated with Gerald when he asked her to 
shave her pubic hair.  Regardless of her frustration, she complied with his demand.  
When Sofia was an adolescent, she looked at female models in magazines.  Her 
positive attitude towards these magazines changed when the father of her child 
abandoned her and when Sofia had to bear the parental responsibilities on her own.  
From Sofia‘s discourse, however, we can decipher that even though she expressed 
anger at the status quo notion that women should look a certain way, she continued 
to be fascinated (seduced) by the images of these models.  In Sofia‘s mind, these 
models were masquerades of femininity, but Sofia wanted men to adore her without 
her being reduced to a feminine image.  
According to Lacan, the hysteric grapples with the question, what is it to be a 
woman?  The hysteric asks this question at the symbolic and not at the imaginary 
level.  Lacan (1993) says that the hysteric wonders about the essence of femininity 
at the unconscious level, and more specifically, asks herself the question, what is a 
feminine organ?  She seeks out the fundamental signifier that would describe her 
being—what am I?  Am I a man or a woman?  Lacan states that the question of the 
feminine organ concerns its possibility of being either empty or full.  The feminine 
organ is a fabricated signifier with no particular signified.  In one‘s unconscious mind, 
to fill the feminine organ with a signified would mean that, in its essence, it is empty. 
The biological feminine organ, the organ in the real, does not lack anything.  
In Lacan‘s theory, there is no lack in the real, only in the symbolic.  In 
contradistinction to feminist views, Lacan encourages us to distinguish between the 
social biases regarding the vagina and the cause of those biases (Écrits, p. 614/729).  
In order to examine fantasies about the feminine organ, its possibility of a minus or 
a plus value, we need to understand Lacan‘s theory of the phallus.  One‘s realization 
of his/her sex depends on the symbolic phallus, on the signifier of desire that 
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separates the subject from a symbiotic relationship with the maternal.35  The 
symbolic phallus is destined to have meaning effects on the subject‘s being and 
instate sexual difference.  
We can now turn to a discussion of the functions of the imaginary and the 
symbolic phallus in Sofia‘s subjectivity.  Sofia‘s father castrated Sofia symbolically 
when he refused to desire Sofia and when he insisted on desiring her mother 
regardless of her coldness and disgust for his sexuality.  Sofia knew that her father 
was a man who used to enjoy his life before marriage.  As I also mentioned earlier, 
Sofia‘s mother also played a significant role in Sofia‘s castration with her criticism.  
Thus, Sofia identified with lack-in-being in relation to her parents and responded to 
that lack in particular ways. 
Lacan conceptualizes imaginary castration, symbolized as negativized small 
phi (-φ), to represent the loss of something essential in an image.  By seeing her 
father‘s penis at a young age, his penis that represented a source of precious but 
prohibited jouissance, Sofia grew up with ambivalent thoughts about the nature of 
her feminine organ.  For Lacan, unlike Freud, Sofia‘s unconscious question about her 
female genitalia was not about whether or not she was deprived of a real male 
organ.  Rather, Sofia‘s unconscious question concerned the mutilation and 
prohibition of jouissance.  To Sofia‘s mind, the feminine organ was a minus-value, 
but it was a minus-value only insofar as its jouissance was concerned.  Her feminine 
organ was anaesthetized in her sexual involvements with men.  By looking at her 
                                                          
35 In Écrits, Lacan underscores the feminist view that the mother plays the most important role in the birth 
of the subject.  Lacan does not reduce his concepts of symbolic Father and imaginary Mother to biological 
parents.  Lacan rather refers to the symbolic Father as ―the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, not 
of a real father, but of what religion has taught us to invoke as the Name-of-the-Father.‖  The symbolic 
Father interrupts the child‘s symbiotic relationship with the devouring maternal object.  Christianity 
teaches us that in order for the subject to bind itself ―for life to the Law,‖ ―the symbolic Father, insofar as 
he signifies this Law,‖ must be ―the dead Father‖ (p. 556/464).  As Lacan elaborates further in the 
Seminar, Book VII, the murder of God in the Christian belief system signifies the prohibition of jouissance 
(satisfaction of the drive).  The dead God is the one who provokes the subject to desire his Law.  The 
symbolic Father is thus the signifier of desire which instates lack between the subject and the Other.  In 
order for the subject to desire and submit to the Law, he/she has to give up some of its autistic living 
jouissance. 
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father‘s erectile organ, ―not as itself, or even as an image, but as a part that [was] 
missing in the desired image‖ (Écrits, p. 697/822), Sofia identified with her mother‘s 
disgust at her father‘s sexual jouissance.  In the locus of the Other, she identified 
with the missing signifier that named genital pleasure as the ultimate goal of a 
sexual relationship between a man and a woman.   
In the Seminar, Book VIII, Lacan provides the following matheme to describe 
the hysteric‘s fundamental fantasy:   
  a 
_____ ◊ Α 
         (-φ)  
 
   Figure 4.2 Hysterical Fundamental Fantasy 
 
In this formula, we see that objet a is over the imaginary castration complex (the 
negativized lowercase phallus, -φ) which indicates that the hysteric veils her 
castration complex in fantasy; she covers up what is missing in her sexed image.  
Sofia‘s experience of being offended by Gerald‘s request to shave her pubic hair 
when Sofia and Gerald were involved in lovemaking showed that Sofia felt the threat 
of castration—the threat of coming closer to the realization that her organ as a 
sexual entity was lacking.  In Sofia‘s mind, the pubic hair covered up the feminine 
organ that had already disappeared from the real and had been transformed into a 
signifier.36   
Sofia was numb to sexual pleasure.  She gave up her own sexual jouissance 
 and identified instead with the signifier of the Other‘s lack.  Sofia was more 
interested in the mother who deprived a man of sexual satisfaction than in the father 
who was able to satisfy a woman sexually.  The function of the mOther occupied 
                                                          
36 Cf. a similar discussion in Lacan‘s (1961-1962) analysis of Zucchi‘s painting on Psyche casting her little 
lamp onto Eros (chapter 16). 
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Sofia‘s mind so much that it deprived her of potential satisfaction with a man.  Sofia 
was interested in the enigmatic desire of her father for her mother, especially when 
she knew that he usually liked having sex with women.  In other words, Sofia was 
not interested in what her father enjoyed but rather in what he desired.  She was 
interested in what her father lacked, because she wanted to be the phallic signifier of 
his desire (Φ) and not the object of his jouissance. 
 Sofia phallicized herself; she embodied the phallus of the Other‘s desire.  In 
her own eyes, Sofia wanted to be desirable and not sexually available.  By being the 
phallus for the Other—by identifying with what the Other wanted but could not have 
or, in other words, by identifying with her mother‘s depriving her father of sex and 
with her father‘s desire for her mother—Sofia attempted to answer the question of 
what a man desired from a woman.  Sofia thus identified with her father‘s desire and 
her father‘s lack-of-being.  Sofia desired as if she were in his position, as if she were 
a man who desired this other mysterious woman who did not give in to his sexual 
demands easily.  In order to maintain her phallic role in her relationship with the 
man she loved, Sofia ensured that man‘s desire remained unsatisfied and that she 
remained a permanent object of his desire.   
It is clear to us by now that Sofia‘s fascination with models embodied 
masculine desire for women.  Although she was angry with men who were seduced 
by the looks of those models, Sofia embodied the pain of sexual dissatisfaction in her 
ego in order to castrate the masculine Other.  She was interested in showing the 
masculine Other that his fascination with the image of a woman was superficial and 
that he needed to produce adequate signifiers to describe femininity with its 
mysteries.  Sofia identified with the object of Gerald‘s desire.  In her mind, the 
image of a female model occupied the place of the Other‘s desire and not the place 
of the Other‘s jouissance.  Sofia nourished Gerald‘s desire so she could be someone 
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special for him and Gerald could continue to desire her without leaving her as her 
previous boyfriend—the father of her child—did. 
 
4.22 Metaphorical and Metonymic Functions in the Dream 
  
We can further elucidate Sofia‘s unconscious desire by discussing the 
metaphorical and metonymical functions in her dream.  Lacan shows the functions of 
metaphor and metonymy in Écrits (pp. 428-429/515-516).  The metonymic structure 
combines signifiers without engendering a new meaning.  It instates the subject‘s 
lack of being and denotes its irreducible nature at the level of the signified.  The 
metaphoric structure substitutes one signifier for another and engenders a new 
meaning by constituting the substituted signifier at the level of the signified. 
Sofia‘s dream of being possessed by the devil and being given a CD by the 
possessed actress Glenn Close showed the following: 
 The manifest signifier, devil, as it appeared in the dream (S3), was the 
metaphoric result of the latent signifier, lived (S2).  The signifier, lived 
(S2), was fixed under the bar of the signified—fixed in a symptom—that 
was inaccessible to Sofia‘s consciousness.  Therefore, the thought of being 
possessed by the devil was a substitute for the repressed thought of living 
without guilt and dissatisfaction in the same way as her father lived before 
his marriage to his religious wife. 
 The actress Glenn Close embodied metonymic combinations of masculine 
and feminine traits.  For Sofia, Glenn Close embodied the unspeakable, 
mysterious, admirable, irreducible, and unrepresentable woman.  She was 
the desired woman, the woman in control, the independent woman, the 
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woman of jouissance, and the woman who was unbounded by oppressive 
norms. 
 Sofia‘s dream revealed her lack of being, the metonymic structure of her 
subjectivity, in the following way: 
At the manifest level, Sofia was preoccupied with the thought: 
 
S3   I am possessed by the devil 
         ___      →  ____________________________ 
   s3   Glenn Close is possessed by the devil  
  
At the latent level, Sofia unconscious thought was: 
 
          S2                                            I am alive 
         ___     →  _____________________________ 
   s2   A Woman reassures my ability to live 
 
Sofia‘s metonymical structure was:  
          f (S2→S3) S2 ≅ S2 (—) s2 
 
Figure 4.3 The Metonymical Structure 
 
In the logic of combinatory structures of representations among the signifiers 
devil and Glenn, Sofia slipped into a metonymical desire that sustained itself 
by her want-to-be.  Her desire to know a woman who could reassure her own 
living existence was located as a ―minus‖ at the level of the signified.  As we 
saw earlier, Sofia constituted her desire not in a couple but in a quandrangle.  
Sofia was interested in the man‘s desire for a woman because she wanted to 
sustain the Other‘s symptom.  Sofia wanted to be the cause of knowledge, 
inspire the Other to produce knowledge, and sustain the Other‘s desire for 
knowledge (Fink, 1997; Soler, 2006).  Sofia wanted to know if such a woman 
existed and if she could embody the possibility of being the woman she was 
not in relation to her beloved boyfriend. 
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4.23 Being Sad, Being the Phallus, and Seeking Love 
 
Sofia felt Gerald‘s desertion and unfaithfulness as a castration of her being.  
Her fear of castration resonated in the annihilation of her embodied integrity—body 
image and psyche.  With Gerald‘s rejections, her entire being was threatened.  She 
felt empty and hollow.  Sofia was in the darkness of despair, humiliation, pain, 
indignity, and trauma.  When she was alive, it was as if she was possessed by the 
devil.  In order to feel alive, she had to be intoxicated.  In Sofia‘s symbolic world, the 
Other was overbearing with its dissatisfied desires.  In order for her to escape from 
the Other‘s monotonous, empty, and judgmental discourse, she got involved with 
various men.  Sofia had had impulsive sexual intercourse with them since the time of 
her adolescent years.  Her relationship with the symbolic Other was stagnant with 
painful dissatisfactions.   
Sofia‘s dream and fantasies revealed her fragmented states of embodiment.  
Her dream of being possessed and passing out and her fantasy of being beaten and 
raped indicated how Sofia did not know who she was and how she felt when 
someone hurt or harmed her.  In waking life, Sofia felt numb when she had sex with 
a man.  She felt as if she was a scrap in men‘s hands.  Her fragmented body was 
exposed beyond the mirror image in which Sofia recognized herself.  The mirror 
image founded her embodied unity, equilibrium, and balance.  As opposed to her 
alienating ego, which was the sedimentation of idealized images, Sofia experienced 
the fragmentations of her body.  For Lacan, the fragmented body, as it is ―regularly 
manifested in dreams when the movement of an analysis reaches a certain level of 
aggressive disintegration of the individual‖ (Écrits, p. 78/97), and as it is well 
depicted in Hieronymus Bosch‘s paintings, is the fantasmatic body of disconnected 
organs and limbs; it is the disjointed, anaesthetic, and spasmodic body. 
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In the Seminar, Book X, in chapters 3 and 4, Lacan states that when the split 
subject identifies with the specular image of another, the subject is captivated in an 
imaginary unity and wholeness.  The subject has a sense of unity when the mirror 
image is recognized by the symbolic Other.  The symbolic Other authenticates the 
subject with a unary trait.  That authenticated image is assumed or assimilated by 
the subject, but the assumed image does not remain stable or fixed over time.  By 
relating to the symbolic Other, the subject engages in a dialectic of having a 
particular image and not having it.  As Lacan (1962-1963) writes, 
[A]t the locus of the Other, authenticated by the Other, there is 
profiled an image of ourselves that is simply reflected, already 
problematic, even fallacious; that it is at a place that is situated with 
respect to an image which is characterized by a lack, that there is 
profoundly orientated and polarized the function of this image itself, 
that desire is there, not simply veiled, but essentially placed in relation 
to an absence. (chapter 4) 
 
The subject, who comes close to the realization of unconscious desire, looks 
for what he could really be.  The more the subject has access to his desire, the more 
he deviates from his assumed image.  According to Lacan, this deviation is often 
experienced as bodily fragmentation.   
Sofia experienced the fragmentation of her body when she came close to 
realization of her Oedipal desires.  She also experienced this fragmentation when she 
felt unloved by the Other.  Sofia‘s desires were unconscious and not articulated.  
When Sofia avoided realizing her unconscious desires or when Sofia did not have an 
adequate relationship with a responsive symbolic Other—with an Other who was able 
to understand, listen, and respond to Sofia‘s unconscious desires and wants—she 
became depressed.  To Lacan‘s mind, depression results from moral cowardice to 
explore the unconscious (Soler, 2006).  The sad subject gives up the search for 
knowledge of the unconscious and gives into the jouissance of depressive symptoms.   
Sofia clinged to her fantasy of being beaten, raped, and gazed at, which is as 
if her desire was directed toward a trace or shadow of an unattainable object.  Lacan 
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(1997) refers to this unattainable object as das Ding (the Thing), which is 
―characterized by primary affect, prior to any repression‖ (p. 54).  Das Ding is the 
unforgettable maternal, the maternal beyond the phallus (Φ), who is lost forever.  
The function of das Ding is the ―beyond-of-the-signified‖ and ―what remains silent.‖  
It tears out and opens a gap between the sign and the subject.  Das Ding refers to 
the fact that language is tainted by the real.  As Lacan further writes, 
 
It is to the extent that the function of the pleasure principle is to make 
man always search for what he has to find again, but which he will 
never attain, that one reaches the essence, namely, the sphere or 
relationship which is known as the law of the prohibition of incest.  (p. 
88) 
 
Das Ding is the remainder of a cut between desire and demand.  It shows that part 
of our experience is unrepresentable and therefore a part of the subject escapes 
through the cutting effects of the signifier.  It denies fantasies of unity, harmony, 
and simplicity; it rather introduces impossibilities, faults, mistakes, and failures.  By 
being possessed by a gap and empty space, das Ding threatens to break our illusions 
of having harmonious sexual relationships. 
Following the Thing that was part of herself, Sofia was lost in depression.  Her 
own desire was not voiced enough and the Thing within herself incarnated the 
threats of her own bodily fragmentation.  Her relationship with the Other could not 
make her life more fulfilling.  Object a—the object cause of the Other‘s desire, the 
object that the Other lacked, and that could never be obtained—was Sofia‘s position 
of truth.  By situating herself as an abject object in relation to parents and 
boyfriends—and when she situated herself as an abject object in relation to 
boyfriends, she did it in the name of love—Sofia realized the real absence of object 
a.  As Fink (1995) puts it, ―object (a) appears in the position of truth…the truth of 
the hysteric‘s discourse, its hidden motor force, is the real‖ (p. 134).  The hysteric is 
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commanded by the real, ―by that which does not work, by that which does not fit.‖  
Her discourse ―does not set out to carefully cover over paradoxes and 
contradictions…but rather to take such paradoxes and contradictions as far as they 
can go‖ (p. 134-135).   
Sofia longed to fill the lack in the Other by situating herself as the phallus for 
the Other‘s desire.  By identifying with the Other‘s lack, Sofia annihilated herself and 
such annihilation was felt as a gaze coming from the Other.  In her fantasy, Sofia got 
herself seen by Gerald while she had sex with another man.  She ended up being 
reduced to an object of his desire.  Sofia incited the Other‘s gaze and disappeared in 
the Other‘s whims regarding her.  The Other‘s gaze altered Sofia‘s sense of 
satisfaction about her image.  By being the object of the Other‘s desire—the object 
that motivated a man to desire knowledge about the true essence of femininity—
Sofia tried to obtain absolute, complete, and total love from the Other.  Yet, by 
getting herself seen, Sofia also provoked disruptions in her relationship with Gerald 
(Copjec, 1994).  She incited Gerald‘s lack.  In fantasy and real life, she made it clear 
to Gerald that he could not concretize her, own her, or confine her to patriarchal 
social ideals.   
Paradoxically though, by desiring a man‘s desire, by ―playing the part of a 
man‖ (Morel, 2002, p. 89), and by being alienated in feminine masquerade in order 
to be the phallus for a man, Sofia‘s jouissance was restricted to patriarchal 
ownership.  Sofia‘s jouissance, which was tied to her hysterical symptom of 
maintaining an unsatisfied desire in her relationships with others, was restricted to 
the limits of patriarchal discourses.  In the field of the Other, Sofia‘s libido lost its 
living and animated state.  She remained in a passive position without expecting to 
receive fulfilling satisfaction from her loved ones.  Sofia situated herself in the 
miseries of structural impotence, castration, and death. 
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By desiring to plug the lack in the Other, without her wanting to be what the 
Other lacked but only wanting to motivate the Other to desire feminine love beyond 
the limits of the phallic One, Sofia‘s drive was restricted to the symbolic Other.  Sofia 
attempted to master libidinal excesses and identified with her mother‘s phallicization 
of her real body.  Sofia‘s real body became a site of suffering by being phallic.  
Sofia‘s drive was limited to the symbolic order and lost its erogenicity.37  Her 
jouissance tied to her hysterical symptoms was sustained by the fantasy of a 
boyfriend who gazed at her from a distance and desired her.  Sofia was thus caught 
up in the logic of an internal contradiction between wanting to be the object of 
Gerald‘s desire, in order to obtain a sense of phallic potency in relation to him, and 
not really wanting to be his object of jouissance, in order to liberate herself from a 
vicious circle of dissatisfaction.  Sofia sought and desired to find love to solve the 
problem of her inadequacy and become a living Woman beyond castration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Lacan differentiates the subject as drive from the subject as demand and as desire (Écrits, 722-
725/851-854; Miller, 1996; Fink, 1997, pp. 207-217).  Lacan (1998a) explains that, in hysteria, the oral 
drive links to the economy of desire.  The hysteric derives jouissance from desexualized digestive zones, 
as we see, for example, in reactions of disgust and vomiting.  In hysteria, the eroticization of the mouth is 
excluded and other desexualized zones become prominent sources of jouissance (pp. 172-173). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Feminist-Lacan Dialogues 
 
The feminist tradition explores women‘s lived experiences of distress within 
patriarchal norms.  Anglophone feminists challenge the psychoanalytic theory of 
gender, claiming that it empowers patriarchy and reinforces norms which position 
women so as to be dominated by masculine ideals.  Whereas feminists challenge 
traditional assumptions about subjectivity and make an important contribution to 
changing the roles of women in relation to men, they fall short of achieving their 
emancipatory potential because of their inadequate theorization of what constitutes 
subjectivity.  As I discussed in chapter 1, Anglophone feminists misread Lacan‘s 
theory of the symbolic Other and underestimate the importance of unconscious 
desire in the constitution of subjectivity.  With their misreading of Lacan‘s 
psychoanalytic theory, feminists promote a view of identity that is consciously 
understood within sociopolitical and patriarchal discourses.   Thus, in feminist 
theories, the unconscious is understood superficially.  Insofar as Anglophone 
feminism commits to an epistemology that undervalues the unconscious, it makes it 
difficult to see how neurotics sustain their dependence on and domination by the 
patriarchal Other.   
In this chapter, I will describe the reason why feminists cannot use the 
Lacanian psychoanalytic model in their epistemology.  In other words, I will describe 
what it means to say that Lacanian psychoanalytic knowledge derives from analytic 
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practice and not from the analysis of sociopolitical discourses. Whereas analysts, on 
the one hand, listen to the effects of retroactive signifiers on a given discourse—
effects which relate to the subject‘s unconscious desires, fixations in symptoms, and 
particular modes of jouissance—feminists, on the other hand, rely on the subject‘s 
use of conscious speech and see symptoms as resulting from sociopolitical 
discourses.  Feminists expose the Other‘s lack and transform the Other by naming its 
discursive practices.  When they name a discourse, they bring something new into 
the signifying order.  Throughout this dissertation, however, I have shown that 
naming and rearranging the signifying chain do not change the relationship between 
the subject and the Other.  Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory indicates that by producing 
new meanings in the subject‘s own existence, we still have not understood how the 
subject‘s structure of desire remains the same and how we end up destroying one 
oppressive Master in order to raise up a new one.  Lacan (2007) makes this clear to 
us when he argues,  
Psychoanalysis is not something that can be transmitted like other 
forms of knowledge.  The psychoanalyst has a position that sometimes 
manages to be that of a discourse.  He doesn‘t thereby transmit a 
body of knowledge, not that there is nothing for him to know, contrary 
to what is foolishly asserted.  This is what is called into question—the 
function in society of a certain form of knowledge, the one that is 
conveyed to you.  (p. 198) 
 
One way to approach the question of why Lacanian theory cannot be situated in the 
political—or to reframe this question, why when we change discourses, we are still 
not liberated from oppression—is to go back to the work of Ferdinard de Saussure 
(1959) and see more closely how Lacan takes up Saussure‘s cardinal distinction 
between language and speech—a distinction which is similar to that between 
empirical psychology and metapsychology.   
Saussure distinguishes language from speech by saying that language 
consists of the normative grammar and is, thus, concrete, homogenous, self-
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contained, and unified, and that speech is the individual‘s execution of language, the 
act of the individual‘s utterance.  Unlike language, speech is heterogeneous.  The 
individual passively learns to speak the signs of language, which consist of ―the 
union of meanings and sound-images‖ (p. 15).  The individual‘s act of speaking, 
however, is differential.  In speech, the signified (word-image) stands apart from the 
signifier (word-sound) (p. 12).  The sign, as it is defined in the dictionary, is fixed.  
In speaking, the individual alters the relationship between the concept and the 
sound-image of that concept, because this relationship is dependent on the 
individual‘s psychophysiology.  Speech is not reduced to ―a simple naming-process‖ 
(p. 114).  For example, Saussure tells us that the speaker‘s enunciated word of 
―Gentlemen‖ changes its substance and meaning every time it is intonated at 
different times and in different contexts.  As Saussure writes, ―Each time I say the 
word Gentlemen! I renew its substance; each utterance is a new phonic act and a 
new psychological act‖ (p. 109).  The word expresses different ideas ―without 
compromising its identity‖ (p. 108).  Saussure concludes that, in the act of speaking, 
the bond between the concept (signified) and the word-image (signifier) is arbitrary 
(p. 67).  He also provides various examples to show the multitude of different 
languages that express the same concept with different words. 
Saussure, however, contends that even though the bond between the signifier 
and the signified is arbitrary in the individual‘s act of speaking, the system of 
language is ―unchangeable‖ (p. 84).  If, for example, we were to rebuild a city by 
using new materials, we would still find ourselves in a familiar context, which is that 
of a city.  Thus, Saussure argues that the conditions of language are distinct from 
the word entities (pp. 108-109).  ―Changes affect only isolated elements,‖ not the 
whole system of language (p. 88).  Saussure explains that the linguistic system is 
always the same as regards the establishing of the value of a sign.  A sign has a 
value when it is situated in a chain of signification.  In other words, we establish the 
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value of a sign when we compare it with other similar signs and contrast it with 
dissimilar signs (p. 115).  In that respect, Saussure understands the value of a sign 
as purely differential and negative.  The sign, as a fixed entity, has a positive value.  
When we look up a word in the dictionary, for example, we get a definition.  In 
speech, however, a concept is not understood by its positive content but by its 
relation with other terms in the signifying system.  We understand a term by what it 
is not.  As I mentioned earlier, a signifier does not have a single signified.  Each 
speaker forms his or her own ―associative relations‖ of a sign based on his or her 
memory and history (p. 123).  Thus, whereas a sign may acquire a fixed value at the 
social level, it nevertheless generates diverse associative relations in the speaker‘s 
own mind.  Thus, each speaker makes his or her own associative relations to a given 
concept. 
Lacan was influenced by Saussure‘s theory but also deviated from it and 
extended it when he described the signifier as autonomous in relation to the sign and 
as dominating over the signified.  For Lacan, the signifier is not an element of a 
unified sign and cannot be studied by linguists or sociopolitical discourse analysts.  
Unlike Saussure, Lacan (1998b) argues that the signifier cannot be limited to 
phonemes and cannot be collectivized (p. 18).  Lacan also dissociates the primacy of 
the signifier from the speaker‘s own physiological and neurological functions, arguing 
that the signifier exists ―apart from any given set of human subjects‖ (Fink, 2004, p. 
76).  Lacan (1998b), thus, explains that Saussure incorrectly viewed the relationship 
between the signifier and signified as arbitrary and incorrectly assumed that it can be 
studied by linguists (pp. 18-19).  One, for example, cannot study what causes a 
signifier to have a particular meaning effect.  As Lacan (1998b) further writes, 
―Meaning effects seem to bear no relation to what causes them‖ (p. 20).  Whereas 
the signifier stuffs the signified, the signified always ―misses the referent‖ that it is 
supposed to represent (p. 20).  The signified itself then also functions as a signifier 
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as soon as it is dialectized with other signifiers.  Lacan, thus, tells us that between 
the signifier and the meaning effect ―there is something barred that must be crossed 
over‖ (p. 18).  This bar, as Fink (2004) explains, is the phallus, which, as I described 
in chapter 2, is the signifier of desire—the signifier that designates the gap between 
a word and the desired image that the word represents.  The phallus does not depict 
positive and visible properties.  It rather represents a reason for the subject to 
desire.  As a signifier, the phallus generates meaning and fixes the subject to an 
imaginary identification.  The image associated with a word, however, only partly 
represents what it is supposed to represent, because there is always something 
lacking in that image.   
Whereas Saussure understood that there is not a close bond between the 
signifier and the signified in the act of speaking, he nevertheless conceptualized the 
speaker‘s enunciation of a word as generating a kind of meaning that can easily be 
understood by the listener.  Lacan, however, is neither a structuralist nor a 
poststructuralist theorist.  He does not study how a word evolves over time and in 
different social contexts or how the Other must name and rearrange its signifying 
chain.  The Lacanian approach to analysis involves a kind of listening which defers 
understanding of conscious meanings from the analysand‘s speech and diverts the 
analysand from producing stories that make too much sense but are indeed 
meaningless and empty.  For Lacan, the subject comes to be an effect of the 
signifier—the signifier structures the subject‘s desire and jouissance—and generates 
meaning effects that are not statically determined by the Other‘s discourse.   
For example, as I laid out my case formulation of Sofia in chapter 4, Sofia 
was represented by the signifier ―devil,‖ which retroactively gave meaning to another 
signifier, ―feeling alive in the same way as her father lived before his marriage to his 
cold wife,‖ and the alienating meaning effects of that signifier were not determinant 
by the Other‘s fixed descriptions of devil, but, rather, by the Other‘s desire—in this 
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case, by her father‘s desire for her mother, the mother refusing to give in to his 
requests to have sex with him.  As I also discussed in chapter 2, the reason why 
subjects repeat symptoms and do not radically go beyond the Other is because their 
symptoms mask an unrepresentable desire.  Neurotics, whose desires remain 
unsatisfied, desire only in relation to prohibition (i.e., the law).  Their desires 
transgress prohibitions but not for the sake of radically altering those prohibitions.  
Transgression makes neurotics even less autonomous in relation to the Other.  This 
is because they situate the Other as irreducible and have the fantasy that there is an 
unfailing, harmonious, fulfilling, and satisfying Other.  
Going back to Saussure‘s point that the conditions of language are distinct 
from the word entities and that ―[c]hanges affect only isolated elements,‖ not the 
whole system of language (p. 88), Lacan agrees with Saussure‘s argument that the 
conditions of language remain the same, no matter how many times we change the 
meaning of words or ideologies of a given concept.  It is for that reason that Lacan‘s 
psychoanalytic techniques, which intend to shift the analysand‘s structural 
relationship in relation to the symbolic Other, do not focus on the analysand‘s 
communication of meanings, but rather, on how the subject is affected by the 
metaphorical and metonymical consequences of the relations between his or her 
unconscious signifiers. 
Because Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is not an analysis of meanings but 
rather an analysis of metaphors and metonymies in the subject‘s unconscious, one 
may also see why Anglophone and some Francophone feminists are still not sure 
whether the hysterical woman contests or conserves patriarchy.  Feminists leave this 
question open without providing a rigorous response to it.  In fact, feminists keep on 
criticizing Freud‘s theoretical errors and reductionism, but when it comes to 
answering the question they themselves raise, they cannot respond.  When one, 
however, concentrates on Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory and rereads Irigaray‘s ethics 
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of difference from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective—in other words, when one 
realizes that Irigaray‘s notion of an ethics of sexual difference can be more clearly 
understood when one is familiar with Lacan‘s theories of sexuation and hysteria—one 
recognizes that the female hysteric both contests and conserves patriarchy, and that 
the feminine subject, on the other hand, is she who is not spoken by the Other, does 
not mime the Other‘s deficiencies and disorders, but is able to go beyond 
boundaries, restrictions, and oppositions; she is able create and discover her own 
plurality and infinity.   
Lacan makes a fundamental distinction between desire and jouissance, and 
hence, a fundamental distinction between the hysteric and the feminine.  The 
hysterical position aims at the endless circle of desire and dissatisfaction and 
preserves masculine desire for an unfailing (m)Other.  The hysteric‘s symptoms 
enunciate the Other‘s failure to represent femininity sufficiently.  Her desire to be 
feminine remains unsatisfied.  The feminine position, on the contrary, aims at the 
domain of the impossible, which is beyond the phallic signifier and the masculine 
Other, and which celebrates the dimension of enjoyment.  By being not wholly in the 
phallic function, the feminine subject supersedes the Other‘s finite and dichotomous 
logic and desires that which gives her satisfaction and that which effaces the phallic 
void. She is able to be constituted in relation to her pure desire—not the Other‘s 
desire—and derive from that a pure form of surplus jouissance.  The feminine 
subject, who is the analyzed subject, understands how she was spoken by the effects 
of the Other‘s speech.  Her understanding, however, is not a matter of conscious 
understanding but a kind of analytic working through.  
Lacan has repeatedly shown us that the hysteric is notorious for calling the 
masculine Other‘s discourse into question and exposing its lack and incompleteness.  
The hysteric positions herself primarily as a dissatisfied subject and situates the 
Other‘s knowledge as deficient.  As Cixous and Clément (1986) indicate, the hysteric 
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is able to destabilize the patriarchal system and expose its powerlessness and lack.  
The hysteric becomes a ―heroine‖ in exposing the limitations of the Other‘s 
knowledge and resisting masculine theories and masculine representations of 
women.  Lacanian psychoanalysts have also pointed out that the hysteric has 
facilitated the evolution of psychoanalysis and science by challenging their 
representations of truths.  The hysteric thus contests and disrupts fixed discourses 
because she desires more knowledge about her own existence.  The knowledge, 
however, that she desires is the knowledge that the Other does not have and cannot 
give her.  As I pointed out in chapter 3, Irigaray‘s (2002) research study of hysterical 
enunciations has shown that although the hysteric produces a discourse which 
interrogates the Other‘s message regarding its incompleteness and ambiguity, she is 
still alienated in the Other‘s enunciations and still constructs the Other as a closed 
and finite system rather than as an open and incomplete one.  She thus always 
constructs herself in relation to a more powerful and more knowledgeable Master.  
She becomes alienated in her own demand that this masterful Other provide the 
ideal sign (the phallus) that can explain how she can be a cause of desire for others.  
As Irigaray explains, the hysteric is the one who mimes masculine language and 
masculine ideals. 
The question for feminists that remains is how they can use Lacan in their 
epistemology.  As I also mentioned earlier, Lacan‘s theory is above all a 
psychoanalytic discourse and not a sociopolitical one.  Lacan‘s analytic discourse 
cannot simply be used by other discourses, since it has its own specificity and 
structure.  Before I answer this question, even insufficiently, the major step that 
feminists need to make is to read Lacan more closely and stop misinterpreting his 
logic.  To my mind, it is more important and productive for feminists to ask how they 
can use this theoretical paradigm, which is substantially different from their own, 
than to go on interrogating its premises and nomenclatures.  As far as feminist 
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commentaries on Lacan‘s work are concerned, we can say that they are still 
backwards.  Feminists keep on criticizing Lacan for being patriarchal, because he 
uses the word phallus, and for being essentialist, because he uses the word 
jouissance.  The result of this backwardness is that we now have a proliferation of 
feminist literature against Freud and Lacan and an ambivalent attitude towards 
psychoanalytic theory.  Feminists desire to use and know Lacan‘s theory.  They use 
him when they attempt to formulate the dialectical relationship between the subject 
and the Other.  They end up, however, misinterpreting some of his most important 
concepts, including the phallus, the real, and the symbolic Other.  Thus, they use 
Lacan‘s theory in the same way as they use Foucault‘s theory.  For Lacan, discourse 
always produces a rem(a)inder, which represents that which it excludes.  Lacan 
teaches us that no matter how many signifiers we add to our signifying chain, the 
chain is always incomplete.  As I discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4, the subject thus 
structures its identity around this lack in the signifying order.  As Copjec (1994) 
says, the subject is ―the effect of the inherent failure of discourse‖ (p. 211). 
 Because feminists desire to use Lacan in their epistemology, and because 
they don‘t do the hard work required to read Lacan closely, feminists end up calling 
Lacan‘s discourse into question and demand that he provide them adequate answers 
about what it means for a woman to have certain desires and jouissance.  Feminists 
express dissatisfaction with Lacan‘s theoretical explanations without making 
substantial arguments why they want to deviate from it.  They protest against 
Lacan‘s terms and, at the same time, they use his concepts superficially to explain 
female sexuality.  The kind of protesting they do ends up retaining Lacan and neo-
Lacanians as Masters who should provide a better theory with which to explain 
femininity and the subject‘s liberation from the Other‘s domination.   
If feminists, however, engage with Lacanian theory more rigorously, there will 
be an evolution in both epistemologies.  If feminists were to speak the Irigararian 
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feminine language—the language that is similar to Lacan‘s concept of the analyst‘s 
discourse—they will succeed in questioning subjects‘ enunciations, and they will not 
locate truth at the level of the ego.  Anglophone feminists criticize psychoanalytic 
theory in a passive way and speak instead the hysteric‘s discourse.  Speaking a 
feminine language on issues related to oppression is the same technique that 
Lacanian psychoanalysts use with their analysands to question their unconscious 
desire and the etiologies of their symptoms.  If feminists use Lacanian theory, they 
will succeed in motivating subjects to ask more questions about themselves.  It is 
well known that the oppressed live and act without asking etiological questions about 
themselves and are, thus, stuck rebelling against and complying with the Other‘s 
demands and desires without realizing their own paradoxical and conflictual desires 
in relation to the Other.  They suffer by being represented by the Other‘s alienating 
effects of language.  
Furthermore, if feminists engage with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory 
rigorously, neo-Lacanian psychoanalysts will also be incited by feminists to further 
elaborate Lacan‘s own concepts, which at times seem to be treated as pre-given and 
theoretically static.  Neo-Lacanians will provide deeper theoretical clarifications to 
questions, including the question that is often raised by feminists in regard to how 
the subject relates to the Other in various sociopolitical settings.  
Feminists, as I said earlier, do expose the Other‘s lacking nature.  What they 
fail, however, to do is to speak a feminine language.  I conjecture that feminine 
language has the same structure as Lacan‘s analytic discourse.  When one shifts to 
the analyst‘s discourse—and again, one makes this shift after one undergoes an 
analytic working through and realizes that the Other is lacking and does not have a 
final answer to give to the subject about how he or she can be happy—one becomes 
the subject of the drive, a pure desiring subject who is not inhibited by the Other‘s 
demands and desires.   
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The feminine subject is not spoken by a symptom and is not in a state of 
suffering.  When, again, I say that she is not spoken by the symptom, I mean that 
she is not castrated or represented through the retroactive effects of master 
signifiers.  The feminine subject is the one who has dialectized master signifiers and 
is no longer inhibited from pursuing her satisfaction.  She enjoys and seeks out her 
satisfaction without being inhibited by an unsatisfied desire.  Her whole body enjoys.  
The feminine subject loves and enjoys by her act of speaking.  Instead of being 
pinned down by the castrating effects of signifiers, she speaks of love and enjoys.   
Thus, in order to speak a feminine language, one also has to be positioned as 
the cause of desire, as objet petit a.  To be the cause the desire, and not the effect 
of the Other‘s desire, means that the subject does not have a fixed structure in 
discourse.  It means that the subject has managed to symbolize its own lack and 
goes beyond the repetitions, fixations, and closures of discourses.  Feminine subjects 
might ask:  what if there is no representation to describe the desires and aims of 
men and women?  What if there are no correct representations for femininity?  What 
if all the representations we have for sexual difference are correct and incorrect at 
the same time?  What kinds of desires and fantasies do subjects maintain when they 
identify strongly with one ideological discourse?  What if we simply punctuate the 
paradox of having a desire for an unsatisfied desire when subjects identify with fixed 
discourses?  What if we then call the subject‘s own fantasies and desires into 
question?   
Feminists need to realize that the Lacanian Other is not the same as the 
Foucauldian Other.  Lacan is not a deconstructionist.  With Lacan, we learn that the 
Other is both powerful and deficient.  For Lacan, the Other is powerful and 
persevering because its discourse revolves around an unnamable hole; the Other 
shows us that something true still remains to be said.  As Stavrakakis (1999) points 
out, the subject‘s desire is then inhabited by the Other‘s desire to master meaning 
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and become a full and meaningful identity.  The subject and the Other cover over 
their irreducible negativity with utopian fantasies that the dialectic of desire in which 
they are both involved will someday bear fruit by giving them the sign of absolute 
meaning, unity, and harmony.  Stavrakakis (1999) thus suggests that one needs ―to 
locate the exact points within linguistic or discursive representation in which the real 
is surfacing‖ (p. 84).   
In order to locate the real of a certain discursive representation and 
encourage subjects to identify with that real to constitute their own pure desire, 
Žižek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1999) point out that we need to call into question 
ideological discourse and elevate it to the level of the signifier, which means to 
interrogate utopian and idealistic fantasies that come with it; it means to expose its 
dystopia and lacking nature, to make subjects ask questions when they are 
represented by a discursive image, so that they put their desire for knowledge about 
their unconscious into motion.  
One of the limitations of this dissertation is that I have not said exactly how 
feminists can use Lacan to further their own epistemological purposes.  Feminists, 
however, need to read Lacan so they can see for themselves where Lacan‘s own 
epistemology will take them.  In this dissertation, I have responded to the most 
important questions that feminists have raised about Lacan.  Much more could, no 
doubt, be said in response to Lacan‘s feminist critics had I been able to work from 
the whole of Lacan‘s opus, but much of it is still not even available in English.  This 
too, then, constitutes one of the limitations of my dissertation. 
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Appendix A: 
A Brief History of Hysteria 
 
The concept of hysteria has a very rich history.  It is the oldest category in 
medical, psychological, and social history.  Historians, such as Veith (1965) and 
Micale (1995), have described the shifting descriptive and explanatory paradigms of 
hysteria and the ways in which the concept has entailed a series of dramatic images 
and treatment modalities.  These paradigms shifted from the gynecological, 
demonological, and neurological theoretical models to psychological theory.  Hysteria 
took its name, around the 5th century B.C., from the Greek word hystera, which 
means uterus.  For millennia, hysteria has been associated primarily with women. 
An Egyptian medical papyrus, which is believed to date back to around 1900 
B.C., recorded that the female womb sometimes became dislocated and independent 
from other parts of the body.  Egyptian doctors developed treatment methods to 
fight the disease, including the placement of aromatic substances on the vulva so as 
―to entice the womb back down into its correct position‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 19).  The 
Greeks adopted the same notion, but they also explained it with the theory of ―an 
unsatisfactory sexual life.‖  When a woman was deprived of sexual relations, her 
uterus was capable of destroying her body, causing symptoms of ―dizziness, motor 
paralyses, sensory losses, and respiratory distress‖ (p. 19).  The Greek remedies 
included the placement of aromatic substances on the vulva, but also the 
recommendation of immediate marriage.  Ancient Roman doctors also understood 
hysteria as a disease of the womb, which caused ―disruptions in female reproductive 
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biology, including amenorrhea, miscarriages, premature births, and menopause‖ (p. 
20).  They identified their most frequent cases of hysteria in widows and virgins and 
they recommended marriage as treatment.   
 The above ideas were enormously influential in medical history for millennia.  
A paradigm shift happened during the rise of Christian civilization.  In St. Augustine‘s 
writings, we find human suffering explained as a manifestation of evil and 
punishment from God.  Explanations of hysteria shifted from medical to religious 
discourses.  Women with hysterical symptoms were called witches.  In the historical 
record, we find numerous attempts to detect such women, and evidence that they 
were tortured and executed. 
 During the Renaissance, the French physician Charles Lepois argued that the 
cause of hysteria is neither related to the womb nor the soul but to the influence of 
passions on the mind.  Lepois also argued that the words and actions of the 
physician had a profound influence on the hysteric.  In the late 17th and 18th 
centuries, British physicians developed a neurological model of disease based on the 
notions of ―humors‖ and chemistry.  They proposed the theory that in hysteria an 
excess of ―animal spirits,‖ released from the brain, entered the blood stream and 
circulated through the body (p. 22).   
 In the late 18th and 19th centuries, we see the reintroduction of the uterine 
theories.  Physicians explained hysterical symptoms as caused by female sexual 
deprivation as well as sexual overindulgence.  The reasons for this shift are unclear.  
It is also significant that the Parisian psychiatric humanitarian, Philippe Pinel, 
classified hysteria under the heading of ―Genital Neuroses of Women.‖  This period 
was marked by ―a great multiplications of texts, theories, and therapies‖ (p. 23); 
previous theoretical paradigms were discussed in light of new medical discoveries 
regarding the role of the brain and the role of the womb.   
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 Mesmer, an Austrian physician, hypothesized the existence of a magnetic fluid 
in the body and argued that hysteria resulted from disequilibrium of this fluid.  His 
treatment of the disease was based on the idea that the physician‘s hands had the 
power to redirect the fluid within the body and bring equilibrium.  Mesmer‘s patients 
were mostly salon ladies and some men.  Although the medical academicians 
accused Mesmer of charlatanism, his theory influenced the discovery of the 
therapeutic effects of hypnosis. 
 After Mesmer, the most important medical figure in the 19th century for 
hysteria was the French clinical neurologist Charcot.  Charcot rejected the genital 
etiology of hysteria and insisted that men were also susceptible to the disease, 
though less frequently than women.  In his theory, hysteria was caused by a 
dysfunction of the central nervous system based on hereditary predisposition and 
environmental factors.  The descriptions of this dysfunction involved symptoms of 
epilepsy and syphilis.  Charcot held out little hope for its cure and ―his therapeutics 
was limited to the alleviation of symptoms‖ (p. 25).  At the famous hospital of 
Salpêtrière, he experimented with the use of hypnosis to treat patients, especially 
women, who manifested symptoms of fainting, paralysis, convulsions, and wild 
screaming.  Another therapeutic technique that he employed was to ignore the 
hysterical behavior and concentrate instead on the present circumstances of these 
patients.  Charcot found that his patients were suffering from many forms of stress, 
including sexual feelings, religious conflicts, and traumas from exploitation or neglect 
by their families.  As hysterics seemed to be easily suggestible to explanations and 
hypnotic effects, several other doctors challenged Charcot‘s experiments and 
characterized him as the ―sinister‖ doctor ―who manipulated his patients like 
puppeteers‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 37).  Although Charcot did not limit hysteria to 
women in his diagnostic schema, it seemed that he equated it with stereotypes of 
female personality.  With his assistants, he saw hysterics as vain, preoccupied with 
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their appearance, deceitful, and self-dramatizing.  These traits were seen by one of 
Charcot‘s assistants as ―varieties of female character … One might even say that 
hysterics are more womanly than other women‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 34).   
 Charcot‘s theories and experiments on hysteria gave rise to psychoanalytic 
theory.  In Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer challenged the nineteenth-century 
theories of hysteria as an organic physical illness and argued instead that it needed 
to be understood as a psychic disorder. They proposed that hysteria was the product 
of a traumatic event, the memory of which got repressed and transformed into 
bodily symptoms (such as coughs, convulsions, and paralysis).  In other words, 
trauma was converted into somatic symptoms.  In 1896, Freud developed the 
seduction theory, in which he contended that infantile sexual abuse caused hysteria.  
As such, ―hysterical symptoms were the derivatives of memories which are operating 
unconsciously‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 40).  By late 1897, however, Freud abandoned 
the seduction theory and contended instead that ―hysterical patients were expressing 
fantasies based on their unconscious Oedipal desires‖ (p. 40).   
 The rise of the psychological paradigm of hysteria led to a sequence of 
publications that elaborated the idea of the hysterical neurotic character.38  Hysteria 
was defined by a set of highly negative character traits, mostly including 
―eccentricity, impulsiveness, emotionality, coquettishness, deceitfulness, and 
hypersexuality‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 24).  Various researchers and psychoanalysts 
elaborated the characteristics of hysterical character and attributed it to pre-Oedipal 
dependence on the mother and Oedipal conflicts.  For example, in the 1950‘s, the 
                                                          
38 Drawing the formulations of hysteria from psychodynamic theories, there is an elusive, disparate, and, 
at times, very confusing distinction among the terms hysterical personality, hysterical neurosis, hysterical 
character, hysteroid personality, conversion hysteria, anxiety hysteria, hysterical psychosis, etc.  These 
distinctions are generally based on the level of specific symptoms as well as on the severity of the pre-
genital and genital fixations that intervene in the patient‘s daily functioning.  In the journal Psychological 
Issues, Alan Krohn (1978) wrote a monograph on hysteria and traced past formulations from object-
relational, self, ego, and other theories, which have either been more faithful to Freudian theory or less 
faithful to it.  McWilliams (1994) also draws her description of hysteria from various analytic traditions, 
including from drive, ego, object-relational, and self theories.   
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researchers Chodoff and Lyons investigated the hysterical traits that were agreed 
upon by  many authors, and listed seven major characteristics: 
1) egoism, vanity, etc.; 2) exhibitionism, dramatization, lying, 
exaggeration; 3) unbridled display of affects, labile affect, 
inconsistency of reactions, etc.; 4) emotional shallowness; 5) 
sexualization of nonsexual situations; 6) intense fear of sexuality, 
frigidity; 7) demandingness and dependence (Krohn, 1978, p. 64). 
 
Several theorists started to develop new approaches to define hysteria, relying on 
conversion reactions (psychosomatic symptoms) and characterological traits.  
Because, however, conversion symptoms were considered to be common in some 
eras and cultures, theorists believed that the definition of personality traits was more 
reliable.  Some sporadic studies showed the remarkable ―unsatisfactoriness of basing 
a diagnosis of hysteria on symptoms,‖ which challenged not only the conversion 
manifestations of hysteria but also the appearance of personality traits (Krohn, 1978, 
p. 68).  Krohn (1978) cites a study by Purtell, Robins, and Cohen that was conducted 
in 1951, which intended to investigate further the nature of hysterical symptoms.  
Their participants were 21 female patients who at the beginning of their study were 
diagnosed with hysteria.  Their symptoms included psychosomatic complaints, 
childishness, and self-dramatization.  During the research study, however, it 
emerged that 14 of the 22 patients showed some signs of psychotic symptoms 
(hallucinations and delusions).  
 The confusion of hysterical symptoms with psychotic symptoms raised several 
doubts about the existence of hysteria.  When, in the 1950‘s, the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia became popular, some psychiatrists proposed that ―all five cases in the 
Studies of Hysteria were actually misdiagnosed schizophrenic illnesses‖ (Micale, 
1995, p. 60).  Some also hypothesized that in Breuer‘s famous case of Anna O, the 
patient suffered from toxic psychosis, probably because of her use of morphine.    
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Libbrecht (1995), in her book, Hysterical Psychosis:  A Historical Survey, 
explores in detail the history of clinical psychiatry with its struggle to diagnostically 
differentiate hysteria from psychosis as well as to theorize the mix of hysterical and 
psychotic symptoms, which may emerge at different periods in the life of a patient.  
These symptoms include hysterical personality traits, somatic conversion, delusions, 
and hallucinations.  Libbrecht cites several theorists who struggled with the 
classification system.  Some patients were classified as ―hysterical in the end,‖ 
although many of them were once ―diagnosed as schizophrenic over the course of 
their lengthy history as residential patients‖ (p. 197).  In the 1960‘s, there was a 
proliferation of articles in Europe and America on the study of hysterical psychosis, in 
the attempt to include both hysterical and psychotic phenomena.  A common 
description of hysterical psychosis was that ―hallucinations, delusions, 
depersonalization, and grossly unusual behavior‖ were ―sharply circumscribed and 
very transient‖ in patients with hysterical characters.  It was hypothesized that the 
so-called psychotic symptoms in hysteria were pseudo-psychotic, in which the 
delusions seemed to be rectifiable and the hallucinations were thoughts rather than 
perceptions; these experiences occurred as a mechanism for coping with certain 
unbearable living conditions.  Other theorists also noted that while hysterical 
psychotics ―can be hypnotized, schizophrenics cannot‖ (p. 191).  In time, the 
diagnosis of hysterical psychosis was replaced with the DSM‘s classifications of 
reactive psychosis and borderline personality disorder.39  Libbrecht (1995) points out 
that eventually psychiatrists, and subsequently the DSM committees, gave some 
attention to hysterical phenomena only within the psychosis paradigm.  Several 
                                                          
39 The shared psychotic disorder (folie à deux) may also be included here.  It refers to the patient who 
develops delusions and/or odd beliefs as a result of a close relationship with a delusional individual.  The 
content and nature of these beliefs depend on the beliefs of the partner.  The phenomenon of folie à deux 
has also been termed ―mass hysteria,‖ which is most observable in large groups (or crowds), and is 
characterized by outbreaks of inexplicable and strange behaviors.  This phenomenon was prevalent in the 
Middle Ages and was explained by the notion of possession.  Groups of people were afflicted by a 
compulsion to run out in the streets, dance, shout, and rave.  Mass hysterical reactions have existed even 
in modern times.  One common example is sports or rock band fans, who yell, scream, and become very 
aggressive when they congregate in mobs.   
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authors/clinicians reported that they felt uncomfortable making a rigid distinction 
between neurosis and psychosis (p. 196) and had difficulty phenomenologically 
describing the manifestations of severe hysteria.   
As Micale (1993) argues, since hysteria was broken down ―into its constituent 
symptomatological parts‖ and lacked a strong theoretical and etiological theory to 
hold it together, it failed to retain its basic clinical unity in the predominant 
psychiatric paradigm.  The symptoms of hysteria became ―reassembled in new 
combinations and distributed to many other medical categories‖ and ―more nuanced 
psychiatric classifications‖ (p. 525).  The major problem that exists in contemporary 
medical epistemology seems to be that the disappearance of hysteria is mainly due 
to the failure to understand it through the lens of analytic discourse.  Whereas Freud 
theorized hysteria by making the effort to decipher the unconscious and allowing his 
patients to free associate and speak about their memories, not only by his 
observations of their manifest symptoms, the DSM-IV fails to give us a clear 
differentiation of the diagnostic categories, resulting in the assignment of patients to 
one or more specific disorders based on ambiguous and arbitrary values.   
The dominant psychodiagnostic epistemology today is problematic and 
inadequate.  The current DSM‘s medico-psychological paradigm leads us to 
understand patients‘ symptoms superficially and to attempt to fix their ―abnormal‖ 
behaviors/thoughts and lessen their most observable symptoms as quickly as 
possible.  Most clinicians today make a diagnosis on the basis of socially desirable 
and adaptive behaviors.  Consequently, psychotherapists are solely focused on the 
elimination of symptoms, without taking into much consideration how these 
symptoms correspond to a deeper structure.   
It is thus evident that the category of borderline personality disorder has not 
been conceptualized thoroughly, since the diagnosticians have located it on the 
border of neurosis and psychosis (I provide Freud‘s psychoanalytic distinction of 
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hysteria and psychosis in Appendix B).  Failing to theorize the patient‘s relational 
structure to the Other, we also fail to connect his or her manifested symptoms (such 
as self-mutilation, suicide threats, intense anger, unstable self-image, and 
alternation between extremes of idealization and devaluation of others) with 
signifiers and with deeper theoretical formulations of his or her positions in regard to 
trauma and the fundamental fantasy.  
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Appendix B: 
The Freudian Theory of Bisexuality and Femininity 
 
Among these is a suspicion that this phase of attachment to the 
mother is especially intimately related to the aetiology of hysteria, 
which is not surprising when we reflect that both the phase and the 
neurosis are characteristically feminine, and further, that in this 
dependence on the mother we have the germ of later paranoia in 
women (Freud, 1990d, p. 324).40 
 
Some portion of what we men call ‗the enigma of women‘ may perhaps 
be derived from this expression of bisexuality in women‘s lives (Freud, 
1990e, p. 359). 
 
In ―Femininity,‖ Freud (1990e) asserts that the sexual development of women 
is enigmatic.  In approaching this riddle, Freud warns that the theory of female 
sexuality is far from clear.  Freud vacillates between two contradictory arguments: 
one argument is that women are predominantly passive and more likely to be 
bisexual or have masochistic tendencies than men;41 the other argument is that the 
truly feminine is heterosexual and normally active.  Both arguments relate to 
women‘s mothering role and partnership with men.   
With Freud, one finds a starting point from which to distinguish between the 
two sexes from a structural and socio-political perspective.  Since Freud‘s inquiry on 
the enigma of women, however, the problem of femininity has remained in feminism 
                                                          
40 In his 1932 essay, Freud examined the issue of the girl‘s preoedipal phase and the effects that this 
phase has on her sexuality.  He was encouraged to undertake this task by the work of women 
psychoanalysts, such as Lampl-de Groot, Deutsch, Brunswick, and others, who served as mother 
substitutes in the transference.  For more information about how Freud was influenced by these women 
psychoanalysts, see Hamon (2000). 
41 Freud (1990e) adds that masochistic men also exhibit ―very plain feminine traits‖ (p. 345). 
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to this day.  Feminists protest against the Freudian theory of women‘s wish for a 
penis, which leads them to question whether or not psychoanalysis is valid.  We can 
argue, however, that protesting against the phallus is not proof that women do not 
have a masculinity complex.  Following Soler‘s (2006) argument, although 
Anglophone feminists protest against the psychoanalytic notion of the phallus, they 
fail to provide an alternative theory that would elucidate the distinction between the 
sexes.  Although feminists challenge the biological and social reductionisms of what a 
woman is or should be, the enigmatic question that still remains in Anglophone 
feminist texts is what Hamon (2000) asks, ―Why do women love men?‖  If women 
feel abused by male power and maternal responsibilities, why then do they love men 
sexually and look forward to assuming maternal responsibilities?  The subsequent 
question that arises in feminist and neo-Freudian texts is whether or not the essence 
of femininity is linked to masochism insofar as women give into men‘s desires. 
In this section, I intend to discuss Freud‘s conceptualization of femininity and 
women‘s possible inclinations to hysteria, paranoia, and masochism.  I will survey 
some of his earlier and later essays, so that the reader better understands the 
development of Freud‘s thinking on femininity in relation to the preoedipal and 
Oedipal positions.  I will also briefly describe Freud‘s case formulations of Schreber 
and Dora, as well as Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, in order to elucidate the 
psychoanalytic differences among the terms normal femininity, hysterical neurosis, 
and psychosis. 
§ 
Freud formulates sexual difference and clinical diagnostics based on the 
Oedipal configuration.  In Freud‘s view, femininity is understood as a succession of 
events in a little girl‘s development, including penis envy and change of love-object 
(from the mother to the father).  Femininity is understood in accordance with the 
Oedipal position.  Freud (1990d) considers the Oedipal phase as more significant 
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than the preoedipal when he argues that the Oedipal relation is ―the nucleus of the 
neuroses‖—whether obsession or hysteria (p. 323).  Depending on the Oedipal 
configuration, one becomes normal or neurotic and one develops a certain sexual 
identity.42  
In his 1931 essay, Freud (1990d) recognizes the significance of the pre-
Oedipal phase in girls and gives credit to women analysts—Lampl-de Groot, Deutsch, 
and Brunswick—for serving as mother substitutes in the analytic transference and 
exploring the pre-Oedipus.  Nevertheless, Freud does not go into many details about 
the pre-Oedipal phase.  Freud considers the failure to resolve the Oedipal complex to 
be the cause of a wide range of clinical problems and psychopathology:  penis envy, 
inhibition, masculinity complex, inferiority, perversion, obsession, and psychosomatic 
symptoms.   
Freud (1990d) hypothesizes that the child‘s unresolved dependence on the 
mother early in life situates it either as hysteric or paranoiac later in life.  In regard 
to the child‘s fixations on the mother, he gives credit to Ruth Mack Brunswick‘s 
analysis of a case of female paranoia.  Brunswick formulates this case in terms of the 
patient‘s preoedipal fixations and failure to achieve the Oedipal position (see Hamon, 
2000, pp. 179-215; Freud, 1990d, p. 324).   
Freud and Brunswick conceptualize the preoedipal phase as the child‘s 
attachment to an omnipotent (phallic) maternal figure, who is seductive toward and 
active with her child.  Freud (1990d) observes that the child is sexually passive 
insofar as it is suckled, fed, cleaned, or dressed by the mother, but the child also 
strives to turn these sexual satisfactions into activity.  The child wants to master the 
                                                          
42 Freud (1990e) asserts that, because girls do not have a penis, they envy the penis.  In the absence of 
castration anxiety, girls do not form a strong superego as boys do.  Girls take refuge in the Oedipal 
situation to resolve their penis envy and ―remain in it for an indeterminate length of time‖ (p. 357).  Girls 
realize they are castrated by seeing the genitals of boys, but their recognition that they do not have a 
penis does not necessarily mean that they accept their castration as a fact.  They long for the penis 
unconsciously.  They resolve their Oedipal complex when they accept that their wish for a penis can be 
replaced by giving birth to a baby.  
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mother‘s omnipotence and identifies with the mother‘s activity.  For example, when 
the little girl plays with dolls, she identifies ―with the active side of femininity,‖ with 
the active mothering role (p. 334).  The mother does everything for the child and 
possesses everything that is desirable.  Conversely, the child views the mother as 
devouring and hostile.  The child sees the omnipotent mother not only as nurturing 
but also as threatening because of all the demands and prohibitions she places on it.   
A child‘s early experiences with the phallic mother determine whether the 
child achieves the Oedipal position and becomes differentiated and autonomous from 
the mother.  The passage from the preoedipal to the Oedipal phase is a passage 
from dependency and passivity vis-à-vis the omnipotent-phallic-active mother to 
independence and activity thanks to identification with the mother (Brunswick, 1990; 
as cited in Hamon, 2000, pp. 219-220).  In normal cases, when the child gradually 
accepts its mother‘s castration and takes care of itself in the same way as her 
mother had taken care of it, the child substitutes activity for passivity.  Based on this 
theory, one might conclude that in psychosis this substitution does not occur, and 
that in hysteria it does not reach its full course. 
In Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, for example, we see that the patient, 
in adulthood, maintained an undifferentiating, symbiotic, and dependent relationship 
with her neglectful, abusive, and threatening sister.  The sister was the predominant 
maternal figure for this patient.  The patient came to see Brunswick for analysis to 
complain that she suspected her husband of being sexually involved with her 
stepmother (her father‘s second wife).  Overwhelmed by her stepmother‘s voice, she 
was hearing buzzing noises in her head and was convinced that neighbors and 
strangers that she passed on the street were laughing and glancing at her.  
In her associations to delusions, dreams, and childhood memories, 
Brunswick‘s patient situated her sister as both omnipotent (phallic) and devouring.  
The patient recalled that when she was 2 years old she was fascinated by her sister‘s 
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pubic hair.  Brunswick interprets that the patient was fascinated because she thought 
that there was a penis hidden behind it.  It was also apparent in one of her dreams, 
in which she saw herself possessing a penis and urinating like a man, that the 
patient had the impression that she and her sister lacked nothing.  Her sister‘s 
sexual pleasure was also overwhelming when the patient realized that she was not 
able to give her sister everything her sister wanted.  When the patient was young, 
she engaged in masturbatory activities with her sister, by which they both 
experienced sexual pleasure each time.  In this memory, the patient was positioned 
as a special partner for her sister.  Her sister, however, was promiscuous and had 
many male lovers.  At a later age, the patient felt that her sister neglected her as a 
love-object.  The patient found herself helpless to win back her sister‘s love, but she 
continued to long for the female object and to believe that neither she nor her sister 
were castrated.   
The experience of being a helpless, traumatized, and passive child in relation 
to her sister was repeated in her transferences to others, including her analyst and 
stepmother, who were positioned by the patient as taking her sister‘s omnipotent 
place.  The patient was envious of her analyst‘s male patients and of her husband 
who received more affection from her stepmother than she did.  The therapist and 
stepmother were objects of jealousy and substitutes for her sister (Hamon, 2000, pp. 
179-215).   
At first glance, her relationship with her husband might seem to be a 
―normal‖ love relationship between a man and a woman.  But when we study her 
delusional jealousies in detail, as Brunswick did, we see that the patient‘s jealousy 
regarding her husband‘s infidelity had its source in feelings of hatred toward men, 
especially of those men who had stolen her sister‘s love from her.  Brunswick‘s 
patient imagined that these men had something better to offer her sister than she 
did.  In the same vein, the patient imagined that her husband was better able than 
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her to seduce her stepmother and other women whom she loved, including her 
therapist.   
Was Brunswick‘s paranoid patient feminine?  To give an answer from a 
Freudian perspective, we have to examine some of Freud‘s contradictory statements.  
Freud makes statements here and there in his writings that dependency on the 
maternal situates the subject in a truly feminine position—a position that is 
characteristic of hysteria and paranoia.  In his 1932 essay, however, Freud is clearer 
about what constitutes true or normal femininity.  For Freud (1990e), the castration 
complex is the linchpin of becoming a woman.  To become a woman, a little girl has 
to accept the idea that she and her mother do not have penises.  The little girl has to 
turn to a man‘s love with the expectation of getting the penis from him.  As Freud 
states, a woman‘s wish for a penis is replaced by having a baby with the man she 
loves.  The baby symbolically takes the place of a penis.  Since Brunswick‘s patient 
did not accede to the Oedipal position and did not perceive herself or her mother-
object as castrated, she was not feminine.  
Freud, however, argues that the paranoiac is fixated on the preoedipal 
mother and becomes both feminized (veiled feminine) and homosexual.  He 
understands paranoid outbreaks as defenses against homosexuality.  Homosexuality 
in the paranoiac originates from a symbiotic love-hate relationship with the 
preoedipal phallic mother.43   
In Schreber‘s case, for example, a case of male paranoia, Freud (1956a) 
asserts that Schreber‘s emasculation wish at the age of 51—his wish to be 
transformed into a woman and submit to the act of copulation—was delusional.  
Schreber had the delusion that if he were a woman, he would redeem and save the 
                                                          
43 Freud does not consider homosexuality to be the cause of paranoia.  Rather, he understands paranoia 
as a defense against homosexuality.  It seems to me that Freud (1990b) considers homosexuality normal 
when the subject achieves the Oedipal position at his or her early ages and is not neurotically conflictual 
about his or her sexual orientation.  Freud (1990e), however, also describes women‘s homosexuality as 
involving a masculinity complex, when these women are neurotics.  Women with a masculinity complex 
are defiantly rebellious regarding the idea that they are castrated. 
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world.  His delusion was an outburst of his homosexual feelings towards his 
physician, Flechsig, who in turn was associated by him with God.  Freud argues that 
the manifestation of homosexuality later in life presumes the ―condition that the 
object of their choice must possess genitals like their own‖ (p. 446).  Since some 
paranoiacs oscillate between homosexual and heterosexual fantasies, paranoiacs 
perceive both sexes as having male genitals.   
Freud argues that Schreber‘s homosexual love for Flechsig was a repetition of 
an infantile transference love—a love that was first directed to the mother and then 
shifted to the father.  In his 1922 essay, Freud (1956b) explains further that 
homosexuality for the paranoiac has its origin in a preoedipal fixation on the 
maternal object.  Because of this fixation, the paranoiac cannot tolerate feelings of 
jealousy toward rivals, e.g., siblings or the father, and so the paranoiac transforms 
rivals into love-objects.  The development of persecutory paranoia comes from a 
primal relationship, which is mixed with love-hate feelings.  The paranoiac 
transforms the loved ones into hated persecutors and the hated rivals into love-
objects.  The transformation of hated rivals into love-objects is a way to avoid 
rivalry.  Hence, Schreber‘s feminization was due to ―an indignant repudiation—a true 
masculine protest‖ (Freud, 1956a, p. 426).  Schreber‘s emasculation wish and 
homosexual love for Flechsig were caused by his fear that Flechsig, a powerful divine 
man, might persecute and abuse him.44  As Schreber writes in his autobiography, 
―Flechsig … tried to commit soul-murder upon [me]‖ (p. 428).  As we will see shortly, 
this form of masculine protest is different from what we find in hysteria. 
The paranoiac‘s fixation on the mother is a narcissistic fixation.  This fixation 
makes it difficult to love another woman because he cannot get beyond the 
autoerotic stage.  For the paranoiac, other love-objects must love him in the same 
                                                          
44 Freud (1956a) explains further how the paranoiac negates and projects in various ways.  The 
paranoiac‘s statement, for example, ―I (a man) love him,‖ is contradicted by a delusion of persecution that 
asserts, ―I do not love him—I hate him.‖  The persecutor here is someone who was once loved by the 
paranoiac (p. 449).   
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way as his mother loved him.  Therefore, the paranoiac‘s attachment to the 
preoedipal mother is a symbiotic love.  Schreber‘s aversion for other women also 
belied the fact that when he discovered that women were castrated, he feared that 
women might castrate him as well.  He also feared his father.  By renouncing 
women, he avoided rivalry with his father and the possibility of castration by his 
mother.  It was for that reason that he transformed his male rivals into love objects 
and identified with the feminine, preoedipal, maternal object.  We need to keep in 
mind here that Schreber‘s emasculation fantasy was not a fantasy of castration but 
rather a delusion of re-creating a whole humanity with his physician, Flechsig.  In 
other words, with his emasculation delusion, Schreber still maintained the idea that 
he was not castrated and that he was all-powerful. 
As I mentioned earlier, feminization is not only a symptom of paranoia but 
also of hysteria.  In the case of Dora, a case of female hysteria written in 1905, 
Freud did not discuss the effects of Dora‘s attachment to her mother.  As I said 
earlier, throughout his work, Freud considered the Oedipal phase, and not the 
preoedipal, to be the nucleus of the neuroses (hysteria and obsession).  In the early 
1930‘s, regardless of his conjecture that a daughter‘s unresolved dependence on her 
mother has an effect on her relation to her father as a love-object, Freud elaborated 
more on how the daughter relates to her father when he discussed the little girl‘s 
different possible paths of sexual development.  In the case of Dora, we read that 
Dora was more attached to her father than she was to her mother and that Dora 
presented her mother as ―an uncultivated woman and above all as a foolish one‖ 
(Freud, 1997a, p. 13).  In analysis, Freud focused on Dora‘s Oedipal complex.  At the 
end of the analysis, Freud discovered that Dora was not heterosexual but bisexual; 
Dora was not only in love with men but also with women.  Hence, she identified with 
both femininity and masculinity. 
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I will describe the case briefly:  Dora was 18 years old and she was brought 
to Freud for treatment by her father.  Since the age of 8, Dora suffered from a 
variety of psychological and psychosomatic symptoms:  chronic asthma, migraines, 
nervous coughing, catarrh, aphonia, depression, suicidal ideation, irritability, and 
loss of consciousness.  There was no evidence of organic cause for her physical 
ailments.   
Dora‘s symptoms were connected with the circumstances of her life:  Her 
father had formed a close relationship with a married couple, Herr K and Frau K.  
Dora was convinced that her father was having an affair with Frau K and complained 
to both her parents that Herr K had made sexual advances towards her.  Both 
parents, however, were unsupportive and suspicious of Dora‘s accusations against 
Herr K.  In turn, they accused Dora of having sexual fantasies and making up 
stories.  Dora disclosed to Freud that Herr K had ―suddenly clasped [her] to him and 
pressed a kiss upon her lips.‖  Freud also tells us that ―Dora had at that moment a 
violent feeling of disgust, tore herself free from the man,‖ and left him (p. 21).  This 
event occurred when Dora was 14 years old.  Up until the age of 18, Dora was 
secretive about this incident and maintained her friendship with Herr K.  Whereas 
Dora reproached her father for having an affair with Frau K, she was protective of 
their affair.  For example, Dora did not visit Frau K when she knew that her father 
was there with her.  She also was devoted to Frau K and took care of the K‘s children 
as if she were their mother.   
Freud interpreted Dora‘s symptoms symbolically.  During the treatment, 
Freud insisted that Dora was in love with Herr K as she had been in love with her 
father during the Oedipal phase.  But because Dora had not resolved her Oedipal 
conflicts, she was not able to free herself from these conflicts and situate herself as a 
woman in relation to a man.  In Freud‘s words, Dora was not able to free herself 
from disease (masculinity complex) and turn to life (normal femininity).  Freud 
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noticed, for example, that during Herr K‘s absences, Dora experienced loss of voice 
and frequent attacks of coughing.  This was an indication to Freud that Dora gave up 
speaking because ―speech had lost its value since she could not speak to him‖ (p. 
33).  For Freud, Dora‘s physical symptoms signified her struggle between her love 
for men and her repudiation of sexuality.  This was clear to Freud when he analyzed 
her hysterical appendicitis attacks—attacks that had no organic basis and involved 
the symptoms of abdominal pain and foot numbness.  Dora told Freud that she 
experienced her first appendicitis attack nine months after Herr K‘s sexual advances 
towards her.  Before Herr K tried to kiss her by the lake at age 18, he told her, ―You 
know I get nothing out of my wife‖ (p. 90).  Freud‘s interpretation was that Dora 
fantasized both childbirth and making a false step with Herr K.  Freud also insisted to 
Dora that she was unconsciously in love with him. 
Only when Dora broke off the analysis did Freud realize that Dora was also in 
love with Frau K.  Dora used to praise Frau K‘s ―adorable white body‖ and never 
spoke ―a harsh or angry word against the lady‖ (p. 54).  Dora started to complain 
about her father‘s affair when she felt that Frau K had betrayed her.  After the 
termination, Freud admitted that the fault lay in his failure ―to discover in time and 
to inform the patient that her homosexual (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K was the 
strongest unconscious current in her mental life‖ (p. 110).  Freud arrived at another 
interpretation on how she derived secondary gains from her symptoms:  Dora 
wanted to frighten and punish her father in order to make him give up Frau K.  Some 
of the symbolic connotations of her symptoms were that Dora was attached to her 
father and identified with masculinity.  In addition, she also felt vengeful toward her 
father and was fascinated with femininity.  Dora‘s fascination with femininity became 
even more manifest when Dora shared with Freud her experience of going to a 
gallery alone and looking at the pictures that appealed to her.  Dora was ―rapt in 
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silent admiration‖ for two hours in front of the Sistine Madonna, the virgin mother (p. 
88).  In other words, the divine beauty of that feminine statue fascinated her. 
In 1908, Freud (1997b) added a new section to his case history, entitled 
―Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality.‖  In that essay, Freud 
established the thesis that a ―hysterical symptom is the expression of both a 
masculine and a feminine unconscious sexual‖ fantasy (p. 118).  Hysterical 
symptoms are bisexual in nature and serve the fulfillment of unconscious masculine 
and feminine sexual wishes.  Freud mentioned the example of a woman who pressed 
her dress to her body with one hand (identification with femininity) while she also 
tried to tear her dress off with the other hand (identification with masculinity).  This 
woman was torn in her fantasies between yielding to a man sexually and rebelling 
against her sexual feelings.   
Returning to Dora‘s case, Dora‘s identification with masculinity was apparent 
to Freud when she adopted her father‘s physical symptoms from the age of eight 
onward, e.g., coughing, hoarseness, catarrh, and so on.  These symptoms expressed 
several meanings in succession. For example, they expressed her love and sympathy 
for his chronic illnesses, identification with his high socioeconomic status regardless 
of his poor health, and revenge for his unwillingness to give up his affair with Frau K 
for the sake of his daughter.  Her oral conversion symptoms were also related to her 
father‘s oral sexual techniques.  Dora repressed the idea that to satisfy Frau K her 
father resorted to oral sex, because of his impotence (Lacan, 2006, p. 180/221).  
Dora recognized her female body in an alienating way by identifying with her father‘s 
bodily image and desire for Frau K.  By taking her father‘s desire as her own desire, 
Dora‘s oral zone lost its erogenicity and became a site of conversion.  Her psychical 
conflicts were transformed into somatic symptoms, e.g. coughing, hoarseness, and 
aphonia.  Dora was subjected to bodily fragmentations caused by her father‘s 
disparate desires and conflictual wishes.  
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When Herr K expressed his passionate affection for Dora and declared that he 
got nothing out of his wife, Dora changed position in relation to the K‘s.  From then 
on, Dora wanted to stop all relations with the K‘s and demanded that her father also 
stop his affair.  She resented her father for offering her to Herr K in exchange for his 
affair with Frau K.  She also resented Herr K for telling her that his wife meant 
nothing to him.  Herr K had once previously repeated the exact same words to a 
governess.  Dora hated Herr K when she realized that Herr K treated her just like a 
governess.  Here, of course, Dora identified with being a woman mistreated by a 
man.   
Since Frau K was the object of her father‘s desire, Dora became fascinated 
with what a man desires in a woman.  Following Lacan (2006), Dora realized the 
impasse ―of accepting herself as a man‘s object of desire‖ and, for that reason, Dora 
idolized Frau K‘s femininity and the Madonna.  Her solution was to offer herself as an 
object of an irreducible, transcendent, and divine desire and not as an object of a 
man‘s desire (p. 181/222).  Dora did not consent to Herr K‘s sexual advances.  In 
other words, Dora identified with femininity not in relation to sexuality with a man 
but in relation to her inability to understand the enigmatic nature of femininity.  Her 
unconscious wish to understand her father‘s desire led to passivity in her relations 
with others and to psychosomatic symptoms.45   
The expressions of bisexuality and passivity in hysteria differ from those in 
paranoia.  What Brunswick‘s paranoid patient and Freud‘s hysterical Dora had in 
common were their conscious love for men but their unacknowledged homosexual 
love for women and aversion toward men.  However, both patients‘ symptoms were 
structured in different ways.   
                                                          
45 Lacan (2006) assures us that Dora‘s pregnancy fantasy after Herr K‘s sexual advances functioned as an 
identification with masculinity (p. 183/224).  We can deduce that Dora identified with masculinity by 
identifying with her father‘s desire to have genital sex, instead of oral sex, with Frau K and procreate.  
Hence, her pregnancy fantasy, converted to appendicitis, was her father‘s unfulfilled desire for a baby with 
Frau K.   
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According to Freud, the underlying mechanism that operates in psychosis is 
repudiation, also called foreclosure (Verwerfung).  Foreclosure occurs when the ego 
rejects an ―incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had 
never occurred to the ego at all‖ (Freud, as cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 
166).  Any idea that is abolished internally returns from without.  The psychotic 
simultaneously repudiates unpleasant ideas with their affects.  In Brunswick‘s case, 
for example, the patient, as a child, foreclosed the idea that her sister was castrated.  
Instead, her sister remained in her mind as an intact whole just like her.  When 
Brunswick‘s patient was confronted with her sister‘s overwhelming sexual jouissance, 
she situated her sister as all powerful.  Brunswick‘s patient foreclosed the idea that 
her sister was lacking and the idea that she herself could not give her sister the 
sexual jouissance she wanted.   
We see the same mechanism functioning in Schreber‘s case.  Schreber 
situated himself and Flechsig as omnipotent in order to repudiate the idea of 
castration and rivalry.  Schreber‘s love for Flechsig was transferred onto Flechsig 
from Schreber‘s father, who was also positioned as omnipotent when Schreber, as a 
child, was not able to signify his separation from his mother.  Schreber maintained 
an undifferentiated relation with his mother by foreclosing the idea that his father 
was able to castrate him and frustrate his symbiotic relation with his mother.  His 
avoidance of rivalry with Flechsig, as with his father, forced Schreber to assume a 
feminized, passive position in relation to him. 
In contrast, the mechanism that operates in the neuroses (hysteria and 
obsession) is repression.  Repression involves keeping something it at some distance 
from consciousness.  Whereas in foreclosure, ideas that are abolished internally 
return from without, in repression, incompatible ideas return from within in the form 
of slips of the tongue, bungled actions, psychosomatic symptoms, and so on (Fink, 
1997).  In Dora‘s case, for example, we see that Dora had fallen in love with her 
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father at first and Frau K afterwards without knowing it.  The idea that she loved her 
father and Frau K was kept unconscious.  In consequence, Dora replaced her 
bisexual love feelings with symptoms that affected her whole life. 
In order for a child to be neurotic/normal and not psychotic later in life, the 
child needs to signify its body and sense of self as different from the body of the 
mother and as different from the mother‘s conception of herself.  Freud (1990d) 
remarks that a neurotic woman represses her original relation to her mother; she 
pushes her conflictual relation to her mother into her unconscious.  With the 
discovery of castration and the realization of her organic inferiority, the little girl is 
more inclined to repress the conflict between the first sexual experiences she had in 
relation to her mother and her frustrations with her castrated mother.  Her 
attachment to her father reflects her relation to her mother.  In other words, her 
attachment to her father is built on her original relation to her mother.  A woman‘s 
husband, Freud (1990d) writes, is ―meant to be the inheritor of her relation to her 
father, but in reality he [becomes] the inheritor of her relation to her mother‖ (p. 
328).  Hence, a woman‘s neurotic struggle with her husband or with men in general 
reflects her struggle with her mother.  For this reason, a woman is more inclined to 
develop a masculinity complex, renounce her whole sexual life, and defiantly 
overemphasize her clitoral masculinity in her unconscious. 
 
§ 
A crucial question that arises in Freud‘s writings is whether or not the essence 
of femininity is linked to masochism/passivity.  Freud (1990c) vacillates between two 
conflicting ideas on masochism.  First, he argues that masochistic males and females 
are situated in a ―characteristically feminine position‖ (p. 286).  The manifest content 
of their masochistic fantasies involves mistreatment, while the latent content 
includes castration, copulation, and giving birth.  Their masochistic behaviors are 
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child-like, i.e., helpless and naughty.  From this point of view, masochism is 
understood as giving expression to ―feminine nature.‖  Second, Freud conceptualizes 
masochism as a symptomatic expression of all patients regardless of their sexuality.  
Patients take pleasure in pain and for that reason they repeat their symptoms.   
The Freudian psychoanalytic interrelationship between femininity and 
masochism remains questionable to this day, especially when we come across 
Freud‘s developmental theory of female sexuality.  Freud‘s (1990e) postulation that 
the essence of femininity is to have ―a preference for passive behavior and passive 
aims‖ connects with his theory of the libido. For Freud (1990a), although men and 
women are bisexual (active and passive in nature),46 their libido is ―of a masculine 
nature.‖  The clitoris, the leading erotogenic zone in female children, ―is homologous 
to the masculine zone of the glans penis‖ (p. 136).  The clitoris is a penis-equivalent.  
When the little girl derives masturbatory pleasure from her clitoris, she is like a little 
man.  Freud defines the libido as masculine, because in a biological and sociological 
sense, it is associated with activity, aggressiveness, intensity, and muscular power.   
When the little girl realizes that her mother possesses neither the penis nor 
the masculine character-traits that are associated with the possession of penis, i.e., 
privilege and power, she reaches the conclusion that her mother is castrated.  She 
understands that neither she nor her mother has the phallus but, instead, her father 
has it.  In order for the little girl ―to pass from her masculine phase to the feminine 
one,‖ she has to accomplish a double task: the switch of erotogenic zone—from the 
clitoris to the vagina—and the change of love-object—from the mother to the father 
(1990e, pp. 347-8).  In other words, the little girl has to drop her initial love that 
was directed toward her phallic mother and has to renounce the pleasure associated 
with her mother from stimulation of the clitoris.  In order for the little girl to desire 
                                                          
46 Freud (1990a) argues that pure masculinity and pure femininity cannot be found in the psycho-
physiological sense. 
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the paternal phallus she needs to recognize both that she is castrated (she does not 
have the male genital) and that her mother had deprived her of a penis.  Her shift to 
femininity is a shift from an active and virile phase to a passive phase.  The little girl 
acknowledges her own lack and expects to get the phallus from her father.  As Freud 
(1990e) writes, ―The turning-away from her mother is an extremely important step 
in the course of a little girl‘s development …. [T]here is to be observed a marked 
lowering of the active sexual impulses and a rise of the passive ones‖ (p. 336).  With 
this statement, we are left to assume that the feminine subject is predominantly 
passive and tolerates the dominance of the masculine in masochistic ways.   
On the issue of activity-passivity, however, there are also other 
psychoanalytic interpretations that underscore the idea that femininity is associated 
only with passivity.  In collaboration with Freud, Brunswick (1990)47 wrote an article 
called, ―The Preoedipal Phase of the Libido Development,‖ which seems to more 
clearly describe Freud‘s theory of psychosexual development in relation to the 
activity-passivity binary.  In that article, Brunswick informs us that Freud retracted 
―the statement that the Oedipus complex contains the nucleus of the neuroses‖ (p. 
43).  It seems to me that the reason why Freud changed his mind (about his 
previous assertion that the Oedipal predominates over the preoedipal in the 
etiological explanations of neuroses) was because Freud was not clear how the 
conversion of activity into passivity, and vice versa, in the Oedipal and preoedipal 
phases works, especially during the 1920‘s.   
Brunswick explains that certain developmental strivings are passive whereas 
other strivings are active and therefore there is not a clear distinction between 
activity and passivity at any given stage of development.  Brunswick states that, in 
normal development, as the child gets older, his/her active strivings increase in 
number and intensity.  This, however, does not mean that all passive strivings are 
                                                          
47 Brunswick began to write this article in 1930 in collaboration with Freud. 
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converted to active ones.  The child identifies with the mother‘s activity gradually.  
For example, the child learns to role play his/her mother‘s activity toward other 
children, toys, and animals.  Unlike Freud‘s early theory that the child‘s libido in the 
preoedipal phase is active, Brunswick asserts that the infant is primarily passive and 
that activity gradually takes precedence over passivity gradually.  Brunswick also 
states that every time the child successfully identifies with the mother‘s activity, the 
child finds its mother less necessary.  The active child, regardless of its biological 
sex, begins to increasingly resent its mother‘s demands and prohibitions.  The child‘s 
resentment and aggression towards the mother are by-products of protecting its own 
activity.   
Following Freud (1990d, 1990e) and Brunswick (1990), there is no neat 
parallelism between male and female sexual development.48  Both theorists argue 
that sexual development in girls is more complex than in boys.  The main reason for 
this complexity is that when a girl realizes that her mother is castrated, she feels 
doomed and that she will ever acquire a penis.  Both theorists assert that the girl‘s 
identification with the mother‘s castration positions the girl in a passive relation to 
her father, since the girl passively expects passively the phallus from her father.   
However, the distinctions between activity and passivity are unclear.  As we 
have already learned from Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, the patient‘s fixation 
on her phallic maternal substitute (her sister) and her failure to achieve the Oedipal 
position situated her as passive in relation to her omnipotent sister.  Therefore, in 
―normal‖ development, the girl‘s shift from her mother to her father as love-object 
also implies that the girl resents her mother‘s overpowering activity in relation to 
her, since the mother is the primary caregiver.  She seeks to actively differentiate 
                                                          
48 To demonstrate the significance of the Oedipus complex that has for the girls more than for the boys, 
Freud (1990d) rejected Jung‘s term, Electra complex.  Freud stated that Jung‘s terminology implies that 
the girl‘s position is analogous to the boy‘s position in relation to the parents.  Freud did not see why the 
term Oedipal in girls should change to Electra; instead, he wanted to emphasize that there is a qualitative 
difference of the Oedipal complex between the sexes and that the phallus is predominant in both sexes 
and in both phases, preoedipal and Oedipal (Freud, 1990d, p. 326; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 152). 
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herself from her mother.  Therefore, the girl‘s passive expectation of the phallus 
from her father requires an active differentiation from her mother. 
In my reading of Freud (1990e), the girl‘s active differentiation from her 
omnipotent preoedipal mother does not necessarily mean that the girl hates or 
reproaches her mother.  Instead, in order for a girl to differentiate from the mother 
and substitute activity for passivity, she has to identify with the active mother.  In 
other words, from a Freudian perspective, when the girl accepts that she lacks the 
penis and realizes that her mother is not the one who can give it to her, the girl 
plays the part of her mother, becomes feminine, identifies with her mother‘s 
activities in order herself to become an active mother and an active individual inside 
and outside the context of the family.49 
On the contrary, Freud (1990e) states that if the little girl regards her 
castration as a misfortune, to the point that she becomes envious because she does 
not have a penis, she becomes entirely dissatisfied with her sexuality and becomes 
contemptuous and hostile towards her mother.  Envy for the penis leads her to a 
struggle about her sexuality as well as to passive dynamic relationships with men 
and women, which is characteristic of the clinical structure of hysteria.  In Freud‘s 
mind, ego identification with either parent always comes down ―in the end to a 
refusal of castration‖ (Hamon, 2000, p. 109). A woman‘s recognition of her 
castration makes the father into a love object, because he has the phallus, but also 
makes the castrated mother into a love object, because she is loved by the father. 
To look at the issues of activity-passivity more closely, we may briefly turn to 
Freud‘s theory of masochism.  Freud (1990f) explains that sexual excitations and 
aggression are turned inward after the individual has suffered painful experiences, 
                                                          
49 Freud (1990e) writes, ―[Playing with dolls] served as an identification with her mother with the intention 
of substituting activity for passivity‖ (p. 356).  ―Women can display great activity in various directions, 
men are not able to live in company with their own kind unless they develop a large amount of passive 
adaptability …. I shall conclude that you have decided in your own minds to make ‗active‘ coincide with 
‗masculine‘ and ‗passive‘ with ‗feminine‘‖ (p. 344-345). 
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and these experiences are reflected in the fantasies at each developmental stage.  
Freud states that, in ―erotogenic masochism,‖ ―the libido meets the instinct of death‖ 
and a portion of the death instinct remains inside the individual (Freud, 1990f, p. 
287).  Erotogenic masochism is present in all of the developmental phases for both 
sexes: the oral stage, as manifested in the ―fear of being eaten up by the totem-
animal (father)‖; the sadistic-anal stage, as manifested in the ―wish to be beaten by 
the father‖; the phallic stage, as shown by fantasies of castration; and the genital 
phase, as shown by fantasies of ―being copulated with and of giving birth, which are 
characteristic of femaleness‖ (p. 288).  We should note here that Freud mentions 
only the father as the cause of these masochistic fantasies.  We may infer that Freud 
considers the differentiation of the child from its primary caregiver (mother) to be 
traumatic and the mediator (the father, who has the phallus) between the child and 
the mother to be a castrator.  We may also infer that the child‘s love for the father 
during the Oedipal phase is ambivalent.  
For Freud, the differentiation between the mother and the child occurs only 
when the child experiences its mother as defective, as lacking the phallus, and its 
father as a threat and as more privileged than its mother.  Although activity and 
passivity are not as clear as one may think—since for Freud, both sexes have a 
combination of active and passive qualities—we are often left to conclude that in 
order for a girl to become feminine, she has to acknowledge her castration, the 
superiority of the male, and her sexual drive as having passive aims.  She has to 
acknowledge that her vagina is to be penetrated by the male organ.  With Freud, one 
may infer that a woman‘s passive pursuit of sexual pleasure situates her as having 
low self-esteem and difficulty separating from the maternal.  A woman is someone 
who endures pain in the service of others and gives preference to passive aims 
(Freud, 1990e, p. 345). 
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According to Freud, it is crucial to clarify, however, that the essence of 
femininity is not masochistic.  Freud (1990f) refers to feminine masochism to 
describe men‘s regression to infantile behaviors, dependency on the mother, and 
helplessness.  In her reflections on Freud, Soler (2006) points out that a masochist‘s 
regressive behaviors are not the same as a woman‘s relationship with a man.  The 
masochist‘s desire to suffer and make himself into a piece of trash is not the same as 
a woman‘s desire to impress a man and make herself loveable to him.  For Freud, 
the true masochist, who has a need for punishment and a need for pain in order to 
feel erotic excitation is associated with the death instinct (the return of the living 
being to the inorganic state). 
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